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EPIGRAPH 
 
 
Consciousness, Hermes reveals, is a great subject and very holy, no less 
than an account of divinity itself. 
    The Latin Asclepius 
 
Understanding our selves—our natures, capacities, and possibilities—is 
the hardest thing in the world and yet endlessly fascinating because it 
cannot be finally settled by empirical research. There are no facts to 
decide, once and for all, whether the mind is part of the body, or whether it 
is a spiritual substance, or an epiphenomenon of the brain. We still do not 
know, in a scientific sense, what consciousness is. 
    A. A. Long, Greek Models of Mind and Self 
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In City of God, Augustine entertains “personal divinity”—the idea that a person could 
become an immortal god. Recent scholarship has focused on the social function of such 
beliefs. The divine status of public figures such as emperors and martyrs has become a 
trope widely understood in its social and institutional dimensions. I add to this 
sociological understanding by inquiring into individual experience. How did a late 
antique person become divine? How did she understand divinity and the limits of the 
self? In City of God, Augustine assembles an archive that includes references to works by 
Platonists Apuleius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, as well as Hermes Trismegistus (the 
eponymous mystagogue portrayed in the Corpus Hermeticum). With ancient and modern 
theories about reading and the imagination in mind—from Quintilian to Cognitive 
Poetics—this dissertation interrogates the way reading (or hearing) texts about personal 
divinity function as implicit “spiritual exercises” or imaginative technologies of self-
transformation. My dissertation shows how the power of mental representations—
		 x	
imagined images of self and world that reside within the mind—affect experience and 
construct “reality.”  
 Considering the role of imaginative reading and its transformative effects adds a 
layer of complexity to how historians of religion and religious studies scholars interpret 
texts about personal divinity, yielding greater compassion for how ancient peoples may 
have understood themselves on their own terms. Furthermore, the heightened self-
reflexivity that results from imaginative engagements with discourses on personal 
divinity is part of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans that Otto ascribes to the divine 
“Wholly Other.” The awe we experience at a thunder and lightning storm, for example, is 
as much the awe of being able to feel or perceive the storm. The texts I interpret 
explicitly provoke such awe. My research invites the modern reader into a numinous 
world where human consciousness itself becomes “divine” through a complex process of 
self-sacralization. Finally, this dissertation suggests that the writing of history informed 
by a reflexive philosophy of history functions much like the “spiritual exercises” that 
constitute my source texts. Writing history is a transformative practice that leads to self-
knowledge in the present. 	
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CAVEAT LECTOR 
 History dissertations do not usually come with caveats. But, this is not a 
commonsense dissertation about “commonsense history.”1 Allow me to explain. This is a 
dissertation about imaginary beings. That is, I shall be discussing things that are invisible. 
This makes them no less real but they require imagination in order to “see” them. Things 
like souls, gods, and people in the past. Thoughts and ideas, like gods, souls, and people 
in the past, are invisible. And, they are no less real. You can “see” them in your mind. 
They can (invisibly) occur to you. And, you can acquire new thoughts and ideas by 
listening to or, in this case, reading them. Gods, souls, and people in the past will take 
form as you read my words and the words of the thinkers—ancient and modern—that I 
shall present to you in this work. If there were a god of the imagination, I would invoke 
him or her now.  Perhaps it is Hermes. 
 Hermes was the guide of souls and messenger of the gods.2  He traveled between 
visible and invisible worlds. Indeed, he made the invisible, visible—bringing “existence 
out of the nonexistent,” knowing “the things hidden beneath heaven and earth.”3 All the 
writers examined in this dissertation, including Augustine, are trying much as I am to 
figure out what divinity is and its relationship to humanity. All of these ancient thinkers 
were working out questions and problems dealing with what it means to be a conscious 
creature. For them, Hermes stood as guide to explore these questions that concern the 
boundary between the visible world of embodiment and the invisible worlds of thought 																																																								
1 See section below on R.G. Collingwood in “Historical Practice” for an explanation of 
“common sense” history. 
 
2 See Antoine Faivre, The Eternal Hermes: From Greek God to Alchemical Magus, trans. 
Joscelyn Godwin (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1995). 
 3	PGM	8.1	–	52.	This	Papyri	Graecae	Magicae	spell	is	addressed	to	Thoth	who	in	late	antiquity	was	the	Egyptian	Hermes.	
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and idea that humans hold within them and give shape to through the stories they tell 
about them.  This is not just a metaphor.4 Augustine spills a good deal of ink on Hermes 
Trismegistus and the writings attributed to him. And it is no coincidence that Apuleius 
went to great pains in court to counter charges of practicing magia in part because he had 
in his possession a small black wooden statue of Hermes, remarkably common as such 
objects were.5 Iamblichus refers to the “books of Hermes” and the “way of Hermes” in 
his writings.6 Eunapius tells us that Porphyry was “in the chain of Hermes.”7 The words 
of the Hermetic corpus often seem to echo in Plotinus.8 
 Hermes (it should be noted) also gives his name to the act of interpretation, 
hermeneutics, and to subjects that are “hermetic,” meaning they are difficult to 
																																																								4	Suggesting historians consider adopting an “unexpected” voice and style in the writing 
of history, Catherine Chin writes eloquently about the use of metaphor, short sentences, 
and “unrealities”: “As historians, we are sometimes afraid of unrealities, of whatever 
does not propose a close relationship between our worlds and the past events we are 
describing. Yet marking distance between words and events is what, paradoxically, 
brings the events more clearly to mind… Awareness of the imaginative work that writing 
does for us, in our own time, and in our own bodies, allows us to reconsider the 
constitutive nature of somatically-engaged fantasy for our own task of historical world-
building. We write history for ourselves… If we were to accept the somatic, and 
aesthetic, qualities of historical production with the same level of seriousness that we 
grant to argumentative prose, we might use these qualities to create late antiquities that 
are themselves newly compelling.” “Pro nobis fabula narrator: Late Antiquity as Art and 
Fantasy,” Marginalia Review of Books, 16 September, 2015: 
http://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/late-antiquity-and-the-new-humanities-an-open-
forum/ 	
5 See Apuleius, Apologia 63.    
 
6 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 8.1, 8.4, 8.5. 
 
7 Eunapius, Vita Sophistarum 457. 
 
8 Cf. CH 16.7 with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.17.28-38; CH 11.20 with Plotinus, Ennead 5.12. 
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understand, obscure, veiled.9 He tells us, as in my first epigraph, that divinity is a great 
topic. In fact, it is so expansively great in scope that upon closer examination we find that 
no one knows quite exactly what it is. (A.A. Long says the same for “consciousness” in 
the second epigraph). We take it for granted that we know what it is to the extent that we 
exist within a worldview that has already defined it for us. If we are people of 
“Abrahamic-descended” traditions of belief, we will think in terms of “God”; if we are 
Graeco-Roman philosophers, that concept takes quite a few other shapes; if we are 
scientists in the modern sense, still another. The topic of divinity, itself, is “sacred,” “set 
apart” from the Latin, sacer (an issue I will address at length in chapter 2). 
 Hermes was also the patron of travelers. The unusual structure of this dissertation 
may require some orientation. An introduction will provide you with important 
preliminary discussions of problems, methods, and terms. But, in order to discover what 
is at the center of this dissertation, we will have to walk around, as it were. Readers will 
enter the discussion from a number of different approaches—“Ways of Hermes”—each 
intended to provide a complementary entryway into a difficult and confusing topic: 
Divinity. You will know that you have reached the “center,” when you stumble upon the 
words of the Muse in a “Poetic Postlude” which more or less encapsulates the spirit of the 
work. For a more detailed map, I refer you to the dissertation outline (“Ways of Hermes”) 
below.  
 Hermes was also a trickster and a thief. I suggest that there are three ways to 
engage with this project: 1) To view it as an intellectual history—a  history of ideas and 
																																																								
9 Plato, Cratylus 408A: “Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὁ Ἑρμῆς, καὶ τὸ 
ἑρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον 408καὶ τὸ κλοπικόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ τὸ 
ἀγοραστικόν, περὶ λόγου” (I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, 
and signifies that he is the interpreter, or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that 
sort of thing has a great deal to do with language. English trans. Jowett). 
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of mentalities—concerning reading, imagination, and personal divinity; 2) As a way to 
enter a thought-world of people in the past and attempt to see through their eyes; 3) To 
use it as a measure of your own thinking about such topics as divinity and the self—
indeed, about the “past”—and as a means of understanding your own invisible world of 
thought. If my extensive use of supporting secondary sources appears to obscure what is 
my contribution to scholarship, know that my argument is not stolen but rather you have 
been tricked. Like a good Late Antique mosaic, no one piece alone stands for the vision 
that appears before you.  
 It was a custom of the ancients to place a garland on the herm stone by the road as 
they set out upon a difficult journey or passed a boundary into unknown territory.10 Let 
this caveat be so. You, dear reader, as Hermes assured us in the epigraph above, are about 
to enter an account of consciousness. Historical? Yes. But very much alive in the present 
where the past is accounted for.  
Mark Roblee 
Plum Island, MA 
March 15, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
10 Hermae (ἑρμαῖ) are “statues composed of a head, usually that of the god Hermes, 
placed on a quadrangular pillar, the height of which corresponds to the stature of the 
human body (ἡ τετράγωνος ἐργασία, Thuc. 6.27; τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τετράγωνον, Paus. 4.33.4). 
… One of the most important features in the mythology of Hermes is his presiding over 
the common intercourse of life, traffic, journeys, roads, boundaries, and so forth, and 
there can be no doubt that it was chiefly in such relations as these that he was intended to 
be represented by the Hermae of the Greeks and by the Termini of the Romans, when the 
latter were identified with the Hermae. It is therefore natural that we should look for the 
existence of this symbol in the very earliest times in which the use of boundary-marks 
was required; and in such times the symbols would be of the simplest character, a heap of 
stones or an unhewn block of marble.” In William Smith, William Wayte, and G. E. 
Marindin, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (London: J. Murray, 1890-91).  
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A NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS 
 
 As a courtesy to general readers, Latin and ancient Greek authors, titles, and 
translations are in English in the main body of the text. Please note the following 
exceptions: Corpus Hermeticum (for work attributed to Hermes Trismegistus), Papyri 
Graecae Magicae (for the collection of Egyptian spells known in English as The Magical 
Greek Papyri) and Metamorphoses (the original title of Apuleius’ The Golden Ass). 
Ancient authors and original titles are given in full in Latin or ancient Greek 
transliteration in parentheses. Quoted passage numbers will appear parenthetically 
without author and title after the first mention in an extended, exclusive discussion. The 
original language is given in the notes accompanied by English translations if not 
supplied in the main text. The English translator is cited in the notes. See “Primary 
Sources” in the bibliography for full citation information including modern scholarly 
edition. My own translations are specified in the notes and my emendations appear in 
brackets in the text where and when they occur. In some cases, I have given slightly more 
of the original in the notes for clarity, context, and interest. On occasion, the original 
Latin and ancient Greek are not supplied in notes when glossed parenthetically in the text 
in sufficient part. Some references to Latin or ancient Greek passages are given in the 
notes with citation only when not quoted in text or immediately relevant to the 
discussion. Important words and phrases occur in the text in Latin, transliterated ancient 
Greek (without accents or other diacritical marks), Middle Egyptian, Arabic, or Hebrew 
as the case may be. Original Syriac, Coptic, and Middle Egyptian are given in English 
translation only. Some Middle Egyptian words are displayed using standard specialized 
transliteration fonts. One Arabic translation in English is accompanied by Arabic 
transliteration without the original in the notes, one Hebrew title appears in transliteration 
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in the notes. I have chosen not to use author and title abbreviations in the notes with the 
following exceptions: Corpus Hermeticum = CH; Papyri Graecae Magicae = PGM; 
“Mithras Liturgy” = ML. Abbreviations for Christian sources in the bibliography are 
listed there.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Historical Practice 
 
“What historians do worst…is reflect on epistemology.”  
 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream1 
 
 A word at the outset about my influences and historical practice should help the 
reader navigate the following case studies with an open mind. My focus in this 
dissertation is concerned with ideas and mentalities. This is an intellectual history about 
reading, imagination, and personal divinity in late antiquity. The choice to focus on ideas 
and the individual reader’s reception does not constitute an objection to social history but 
rather it serves as an aid to understanding the social more fully. Indeed, intellectual 
history is a part of social history. That is, intellectual life happens in a social context. 
Broadly speaking, intellectual history is “the study of intellectuals, ideas, and intellectual 
patterns over time.”2 I would like to think that I am doing the work of the intellectual 
historian here; but, I seek to do more than document the change of ideas and concerns of 
people in the past over time, even to do more than explore the context in which these 
                                               
1 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American 
Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 15. Quoted in 
Elizabeth A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 77. Mark Salber Phillips gives an 
example of a lack of reflection on historical distance: “The very ubiquity of distance, 
however, has tended to render it invisible, and over time certain canonized ideas about 
the proper forms of distance have become so much a feature of our historiographical 
tradition that we are hardly aware of their influence.” “Distance and Historical 
Representation,” History Workshop Journal no. 57 (2004): 125. Thanks to Marla Miller 
for recommending this source. 
 
2 Peter E. Gordon, “What is Intellectual History? A frankly partisan introduction to a 
frequently misunderstood field,” (Harvard University, Cambridge MA: 2012): 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/pgordon. Used with permission. 
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ideas presented themselves and were discussed. My interest lies in understanding as 
much as explanation.3 According to Peter E. Gordon, the intellectual historian’s interest  
in “reconstructive understanding as against strict evaluation…has at least two notable 
consequences for the practice of intellectual history”: “First, it enables intellectual 
historians to draw sometimes surprising and creative connections between different sorts 
of texts. Second, it allows them to think about intellectual ‘meaning’ in a rather capacious 
or open-ended fashion.”4  
 Robert Darnton claims that intellectual history cannot be considered a “whole”: 
“It has no governing problématique. Its practitioners share no sense of common subjects, 
methods, and conceptual strategies. At one extreme they analyze the systems of 
philosophers; at the other they examine the rituals of illiterates.”5 Darnton delineates four 
kinds of intellectual history practice: “the history of ideas (the study of systematic 
thought, usually in philosophical treatises), intellectual history proper (the study of 
informal thought, climates of opinion, and literary movements), the social history of ideas 
(the study of ideologies and idea diffusion), and cultural history (the study of culture in 
                                               
3 See discussion of Collingwood’s engagement with Dilthey and continental philosophy 
below and Karsten R. Stueber, “Understanding Versus Explanation? How to Think about 
the Distinction between the Human and the Natural Sciences,” Inquiry 55:1 (2012): 17-
32. Stueber provides a nice summary of the debate with nuanced commentary about 
whether the human and natural sciences are commensurable in subject and mode of study 
or not.  
 
4 Gordon, “What is Intellectual History?,” 2013. 
 
5 Robert Darnton, “Intellectual and Cultural History,” in The Past Before Us: 
Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, ed. Michael G. Kammen (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1980), 337. 
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the anthropological sense, including world views and collective mentalités).”6  In this 
dissertation, my emphasis is on the latter. 
 A.O. Lovejoy’s history of ideas, with its search for “unit-ideas” and “mind,” was 
an approach to intellectual history that rose sharply in the post-war era and seemed to 
crash just as suddenly with the advent of social history in the 1950s and 60s. In his 
reassessment of Lovejoy’s contribution to the more recent direction of intellectual 
history, Anthony Grafton notes how “for the last ten years…younger scholars, especially 
graduate students, had been scrambling over the gunwales of the good ship History of 
Ideas, abandoning the effort to converse abstractly with the mighty dead.”7 However, 
after a dazzling object lesson in the history of 20th century intellectual and cultural 
history, Grafton concludes that, after all:  
Lovejoy built extremely well—better, possibly, than he knew. The crossroads he 
laid out and paved remains a central and attractive meeting point for many 
disciplines. And the history of ideas—in the general sense of a study of texts, 
images, and theories that seeks to balance responsibility and precision in the 
formal treatment and analysis of its objects with an equally measured effort to 
connect them to a particular historical world—has proved resilient, even 
expansive, through multiple transformations of the disciplinary fields at whose 
borders it resides.8  
 
                                               
6 Darnton, “Intellectual and Cultural History,” 337. 
 
7 Anthony Grafton, “The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950 - 2000 and 
Beyond,” Journal of the History of Ideas. 3 (2006): 3. David Harlan writes about “recent 
developments in literary criticism and the philosophy of language make it possible for 
intellectual historians to return to an earlier understanding of their discipline: intellectual 
history as a conversation with the dead about things we value.” “Reply to David 
Hollinger,” American Historical Review 94 (1985): 625. Quoted in David Boucher, “In 
Defense of Collingwood: Perspectives from Philosophy and the History of Ideas,” in 
R.G. Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment: Studies in Folktale, Cultural 
Criticism, and Anthropology, eds. David Boucher, Wendy James, and Philip Smallwood 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), xcvii.  
 
8 Grafton, “The History of Ideas,” 30. 
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The flight from history of ideas (and intellectual history in general) to social history that 
Grafton describes was not the end of historians’ attempts to engage with ideas. Elizabeth 
Clark observes the swing of the pendulum in the other direction:  
By the late 1970s…a challenge to [social history’s] dominance began to emerge 
in the form of a new cultural history equipped with a theoretical apparatus whose 
concepts—“mentalité, episteme, paradigm, hermeneutics, semiotics, hegemony, 
deconstruction, and thick descriptions”—might well bewilder many social and 
economic historians. These theoretical currents, however, have not merely 
reinvigorated intellectual history, but have contributed to its “dizzying” success, 
as the writings of Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, Roger Chartier, and 
Dominick LaCapra (among others) testify. Intellectual history in this new mode 
provides a welcome home for late ancient Christian studies, as for premodern 
studies more generally.9 
 
 There are consequences to historical knowledge when we do not reflect on 
epistemology. Historians need to distinguish between “the reality of the past” which is 
“the historian’s object of study,” historiography, “which is the historian’s written 
discourse about this object,” and the philosophy of history, “which is the study of the 
possible relations obtaining between this object and this discourse.”10 In my research, I 
have hoped to avoid an approach to writing history that takes “epistemological positions 
without reflection or argument,” what Jerzy Topolski terms “spontaneous epistemological 
realism.”11 Expanding on my discussion of intellectual history, I will equally engage with 
the history of mentalities, microhistory, and the philosophy of the historian and 
archaeologist, R.G. Collingwood. 
                                               
9 Clark, History, Theory, Text, 106. 
 
10 Hayden White, Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 3.  
 
11 Jerzy Topolski, “Historians Look at Historical Truth,” in Epistemology and History, ed. 
Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 406. Quoted in Clark, History, 
Theory, Text, 17. Clark writes: “By spontaneous Topolski means that historians generally 
assume their epistemological positions without reflection or argument.” (205, n. 78).  
 
	 5	
 
Histoire des Mentalités  
 The history of mentalities was developed by the later Annalistes who were 
dissatisfied with the explanatory power of quantitative approaches to history of the 
previous generations. Jacques Le Goff describes the notion of “mentality” as a kind of 
“historical beyond”: “Its function, as a concept, is to satisfy the historian’s desire to ‘go 
further’, and it leads to a point of contact with the other human sciences.”12 History of 
mentalities turned to emotions or affect with a keen interest in the role of epistemology in 
the writing of history.13 A study of mentalities was intended to provide a meeting point 
for the tensions between “the individual and the collective, the long-term and the 
everyday, the unconscious and the intentional, the structural and the conjectural, the 
marginal and the general.”14 Le Goff complains that feudalism, for example, cannot be 
understood adequately by only looking at economic, political, and institutional structures 
in the past. Ideas, attitudes, and beliefs also had a role to play for elites and common 
people in the feudal period.15 The historian of mentalities must borrow understandings of 
human experience from the tool kits of the anthropologist, sociologist, and psychologist. 
Such historians are interested in the “mental worlds” of ordinary people as are the 
philosophers who interpret textual (and material) evidence with the understanding that 
“mental worlds” can be reconstructed even when not explicit. Le Goff describes it as a 
                                               12	Jacques Le Goff, “Mentalities: a History of Ambiguities” in Constructing the Past: 
Essays in Historical Methodology, eds. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Mason de 
Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge University Press 1985), 167. 	
13 Clark, History, Theory, Text, 69-70. 
 
14 Le Goff, “Mentalities,” 169.  
 
15 Le Goff, “Mentalities,” 167. 
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kind of “archaeopsychology.”16 This approach attempts to avoid the criticism of “floating 
ideas” leveled against history of ideas by analyzing mentalities with an eye to “where and 
by what means such mentalities were produced.”17  Whereas, Darnton, who regards the 
history of mentalities as a kind of cultural history, criticizes the overly broad strokes 
sometimes found in studies of mentalities: “They tend to load the term with notions of 
représentations collectives derived from Durkheim and the outillage mental that Lucien 
Febvre picked up from the psychology of his day.”18 In contrast, Le Goff suggests that 
the imprecision, ambiguity, or even vagueness that a history of mentalities sometimes 
presents, is, in fact, part of its usefulness. Jan Assmann sees the history of mentalities as a 
history of meaning that “discusses history as a cultural form in which the course of events 
forms the backdrop and the discourses generating and reflecting meaning occupy the 
front of the stage.”19 His focus is on “the fundamental attitudes generally referred to as 
‘mentality,’ attitudes that are implicit in texts, images, and the events of history without 
being explicitly expounded or commented upon.”20  Mentalities are not ordered structures 
that determine predictable expressions. They highlight the presence of inner worlds of 
historical actors and offer a view into the “inside” of events, (a term that we shall take up 
again during our discussion of Collingwood below.)  
  
                                               
16  Le Goff, “Mentalities,” 169. 
 
17 Le Goff, “Mentalities,” 174. 
 
18 Darnton, “Intellectual and Cultural History,” 346. See also Lucien Febvre, Le 
Problème de l'incroyance au XVIe siècle, la religion de Rabelais (Paris: A. Michel, 
1968). 
 
19 Jan Assmann, The Mind of Egypt: History and Meaning in the Time of the Pharaohs, 
trans. Andrew Jenkins (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), viii-ix. 
 
20 Assmann, Mind of Egypt, viii. 
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Microhistory  
Like Histoire des Mentalités, microhistory evolved out of the dissatisfaction of 
the third generation of Annalistes with “what they deemed a mechanistic or deterministic 
form of history-writing that emphasized statistics, generalizations, [and] quantitative 
formulation.”21 Microhistory ostensibly looks to particular events, communities, or 
individuals in order to suggest larger scale social and cultural trends. Bridging the 
concerns of intellectual, cultural, and social historians, microhistorians strive to capture 
“lived experience” from the “bottom up” in an attempt to present an inclusive social 
history. Notable practitioners include Natalie Zemon Davis, Robert Darnton, Laurel 
Thatcher Ulrich, and Carlo Ginzburg.22 Coming out of the intellectual climate of the 
1970’s in Bologna, like history of mentalities, microhistory was a response to the Annales 
School with its focus on the longue durée and quantitative social science. Microhistory 
“returns to interpreting utterance and beliefs, to describing brief dramatic events, and to 
envisioning a past characterized more by abrupt changes than by deep structural 
continuities.”23 The broader historiographical trend of microhistory which, according to 
John Brewer, it is a part, “emanates from two major debates within the social sciences 
and politics. One is concerned with the nature of everyday life under modern capitalism, 
the other with the vexed issue of the relations between free will and determinism – the 
                                               
21 Clark, History, Theory, Text, 75. 
 
22 Natalie Zemon Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983); Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in 
French Cultural History (New York : Basic Books, 1984); Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A 
Midwife's Tale : The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on her Diary, 1785-1812 (New York: 
Knopf, 1990); Carlo Ginzburg,  The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-
century Miller (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
 
23 Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero, Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe 
(Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), vvi. 
 
	 8	
question of the efficacy of human agency.”24 Toggling perspectives of scale, 
microhistorians examine the relationship between social structure and agency, between 
the culture of the elites and the culture of the masses in order to discover the conditions 
under which agency seems to exert itself. Agency is excluded in any discussion of 
microhistorians purely revolving around structural constraints within society. By contrast, 
social microhistorians such as Giovanni Levi see all social interaction as “the result of an 
individual’s constant negotiation, manipulation, choices and decisions in the face of a 
normative reality which, though pervasive, nevertheless offers many possibilities for 
personal interpretations and freedoms.”25 The ideology of self-sacralization explored in 
this study certainly qualifies as a manipulation of normative reality with freedom in (and 
of) mind. Microhistory challenges a reductionist and determinist view of history. 
However, microhistorical theory and its methods invite a number of criticisms. 
Perhaps the most obvious one is in regard to selectivity and significance: “By what 
criteria are names to be picked out and how representative of broader social trends and 
collective mentalities are the subjects’ activities and thoughts? What can the few tell 
about the many, especially when the process of selection is neither random nor 
statistically rigorous? And how can historians concerned with trifles avoid producing 
trivial history?”26 Still, even if the sample individual, group, or event are isolated and 
idiosyncratic, we can learn something about the relationship between the margin and the 
center, the deviant and the norm, and the power relationship between actors in a society.  
                                               
24 John Brewer, "Microhistory and the Histories of Everyday Life," Cultural And Social 
History 1 (2010): 91. 
 
25 Brewer, “Microhistory and the Histories of Everyday Life,” 96. 
 
26 Muir and Ruggiero, Microhistory, xiv. 
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Collingwood 
 British philosopher, historian, and archaeologist, Robin George Collingwood 
(1889-1943) seems to have anticipated many of the concerns of contemporary intellectual 
historians, especially the historians of mentalities. He is favorably known for his 
articulation of historical imagination, what he termed “a priori imagination,” and his 
keen observation of the role of historians’ “present situatedness” in their inquiry.27 Less 
favorably received, however, are his ideas about the intellectual foundation of history 
(“All history is the history of thought”), the persistence of the past in the present, the 
necessity of “re-enacting” the thoughts of people in the past, and his anti-positivism. All 
of these ideas, whether championed or criticized, have influenced the way I am writing 
history.  
 Collingwood equates inference with “a priori imagination,” a tool that allows the 
historian to fill in gaps between what the evidence provides. He gives the example of 
Caesar crossing the Rubicon: “I described constructive history as interpolating, between 
the statements borrowed from our authorities, other statements implied by them. Thus our 
authorities tell us that on one day Caesar was in Rome and on a later day in Gaul; they 
tell us nothing about his journey from one place to the other, but we interpolate this with 
a perfectly good conscience.”28 Constructive historical imagination, Collingwood is 
careful to point out, must be grounded in evidence, a specific time and place, and must be 
consistent with the known facts surrounding it.  
                                               
27 Clark, History, Theory, Text, 108. 
 
28 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, ed. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1946), 240. 
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 On the “present situatedness” of the historian, Collingwood suggests that 
historical interpretations depend not only on evidence available at the time of 
interpretation but also on the “attitude of mind from which the historian approaches it”: 
“In the person of the historian, the mind of his age ‘measures itself against’ the past, and 
shows what its own interests are, its own views and ideals of life, by the way in which it 
interprets that past.” 29  This “present situatedness” penetrates as well into the mind of the 
historian who must come “to grips with his own personality, by reconstructing the past in 
ways determined by the forces at work in that personality.”30  Thus, “[t]he individuality 
of a man or an age, which determines the way in which the individual conceives itself 
and the world and determines its practical attitude to life, determines also the individual’s 
attitude to the past.”31  
 The notion that historiography reflects present society has become commonplace. 
For example, in his review of Alan Cameron’s The Last Pagans of Rome, Peter Brown 
puts in this light the older narrative of the altar of victory controversy:  
It is not for nothing that the scenario of a desperate last stand of paganism was 
propounded with especial fervor in the years that immediately followed the end of 
World War II. Such an account echoed the fears of a postwar world. For scholars 
in Europe and America who had recently emerged from thirty years of violence 
and ideological intolerance, only to confront the new, spreading shadow of the 
                                               
29 R. G. Collingwood, "Book Review: Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst 
Cassirer," The English Historical Review 52 (1937): 144. Oddly, Joan Wallach Scott 
criticizes Collingwood for a failure not his own: "The question of where the historian is 
situated – who he is, how he is defined in relation to others, what the political effects of 
his history may be – ever enters the discussion." "The Evidence of Experience." Critical 
Inquiry 17, no. 4 (1991): 783. 
 
30 Collingwood, “Cassirer,” 144. 
 
31 Collingwood, “Cassirer,” 144. 
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cold war, the conflict between a liberal paganism and an intolerant Christianity 
seemed like a foreshadowing of the nightmares of their own times.32 
 
Constructive imagination is also necessary for historians because, unlike those 
“scientists” who study natural phenomena, historians study events that are not 
perceptible. Yet, Collingwood points out, the evidence of the past is indirect:  
The historian cannot answer questions about the past unless he has evidence about 
it. His evidence, if he ‘has’ it, must be something existing here and now in the 
present world. If there were a past event which had left no trace of any kind in the 
present world, it would be a past event for which now there was no evidence, and 
nobody—no historian; I say nothing of other, perhaps more highly gifted 
persons—could know anything about it.33  
 
To illustrate how the past is not dead but still living in the present, he gives the example 
of Latin. If the reading of Latin had not survived the Middle Ages, no historian would be 
able to write medieval history: “The past simply as past is wholly unknowable…it is the 
past as residually preserved in the present that is alone knowable.”34 He offers a more 
abstract model explaining that history is more about process than event:  
[Processes] are things which do not begin and end but turn into one another; and 
that if a process P1 turns into a process P2, there is no dividing line at which P1 
stops and P2 begins; P1 never stops, it goes on in the changed form P2, and P2 
never begins, it has previously been going on in the earlier form P1. There are in 
history no beginnings and no endings. History books begin and end, but the 
events they describe do not. If P1 has left traces of itself in P2 so that an historian 
living in P2 can discover by interpretation of evidence that what is now P2 was 
once P1, it follows that the ‘traces’ of P1 in the present are not, so to speak, the 
corpse of a dead P1 but rather the real P1 itself, living and active though 
incapsulated within the other form of itself P2. And P2 is not opaque, it is 
transparent, so that P1 shines through it and their colours combine into one.35 
                                               
32 Peter Brown, “Paganism: What we owe the Christians,” The New York Review of 
Books, April 7th (2011): 68. 
 
33 R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 96. 
 
34 R. G. Collingwood, “The Limits of Historical Knowledge,” The Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 3 (1928): 220. 
 
35 Collingwood, Autobiography, 97-98. 
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If all history is the history of thought, as Collingwood contends, then historical 
knowledge is “knowledge of what the mind has done in the past.”36 How then can the 
historian understand the thoughts of the past?37  
 To answer this question, Collingwood gives Plato as an example. To know what 
Plato thought, the historian of philosophy must think Plato’s thoughts for herself. 
Historical understanding is “re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind.”38 
This is another way that the past lives in the present. Historical knowledge exists in the 
present.39 The “re-doing” of past thought perpetuates past acts in the present: “To the 
historian, the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but 
                                               
36 Collingwood, Idea of History, 218. This position shows the great influence of Dilthey 
on Collingwood’s thought and Collingwood’s engagement with continental philosophy. 
See Wilhelm Dilthey, The formation of the historical world in the human sciences 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Elizabeth Clark, who reiterated Peter 
Novick’s point about historians and epistemology quoted in the opening to this section, 
sees all history as intellectual history. 
 
37 “Taken at face value the verstehen approach (internal understanding rather than 
objective observation) is asking rather a lot of the historian – to rethink and re-experience 
thoughts and actions in the past. Not only was it asking a lot, for historians like E.H. Carr 
it was as a step too far in the direction of an idealism (and continental philosophy) that 
jeopardised objectivity. How can the historian be self-conscious and historicist?” Alun 
Munslow, The Routledge Companion to Historical Studies (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 48. 
 
38 Collingwood, Idea of History, 215. 
 
39 Assmann provides another way to understood Collingwood’s point in terms of that 
may be more familiar to historians working after the linguistic turn: “History is seen here 
above all in terms of the way changes, crises, and new departures reflect shifts in existing 
structures of meaning. Their sequence may indeed by understood as a ‘development,’ but 
only as long as we resist seeing it simply as progress and decline—that is, as a one-way 
process heading straight for some ineluctable destination. If we discern coherence in this 
process, it is a coherence we owe to cultural memory and the way it contrives to take past 
meaning preserved in the written word and the pictorial images, reactivate it, and 
incorporate it into the semantic paradigms of the present.” Assmann, Mind, viii. 
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experiences to be lived through in his own man; they are objective, or known to him, only 
because they are also subjective, or activities of his own.”40 The historian must be 
“capable of entering into the minds of the person whose history he is studying.”41 Re-
enactment of thought is historical knowledge as opposed to what Benedetto Croce called 
“mere chronicle” or what Collingwood terms derisively, “scissors and paste” history.42 
 Collingwood’s philosophy of history (and mind) suggests an accessibility to 
ancient thought that is appealing to historians of mentalities: 
[Metaphysics is] no futile attempt at knowing what lies beyond the limits of 
experience, but is primarily at any given time an attempt to discover what the 
people of that time believe about the world’s general ‘nature,’ such beliefs being 
the presuppositions of all their ‘physics’, that is, their inquiries into its detail. 
Secondarily, it is the attempt to discover the corresponding presuppositions of 
other peoples and other times, and to follow the historical process by which one 
set of presuppositions has turned into another.43 
 
 Collingwood’s anti-positivism set him at odds with historians (and philosophers) 
who believed that a historical science, using the principles and methods of the natural 
sciences, could fulfill the Rankean dream of discovering “wie es eigentlich gewesen” 
(“what actually happened”). Collingwood finds the study of human beings (apart from 
their biology) to be incommensurable with the study of the natural world. He writes:   
                                               
40 Collingwood, Idea of History, 218. 
 
41 Collingwood, “Cassirer,” 144. One of Collingwood’s harshest critics, Hans-George 
Gadamer, qualifies this problematic position with his concept of Horizontverschmelzung 
(fusion of horizons) which, interestingly, draws from another Collingwoodian idea he 
finds more compelling, that of “present situatedness” discussed above. Briefly, 
Horizontverschmelzung occurs when the scholar interprets a text with awareness of his or 
her own limited perspective but is able to see beyond that perspective toward a “horizon” 
which fuses with the perspective of the text (or writer). See Hans-George Gadamer, Truth 
and Method (New York: Continuum, 1997), 302. 
 
42 Mark Salber Phillips, “Distance and Historical Representation” History Workshop 
Journal no. 57 (2004): 135. 
43 Collingwood, Autobiography, 66. 
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A positivistic view of history (by which I mean one that endeavors to assimilate 
its principles and methods to those of the natural sciences) should answer the 
question “how then is historical truth to be reached?” by saying “we must 
eliminate the subjective element, as a source of distortion, and arrive at an 
historical view of the facts from the point of view of a generalized 
consciousness”…But this, although it is the proper method in natural science, is 
impossible in history.44  
 
For Collingwood, the subjective element that the natural sciences sought to eliminate, 
was indeed, necessary for the production of historical knowledge.45 The constructive 
imagination and the historical (and psychological) context of the historian that flavor the 
questions, methods, and interpretations are tools for inquiry that are not to be discarded. 
The processes of nature are events, while the processes of history are composed of 
actions which have an “inner side” consisting of thought. Collingwood uses the 
metaphors “outer” and “inner” to represent the relationship between thought and its 
expression through action.46  
 Ultimately, the purpose of studying history is, for Collingwood, self-knowledge 
and knowledge of humanity. Thus, historical practice is a process of self-creation.47 But, 
it is an “open” project (unlike the “closed” history of the textbook practiced by “scissors 
and paste” historians): “[H]istorical knowledge has perpetually to be revised and re-
                                               
44 Collingwood, “Cassirer,” 144. 
 
45 Collingwood, “Cassirer,” 144. 
 
46 “Dilthey calls this ‘the turn towards reflection, the movement of understanding from 
the external to the internal’. Its essence is the tendency to make use of every outward 
expression to understand the mental state from which it arises. When we read about war 
or economic activity, our minds are filled with images, ‘but what moves us, above all, in 
these accounts is what is inaccessible to the senses and can only be experiences 
inwardly…For all that is valuable in life is contained in what can be experienced and the 
whole outer clamor of history revolves around it.’” Phillips, “Distance and Historical 
Representation,” 134.  Dilthey quote in Phillips from Wilhelm Dilthey and H.P. 
Rickman, Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 172. 
 
47 Collingwood. “Cassirer,” 146. 
 
	 15	
created by new generations and new students, and can never be transferred from one 
mind, ready-made, to another.”48 
 In addition to their nominal focus on “intellect” and the “mental,” intellectual 
historians and cultural historians of mentalities were also interested in affect, emotions, 
sensibilities, manners, and taste long before the recent upsurge in history of emotion 
projects across the globe.49 The humanities project of studying the widest range of human 
thought, experience, and creativity takes us far out of the realm of the political, economic, 
and institutional “facts” as Collingwood’s “scissors and paste” historians would 
understand them. Averil Cameron reflects on new directions for historians of late 
antiquity which owe something to epistemologically sensitive historians such as 
Collingwood and intellectual and cultural historians of the “linguistic turn”:  
The recognition that history is only partly about ‘the facts,’ and very much about 
how we see the past, what we can learn from the past, and how the past is shown 
to us by its survivals, can be a liberating force. It frees us to use our own 
imaginations and to inquire into the imagination and the memory of our subjects. 
It presents us with emotion, imagination, and memory as possible and proper 
subjects of our inquiries. It opens up the history of late antiquity so that it can 
become a vast field of experimentation. Above all, it liberates our own 
understanding and speaks to our creative strengths.50 
 
A recent study on imagination in late antiquity and the Middle Ages by Giselle de Nie 
explores the position of philosopher Gaston Bachelard that “imagination reveals our 
                                               
48 Collingwood. “Cassirer,” 144. 
 
49 See Max Planck Institute: https://www.history-of-emotions.mpg.de/en 
 
50 “History and the individuality of the historian: the interpretation of late antiquity,” in 
The Past Before Us: The Challenge of Historiographies of Late Antiquity [Conference at 
Smith College in 1999], ed. Carole Ellen Straw and Richard Lim (Turnhout: Brepols 
Publishing, 2004), 76-77. 
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experienced reality.”51 De Nie stresses the utility and necessity of a history of emotions 
that includes imagination: “[I]dentifying the dynamic affective patterns…implicit in 
particular texts and images can uncover up to now unnoticed, important dimensions of 
experience and meaning.”52 Indeed, imagination, understood as a cognitive process in 
human consciousness and a key component in the activity of reading—perhaps, a 
thinking process as much as a feeling process—plays a central role in this dissertation. 
 
Humanities  
What are the humanities? The humanities comprise those fields of knowledge and 
learning concerned with human thought, experience, and creativity... 
encompass[ing] all areas of research and learning that ask fundamental questions 
about the way individuals and societies live, think, interact, and express 
themselves… but [whose] subject matter concerns those aspects of the human 
condition that are not necessarily quantifiable or open to experiment.53  
 
 As an intellectual history about reading, imagination, and personal divinity in late 
antiquity, this dissertation is a humanities project. The central question is: how did a late 
antique person become divine? This question assumes that at least some late antique 
people thought they could become divine and that those people had something substantial 
in mind when they used the term “divine.” While this dissertation analyzes and interprets 
texts written by people in the past about their thought, experience, and creativity relating 
to “becoming divine,” it makes no claim to quantify “personal divinity” (or any human 
                                               
51 Gaston Bachelard, L’air et les songes. Essai sur l’imagination due movement (Paris: 
Joseph Corti, 1943), 10-13, 120. 
 
52 Giselle de Nie and Thomas F. X. Noble, Envisioning Experience in Late Antiquity and 
the Middle Ages: Dynamic Patterns in Texts and Images (Farnham, Surrey, England: 
Ashgate, 2012), 2. 
53 American Council of Learned Societies. “What are the humanities?,” 
http://www.acls.org/about/faq/#humanities (accessed March 15, 2017).  
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experience for that matter).54 As for opening up the prospect of “becoming divine” to 
experimentation, well, I will leave that—as my writers did—to the reader’s 
discretion…and imagination.  
 
Personal Divinity 
My study asks fundamental questions about human thought, experience, and 
creativity from the point of view of the individual, in particular, a late antique “ideal 
reader” (or hearer) who imaginatively engaged with texts about personal divinity.55 This 
engagement was guided by paideia; that is, by an understanding of rhetoric and 
philosophy acquired through education (see chapter 1). The late antique people I am 
concerned with here were writers and readers of philosophy, particularly the work of 
Plato and his late antique commentators and works that appear to have been influenced 
by the notion that there is more to the world than what appears to the senses, that there is 
                                               
54 On quantification and scientific validation in intellectual history projects: “The 
acknowledged failings of history as a truth-establishing discipline are balanced by 
invoking the falsifiability principle, whereby historical interpretations are asserted as 
provisional propositions (hypotheses) to be falsified in the light of the evidence. When 
we judge we have reached a point of maximum falsifiability, we are left with a residue 
that is a description that we believe comes closest to the historical truth. The gap between 
fact and mind is then at its narrowest. The doubts concerning the possibility of historical 
truth derive ultimately, of course, from the pervasive condition of Nietzschean-inspired 
postmodern epistemological scepticism. Doubts exist not only concerning history's 
mimetic method, but also the adequacy of representational language. The mediatory role 
of the historical imagination through which the historian chooses to emplot the past as 
history is also claimed to be a major obstacle to objective knowing and truth. This is 
compounded by cultural relativism because historians cannot escape their epistemic or 
cultural preferences. At present there seems little likelihood of a rapprochement between 
the sceptics (and relativists) and the supporters of weak correspondence” Munslow, 
Historical Studies, 218. 
 
55 The quotation in this dissertation’s title, “Greetings, I am an immortal god!” (my 
translation) is from Plotinus, Ennead 6.7.10.39: “χαίρετ᾿, ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος.” 
Plotinus alludes to Empedocles’ fragment B 112. 
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an invisible reality behind the world of appearances. For these late antique people, this 
invisible world is what they characterized as the divine.56 This hidden divine reality was 
the source of all being and it was being itself. It was independent of the earthly cycles of 
life and death and accessible to humans because human consciousness was naturally 
divine: it was made of the same invisible “stuff” and also independent of the cycles of life 
and death.  
A deathless consciousness that could access the divine was called “mind” (nous) 
or “soul” (psyche, anima, pneuma). The Homeric idea that “soul” is what makes a body 
move and live is carried through to Plato—“What is it that, when present in a body, 
makes it living? –A soul” (Phaedo 105c).57 Indeed, for Plato (Alcibiades I 130c)58 and for 
Cicero (De Republica 6.24)59 the soul was the person, the soul defined the human 
                                               
56 Historical philology demonstrates that word meanings change over time and place. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, however, to thoroughly trace the history of words 
and concepts like “divinity,” “god,” and “soul.” I will use the English terms “divine,” 
“sacred,” and “holy” more or less interchangeably; likewise, “divinities,” ”deity,” 
“deities,” “god,” “gods.” For my purposes “personal divinity” is equivalent to “theurgy,” 
“immortalization,” “self-deification,” and “self-divinization.”  Where philological 
nuances pertain to my arguments, I will draw them out in the particular chapter 
discussion.  
57 Emlyn-Jones, trans. “Ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἔσται; Ὧι ἂν 
ψυχή, ἔφη.” 
58 “τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν.” Alcibiades I, now spurious, was not so for late 
Platonists.  
 
59 “Strive on indeed, and be sure that it is not you that is mortal, but only your body. For 
that man whom your outward form reveals is not yourself; the spirit is the true self, not 
that physical figure which can be pointed out by the finger. Know, then, that you are a 
god, if a god is that which lives, feels, remembers, and foresees, and which rules, 
governs, and moves the body over which it is set, just as the supreme God above us rules 
this universe. And just as the eternal God moves the universe, which is partly mortal, so 
an immortal spirit moves the frail body.” Keyes, trans. (Tu vero enitere et sic habeto, non 
esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc; nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens 
cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quae digito demonstrari potest. deum te igitur 
scito esse, siquidem est deus, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit 
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being.60 More than animating the body, the psyche and anima took on cognitive 
functions.61 For the Platonists, it housed “insight and thought” in reflection of the divine 
so that the soul was a personal divinity, a daimon (Plato, Alcibiades 1 133b).62 On the one 
                                                                                                                                            
et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps 
deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus 
animus sempiternus movet.)  
 
60 Despite significant differences between theorists in regards to whether the soul plays a 
role in thought, perception, desire, and biology, and whether it is a material or non-
material thing, the earliest Homeric meaning of a force that moves things is carried 
through. Although psyche is the most common ancient word for soul, daimon 
(Empedocles), animus and anima (Lucretius), and pneuma are also used to refer to the 
soul. Although the Pythagoreans and Stoics had the concept of an immortal soul, it is 
Plato’s idea and the Neoplatonic elaboration upon it that concerns us here. Plato’s 
reasoning for the immortality of the soul can be summarized simply that the soul is a non-
material force most like his imperishable “Good,” evident in its ability to apprehend the 
“Good” and animating power. For an excellent summary and analysis of the relationship 
between body and soul in ancient thought, see Kevin Corrigan, “Body and Soul in 
Ancient Religious Experience,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, 
Greek, Roman, ed. A.H. Armstrong, 360 – 383 (New York: Crossroad, 1986). Also 
helpful is Hendrik Lorenz, “Ancient Theories of Soul,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ancient-soul/>. 
 
61 “The idea of psychē as an intellectual agent seems to stem from earlier usages in which 
an intense, intellectual decision must be made in the context of psyche/life: Odysseus 
performs every mental trick to say his life/psychē; Theognis is ‘bitten in his psychē’ 
concerning which course of life he will choose (Odyssey 9.422 – 23; Theognis 910).” 
Kevin Corrigan, “Body and Soul in Ancient Religious Experience,” in Classical 
Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman, ed. A.H. Armstrong, 360 – 383 
(New York: Crossroad, 1986), 368. 	
62 “And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is 
the seat of knowledge and thought?....Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever 
looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge 
of himself.” Lamb, trans. (Ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅ τι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ 
τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν; … Τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ᾿ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο 
βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, [θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν], οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη 
μάλιστα.) Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei  8.5.27 – 29: “Moreover, the faculty that sees 
and judges whether the likeness is beautiful or ugly is assuredly superior to the actual 
likeness on which such a judgment is passed. Now that faculty is the human mind and the 
substance of a rational soul, and it is certainly not material, if even the likeness of a body, 
when seen and judged in the mind of one who is engaged in thinking, is not itself 
material. … Furthermore, if our mind is not material, how can God, the mind’s creator, 
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hand, the divine was said to be beyond description and, on the other, it was described as 
intelligent, a kind of “god” that permeated the world of appearances. Although the 
constitution of gods in antiquity varied widely over time and place, the conception that 
developed among the thinkers I am describing tended toward the concept of god (theos) 
as invisible, intelligent, immortal power.63  
The late antique peoples who thought they could personally access that invisible 
world, achieve a deathless state, and continue to exist as intelligent beings beyond the life 
of their body, claimed personal divinity.64 They claimed to become gods.65 Known as 
                                                                                                                                            
be material?” Wiesen, trans. (cum in animo cogitantis aspicitur atque iudicatur, nec ipsa 
corpus est. Non est ergo nec terra nec aqua, nec aer nec ignis, qui bus quattuor 
corporibus, quae dicuntur quattuor elementa, mundum corporeum videmus esse 
compactu. Porro si noster animus corpus non est, quo modo Deus creator animi corpus 
est?) 
 
63  For Homer, being godlike was to be the best by far in one or more aspects: strength, 
beauty, wit, glory. Gods have the “power to do things” (θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύνανται) 
(Homer, Odyssey 10.306). But, immortality becomes the defining features of godliness in 
the philosophical tradition. Clement recalls Thales’ definition as “what has neither 
beginning (ἀρχήν) nor end (τέλος)” (Clement, Stromata 5.96.4). When Socrates was 
asked, “What is God?,” he similarly replied, “What is immortal and everlasting” 
(ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιον) (Stobeus, Florilegium 1.29a). For Aristotle, immortality is the 
activity of god (θεοῦ δ᾽ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία) (Aristotle, De Caelo 2.3, 286a9). See David 
M. Litwa, We Are Being Transformed Deification in Paul's Soteriology (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2012) for an excellent survey of godliness in Greco-Roman antiquity, esp. 43-45. 
 
64 Personal divinity, I suggest, was the personal (psyche) identification and participation 
in the invisible, intelligent power of the divine Mind (Nous), an emanating feature of the 
Neoplatonic One (to hen). 
 
65 The term “theurgy” (“divine work”) was used by some of the writers I will be 
discussing (Augustine, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius, the two Julians of the 
Chaldean Oracles) and for many modern scholars, myself included, it satisfactorily 
encompasses the aims of the writers and readers of the Corpus Hermeticum, the Papyri 
Graecae Magicae, and, I argue, in prototypical form in Apuleius. Theurgy is a flexible 
label. However, I prefer the term “personal divinity” because it avoids the problem cases 
of restricted use. Garth Fowden has argued convincingly that Neoplatonic theurgy and 
Hermeticism occupy the same sphere of concern by virtue of their shared beliefs and 
practices. That standard work has been Yochanan, Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and 
Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire. Translated by 
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Platonici and theurgici to Augustine, modern scholars call them Neoplatonists, 
Hermetists, and theurgists.66  
                                                                                                                                            
Michel Tardieu. Paris: Institut d'Études augustiniennes, 2011, recently released in a third 
edition including many corrections, clarifications, and an essay and bibliography from 
1891 – 2011 by Tardieu. See Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical 
Approach to the Late Pagan Mind, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
Following Fowden, Sarah Iles Johnston writes: “[I]n modern use, the term theurgist 
usually does not include some other figures who shared important beliefs with Proclus, 
Iamblichus, and the Juliani, including a soteriology based in Platonic metaphysics and an 
interest in animation rituals: I mean those whom we typically call the Hermetists, that is, 
those who composed and studied the philosophical and ritual texts that we subsume under 
the titles Corpus Hermeticum or Hermetica. Sharply dividing the theurgists from the 
Hermeticists falsely represents ancient reality, as Garth Fowden shows; for the milieu we 
will be considering here, ‘theurgy’ and ‘Hermeticism’ were two names for essentially the 
same constellation of beliefs and practices.” Sarah Iles Johnston, “Animating Statues: A 
Case Study in Ritual,” Arethusa 41 (2008): 450-451; Also see Claire Fanger, Invoking 
Angels: Theurgic Ideas and Practices, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries (University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 15-27. More recently, Ilinca Tanaseanu-
Döbler, shows how Hermetic texts “can be subsumed under this label e.g. by Iamblichus, 
who explicitly chooses to draw this connection … Late authors such as Proclus or 
Damascius are more specific and reserve the term ‘theurgist’ for the Chaldean tradition, 
distinguishing it from Orphic lore. … From the beginning of its Neoplatonic career, 
theurgy was not only connected with other rituals, but also with various terms which 
were used sometimes synonymously with it, sometimes to denote related and 
overlapping, though not distinct fields. Thus, while ‘hieratic’ is synonymous to ‘theurgy’ 
in Iamblichus, it is used in a wider sense by Proclus, for who ‘hieratic’ includes the 
Chaldean theurgists as a prominent instance, but can also refer to priests in general, or to 
the legendary wisdom of Egyptian priests in the Timaeus. …. ‘Telestic’ is another label 
for rituals that can be stretched at will ; it gradually enters the discourse about theurgy 
and slowly overlaps with the latter.” Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity: 
The Invention of a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 278-
279.  
 
66 For concise introductions to prominent members of the Neoplatonic school, see 
Dominic J. O’Meara, Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), chapter 2; Pauliina Remes, Neoplatonism (Stocksfield: 
Acumen, 2008), 19 – 33. For social context, see Garth Fowden, “The Pagan Holy Man in 
Late Antique Society,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 102 (1982): 33-59; Richard Lim, 
Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995; Edward Jay Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and 
Alexandria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).Apuleius is categorized by 
modern scholars as a “Middle Platonist,” in the tradition of Plutarch. He also, for some, 
will fall slightly outside of our period of late antiquity, being more representative of the 
“high Empire” of the Antonines. 
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Individuals67 
In Peter Brown’s groundbreaking work on the “holy man” in late antiquity, rather 
than asking if late antique people believed that a person could become divine, he 
suggested we consider what they got out of believing so “on the ground.” In other words, 
what function did the idea of personal divinity play in the organization of society? This 
question revolutionized scholarship, allowing the problem of belief and access to the 
minds of people in the past to be “bracketed.” Scholarship in the last forty years has 
focused on the social function of beliefs and practices related to personal divinity.68 The 
“divine” status of public figures in late antiquity such as emperors, martyrs, and monks 
has become a trope now widely understood in its social and institutional dimensions.69 In 
                                               
67 “What does individualization mean? First and foremost it includes the notion of de-
traditionalization. Individual action is less and less determined by traditional norms 
handed down by family and the larger social context. Options open up, choices are made. 
On the part of the individual, this development is reflected in changes in ‘individuation’, 
the parallel process of gradual full integration into society and the development of self-
reflection and a of a notion of individual identity. Socialization, the biographical process 
of being integrated into ever larger social contexts (not necessarily in any formal manner) 
by the individual’s appropriation of social roles and traditions—and the development of 
individual identity go hand in hand.” Jörg Rüpke, “Individualization and Individuation” 
in The Individual in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean, ed. by Jörg Rüpke 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7. 	
68 Peter Brown, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity,” Journal of 
Roman Studies 61 (1971): 80-101. 
 
69 While much of the scholarship on self-deification in this period has emphasized 
“ruler-cults” such as S. R. F. Price, Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in 
Asia Minor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Ittai Gradel, Emperor 
Worship and Roman Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Duncan Fishwick, The 
Imperial cult in the Latin West: Studies in the Ruler Cult of the Western Provinces of 
the Roman Empire (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987); Sabine MacCormack, Art and ceremony 
in late antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); and, in the Egyptian 
context, Wildung, Dietrich. Egyptian Saints: Deification in Pharaonic Egypt (New 
York: New York University Press, 1977), in contrast, my research examines self-
deification of individuals who did not represent themselves as wishing to become 
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this dissertation, I add to this social-functionalist understanding of personal divinity by 
inquiring more deeply into areas of personal meaning and individual experience. I am 
interested in the thoughts and emotions—the mentalities—even more, the imaginations—
of late antique writers, readers, and hearers for whom personal divinity was seen as an 
option on their horizons.  
 In approaching the works of these writers, I recognize that human endeavors are 
complicated and contradictory, that the various thoughts and practices relating to personal 
divinity, for example, could be both socially and personally constructed in meaningful 
and functional ways without being reducible one to the other. That is, the idea of personal 
divinity can fulfill different social and personal functions at the same time. Anthony 
Cohen has criticized the tendency of social scientists to privilege the social aggregate at 
the expense of individual variation: 
Traditionally the self and the individual have been treated as micro-versions of 
larger social entities by the social sciences in general, and by anthropology in 
particular….[T]his practice has resulted in the misunderstanding of social 
aggregates precisely because the individual has been ignored as a constituent 
element. By acknowledging the individual's self awareness as author of their own 
social conduct and of the social forms in which they participate, this informs 
social and cultural processes rather than the individual being passively modeled 
by them.70  
  
I also recognize that the divine status attributed to a ruler with social power and the 
personal divinity of a reader of esoteric texts are quite different things. For example, an 
emperor’s claim to divinity may serve to legitimize his authority while a philosopher’s 
claim, which certainly legitimizes authority within an intellectual circle or textual 
                                                                                                                                            
members of the ruling elite. 
 
70 Anthony P. Cohen, Self Consciousness: An Alternative Anthropology of Identity 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 114-115. 
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community, might also have the purpose of inspiring students to follow suit…not a 
desirable outcome for an emperor at all!71   
 The degree to which we may access the interiors of individual minds in the past 
(never mind of those present) is fraught to say the least. The problem of the extent to 
which we can “penetrate the secrets of the heart,” as Dodds put it, is a difficult one.72 
Richard Lim rightly draws our attention to the scarcity of sources outside of elite circles, 
of “ipsissima verba that should be taken as a form of ‘personal expression’ [allowing] 
one to get ‘as close as possible to the individuals themselves.’”73 So, it is not without 
caution that I will attempt to unpack the subjective phenomena of personal divinity. With 
Carlin Barton, I subscribe to the idea that “[w]e have no access to minds other than our 
                                               
71 Richard Lim has pointed out the decline of public dialectical disputation in late 
antiquity with the rise of the “pagan holy man.” See my chapter 4 and Richard Lim, 
Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), esp. ch. 2 and Garth Fowden, “The Pagan Holy Man in Late 
Antique Society.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 102 (1982): 33-59. 
 
72 E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety; Some Aspects of Religious 
Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge: University Press, 1965), 
83.  
 
73 Richard Lim, “Reviewed Work(s): People, Personal Expression, and Social Relations 
in Late Antiquity by Ralph W. Mathisen,” Speculum 80, no. 3 (2005): 925. On the 
challenge of studying emotions in the past, Alexandra Verbovsek writes: “Current 
research [on rituals and emotions] focuses in particular on the genesis, codification, and 
functions of emotions. One of the most significant questions relates to the role of 
emotions in social and cultural processes. To date we on not know exactly how feelings, 
their presentations, and interpretation are constituted, so it is still an open question of 
whether emotions are predominantly guided by cultural influence and what the causes for 
emotion priorities and characteristics in different chronological, regional and ethnic 
contexts are. How can we know what, why, and where we need to feel? And how can we 
be sure about the individual and social consequences of our feelings? Is the cultural 
knowledge of emotions standardized, does it depend on social class and status, or is it 
individual and flexible?” “The Correlation of Rituals, Emotions, and Literature in 
Ancient Egypt,” in Ritual Dynamics in the Ancient Mediterranean. Agency, Emotion, 
Gender, Representation, ed. Angelos Chaniotis (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011), 
237. 
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own except insofar as we impute to them shared qualities.”74 The difficulties in accessing 
experience75 should not cause us to ignore its profound shaping influence nor prevent us 
from using humanistic approaches to “get at” the individual. Further, I believe that 
British historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood (1889 – 1943) offers a solution to 
this difficulty in his insistence that the past lives in the present mind of the historian (see 
“Collingwood” above and Conclusion).  
 
Reading Mysteries 
 The activity of reading is front and center in this dissertation. Neoplatonic and 
Hermetic literature was intended to transform those who engaged with it through the 
“mystery of reading” which, as Arthur Versluis puts it, allows us to  “travel ever more 
deeply in the worldview of the authors, perhaps even experience…moments of insight 
during which we suddenly see ourselves and the world around us in a new light.”76 This 
notion was not unfamiliar to Augustine who explored how words, images, and mental 
representations  “play a fundamental role in mediating perceptions of reality.”77 Brian 
                                               
74 Carlin A. Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 5. For Ernst Gellner social functional 
approaches to ancient minds “enable us to attribute meaning to assertions which might 
otherwise be found to lack it.” “Concepts and Society,” in Sociological Theory and 
Philosophical Analysis, eds. D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 
115 – 149. Quoted in Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of 
Religions (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 298. Smith comments: “Gellner restores the capacity 
for thought, for rationality and rationalization to the primitive and, by so doing, restores 
their recognizable humanity,” 298. 
 
75 See note 544. 	
76 Arthur Versluis, Restoring Paradise Western Esotericism: Literature, Art, and 
Consciousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 4-5. 
 
77 Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of 
Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1. 
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Stock describes Augustine’s theory of reading as a kind of ritual intended to bring the 
reader into an experience of personal divinity: 
The act of reading is then a critical step upwards in a mental ascent: it 
is…a rite of initiation, in which the reader crosses the threshold from the 
outside to the inside world. This upward and inward movement takes place 
when the appropriate text is transformed into an object of contemplation. 
Lectio becomes meditatio.78 
 
Likewise, Sarah Ahbel-Rappe suggests that the ideal reader of texts about personal 
divinity actively “take part in a theurgic ritual.”79 Richard Reitzenstein’s characterization 
of these kinds of ancient texts as Lese-Mysterium, that is (in Brian Copenhaver’s words) 
“texts meant to have cultic effects without actual cultic practice,” highlights the 
importance of reading.80  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
78 Stock, Augustine the Reader, 1-2. 
 
79 Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: non-discursive thinking in the texts of 
Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius (United States of America: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2000), 173.  
 
80 Brian Copenhaver, Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin 
Asclepius in a New English Translation, with Notes and Introduction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), lii. See Richard Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen 
Mysterienreligionen nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen (Leipzig 1927), 51-52, 
64. Reitzenstein’s assertion that Hermetic communities did not exist has been rejected 
by many scholars since the discovery of Coptic Hermetic ritual texts from Nag 
Hammadi that parallel the Greek texts and serve as evidence for a textual community. 
Garth Fowden writes: “Admittedly our philosophical texts imply an actual historical 
milieu that was dedicated to the spiritual life. Instruction and initiation were group 
experiences, even when at the highest levels, they involved only the spiritual guide and 
a solitary pupil; and those who participated in these encounters instinctively expressed 
their solidarity and joy through prayer and hymnody, and in such comradely gestures as 
embraces and the sharing of food.” Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 149. 
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Compassion 
 My emphasis on the creative role of imaginative reading as a “spiritual 
exercise”—with theurgic aims (see chapter 1 below)—adds a layer of complexity to how 
scholars and amateurs read texts about personal divinity, yielding I hope, a better 
appreciation for how ancient peoples may have understood themselves and their worlds 
on their own terms. Reading texts on their own terms restores something of the original 
potency they had for ancient writers, readers, and hearers. Reminding us that “historical 
and ethnographic records attest to considerable ontological diversity across human 
experience,” Greg Anderson suggests that “conventional historicist models, categories, 
and protocols require us to analyze non-modern lifeworlds as if all were experience 
within one and the same real world….”81 Such a disciplinary practice “effectively 
modernizes the very fabrics of non-modern being, thereby denying past peoples the 
power to determine the truths of their own experience.”82 Avoiding the conventional 
historicist models Anderson speaks of, scholars like Janet Coleman and Mary Carruthers 
have admirably represented premodern mentalities through their discussion of memoria, a 
word that meant more than “memory” means to moderns.83 
 Although it is commonplace now to think that “becoming divine” could only be a 
kind of self-deception, this dissertation offers the modern reader access to late antique 
texts and mentalities that now seems foreign to many. My approach challenges the 
                                               
81 Greg Anderson, “Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past: The Case for an Ontological 
Turn,” American Historical Review 120, no. 3 (2015): 789. 	82	Anderson, “Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past,” 789. 	
83 Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval 
Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 	
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tendency to explain away beliefs and experiences that seem unscientific to many moderns 
who reduce them to their utilitarian social function in order to make them palatable.84 
This dissertation stands as a corrective for what I see as unnecessary excess in the social-
functional approach to human experience. By recovering this historical mentality, I hope, 
at least to provoke us to re-imagine a world that values many sources of human 
knowledge and many ways of being human.  
 
 
Technologies of Self 
 
 Michel Foucault’s concept of the “technology of self” arose out of his 
engagement with Plato’s discussion of how one should “care for the self.”85 Foucault 
describes the “technology of self” as a conscious, intentional shaping of one’s own body, 
mind, or behavior that leads to some notion of “happiness, perfection, or immortality.”86 
Likewise, Pierre Hadot suggests that technologies of self foster constructive introspection 
and lead to a transformed self-possession and independence:  
What Foucault calls “practices of the self” do indeed correspond, for the 
Platonists as well as for the Stoics, to a movement of conversion toward the self. 
One frees oneself from exteriority, from personal attachment to exterior objects, 
and from the pleasures they may provide. One observes oneself, to determine 
whether one has made progress in this exercise. One seeks to be one’s own 
master, to possess oneself, and find one’s happiness in freedom and inner 
                                               
84 “Modern aesthetic preferences are irrelevant to works’ value as evidence. The fact that 
scholars often find the epic vitae bizarre, distasteful, or inexplicable indicates that we 
should pay attention…By focusing on the problematic and the neglected, we gain new 
perspectives.” Anna Lisa Taylor, Epic Lives and Monasticism in the Middle Ages, 800 - 
1050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 19. 
 
85 My trans. Apologia 86c: “ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη.” 
 
86 Michel Foucault, Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. 
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988), 19. Foucault’s later thinking about technologies of self 
emphasized their use in expressing agency over governmentality.  
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independence. I concur on all these points. I do think, however, that this 
movement of interiorization is inseparably linked to another movement, whereby 
one rises to a higher psychic level, at which one encounters another kind of 
exteriorization, another relationship with “the exterior.” This is a new way of 
being-in-the-world, which consists in becoming aware of oneself as a part of 
nature, and a portion of universal reason. At this point, one no longer lives in the 
usual, conventional human world, but in the world of nature. As we have seen 
above, one is then practicing “physics” as a spiritual exercise.87  
 
I have come to understand the act of reading, hearing, and performing texts about 
personal divinity in terms of the “spiritual exercise”—that is, as a kind of thought 
experiment or mental practice intended to produce a change in self-concept or state of 
being—essentially, a self-fashioning—that brings one into a new relationship with the 
cosmos, a relationship understood as being beyond what is normally accessible through 
the senses. What I think makes them “spiritual” exercises is that they entertain subtle 
things, like the air or the breath of life (spiritus), things that are invisible or intangible—
almost seen—and therefore require imagination in order to be “seen” or “felt.”88 For 
example, the sphere that Plotinus invites his reader to imagine (described more fully in 
chapters 1 and 2) gives the sense that the mind is larger than the cosmos, that it exceeds 
the limits of a physical body. This “sense” happens in an imaginary inner “space,” what 
we can describe as an interior map of an inner landscape, invisible to others except 
perhaps in how the exercise effects the choices and actions of the reader. These spiritual 
exercises are imaginative exercises.  
                                               
87 Pierre Hadot and Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises 
from Socrates to Foucault (Oxford; New York: Blackwell, 1995), 211. 
 
88 “The Greek psyche also means breath, as does the Latin anima. One of the early 
Milesian philosophers, Anaximenes, believed that the air is god, and he drew an analogy 
between the air, which sustains the universe, and the human soul: ‘As our soul, being air, 
holds us together, so do breath and air (pneuma, aēr) surround the whole universe’ (fr. 
2).” Corrigan, “Body and Soul,” 367. 	
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According to Neoplatonist scholar Sara Ahbel-Rappe, imaginative spiritual 
exercises—whether explicit or implicit—consist of an “active but directed use of the 
imagination, and [a] sustained presence of this imaginative construction as a method of 
changing habitual modes of thought or self-awareness.”89  Self-deification, I will argue, 
can be usefully understood as a “technology of self.”  These internal events—discourses 
played upon the stage of interiority intended to produce a change in self-concept, state of 
being, and relationship to the cosmos—impact the subject significantly constituting what 
I refer to as an “imaginative technology of self-transformation.”  
Spiritual or imaginative exercises in texts can be explicit or implicit. That is, they 
can be explicitly prescribed using the hortatory subjunctive or the imperative mood as in 
Plotinus’s well known sphere exercise: “Let there be, then, in the soul an imagination of a 
sphere…” (Ennead 5.9.8).90 Or, imaginative exercises can be suggested implicitly 
through imagery and concepts within the narrative of the text that serve to shape interior 
topography without calling attention to itself, using vivid language to draw a map of the 
self and its world in an interior imagined space of the mind. Implicit spiritual exercises 
generate inner experiences just as explicit ones do. Acts of reading (or hearing) are often 
explicit spiritual exercises but they are always implicit spiritual exercises.91 Reading as 
                                               
89 Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 79. 
 
90 Armstrong, trans. “Ἔστω οὖν ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι φωτεινή τις φαντασία σφαίρας ἔχουσα πάντα 
ἐν αὐτῆι.” 
 
91 Catherine Bell (following J.Z. Smith) has noted how potentially any human activity 
can be separated out as “ritual.” See Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New 
York/Oxford, 1992). 
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an exercise produces what Patricia Cox Miller refers to as a kind of “mental theater” or 
what Zeke Mazur has called “inner ritual.”92  
 Augustine gives an excellent example of the rhetorical technique: “Look, here am 
I, watching Cyprian; I’m crazy about Cyprian….I’m watching him, I’m delighted by him, 
as far as I can I embrace him with the arms of my mind” (Sermones 301A.7).93 
Augustine’s idea of the three kinds of vision supports this idea: “’[O]ne kind of vision 
occurs through the eyes, by which the soul perceives corporeal objects by means of the 
body; the second kind of vision occurs in the imagination, where the soul sees likenesses 
of corporeal things that are absent; in the third kind, vision occurs ‘through an intuition of 
the mind’, where ‘the soul understands those realities that are neither bodies nor the 
likenesses of bodies.’”94 Regarding the use of allegory in Christian late antiquity, Denys 
Turner locates the “broad distinction between ‘literal’ and ‘spiritual’ senses” in Origen’s 
On First Principles in the early fourth century, in Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine in 
                                               
92 Patricia Cox Miller, The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient 
Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 87; Zeke Mazur, 
“Unio Magica: Part II: Plotinus, theurgy, and the question of ritual,” Dionysius 22 
(2004): 43. The theoretical basis for the idea that the gaze was performative whether seen 
outwardly or inwardly is ubiquitous in antiquity from Aristotle to Augustine. See Miller 
2009, 89 and also Carlin Barton, “Being in the Eyes: Shame and Sight in Ancient Rome” 
in The Roman Gaze: Vision, Power, and the Body, ed. Frederick David, (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 216 – 235. 
 
93 Hill, trans. “Ecce ego specto Cyprianum, amo Cyprianum....Specto, delector, quantum 
valeo lacertis mentis amplector.” 
 
94 Patricia Cox Miller, “Relics, Rhetoric and Mental Spectacles in Late Antique 
Christianity,” in Seeing the Invisible in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, eds. 
Giselle de Nie, Karl F. Morrison, and Marco Mostert (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 
2005), 33. Miller’s translation is based on several translated sections of De gen. ad lit. in 
Taylor, 185-186, 213. Text in August. De gen. ad lit. 12.6.15; 12.7.16; 12.24.50. 
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the early fifth, and in Gregory the Great‘s Dialogues in the late sixth century.95 Gregory 
argued that “the meaning invested in things was to be deciphered by analogical 
reasoning, linking orders of reality—the physical and the moral.…”96 This is Miller’s 
point: “[I]t makes no difference whether the image is true to reality or not; what matters 
is that ‘it is useful for some other purpose,’—[a transformative] knowledge.”97  
Imaginative exercises as technologies of self-transformation embedded in texts 
about personal divinity heighten reflexivity, an extreme form of self-consciousness that 
isolates the subject as object to be manipulated, worked on, transformed. In my project, I 
show how each text in this constellation of discourses about personal divinity offers 
imaginative exercises, constructing a highly sacralized or divine self-concept through 
interior map-making and topographies of self.   
 
Performativity 
Words do things.98 For the speaker and the hearer. For the writer and the reader. If 
I say (or you read), “The sky is blue,” you would probably remember or reconstruct a 
brilliant blue sky in your mind’s eye. If I say (or you read), “I am flying in the blue sky,” 
you might imagine this as well. As unlikely as it is that you would ever see me flapping 
about in a clear blue sky, it is likely that you could imagine it. Your imagining would be 
                                               
95 Denys Turner, “Allegory in Christian late antiquity,” in The Cambridge companion to 
allegory, eds. Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 71-72. 
 
96 William D. McCready, Signs of sanctity: miracles in the thought of Gregory the Great 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989), 5. 
 
97 Miller, “Relics, Rhetoric and Mental Spectacles” 35. 
 
98 On the concept of “performative utterance,” see J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with 
Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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different than my imagining or the imagining of the person sitting next to you. At least 
somewhat. But, positing such a scene, I cannot imagine it for you. I cannot enter the 
interior world of your experience and draw my avian self on an expanse of your blue. 
You have to do it. It may be my descriptive words that suggest. But, it is you taking them 
in, internalizing them, and putting them together into an inward understanding. I contend 
that in seeing this scene in your mind’s eye—me flying in the wild blue yonder—you are, 
having assembled it, re-enacting it. Uttering is performative. Language’s “performativity” 
is what Judith Butler calls “the power of discourse to materialize its effects,”99 a power 
realized through imaginative reading. Seeing too is performative. And, surely, seeing 
with the mind’s eye, that is, imagining, is performative.  
 
Scope of the Divine  
In City of God, Books 8 – 10, Augustine of Hippo100 attempts to refute certain late 
antique ideas and practices pertaining to personal divinity. In doing so, he assembles the 
archive for this dissertation including works by second-century North African Latin 
                                               
99 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 187. 
 
100 Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) was born in Thagaste, the North African Roman 
province of Numidia (now Algeria) and died in Hippo Regius in the same province. For 
manuscript tradition of City of God, see Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God: A 
Reader’s Guide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 275 – 276. Scholarship on Augustine’s 
vast corpus is long and wide. See bibliography in Brown’s biography below. Important 
biographical works include: Henri Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture 
antique (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1983); Henry Chadwick, Augustine of Hippo: A Life 
(Oxford; New York : Oxford University Press, 2009); Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo; 
A Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; James Joseph O’Donnell, 
Augustine: A New Biography (New York: Ecco, 2005); Robin Lane Fox, Augustine: 
Conversions to Confessions (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 	
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writer, Apuleius101; the third-century Roman-Egyptian Neoplatonist, Plotinus102; his 
student and biographer, Porphyry103; Iamblichus104, the Syrian philosopher known for his 
interest in ritual; as well as works attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, the eponymous 
mystagogue portrayed in the so-called Corpus Hermeticum.105  
                                               
101 Apuleius of Madura (c. 124 – c. 170). Roman North African (now Algeria) rhetor and 
philosopher, part of the Late Antique revival of Platonism. Studied and travelled in 
Athens, Italy, Egypt. For biography, background, writings, see S. J. Harrison, Apuleius: A 
Latin Sophist (Oxford University Press, 2000), 1 – 38. For manuscript tradition and 
bibliography on De deo Socratis, see C. P. Jones, and Apuleius. Apologia; Florida; De 
Deo Socratis. Loeb Classical Library: 534 (Cambridge, MA; London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 2017), vii - xxxii; For Metamorphoses, see Apuleius, Metamorphoses. 
Edited and translated by John Arthur Hanson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), vii – xvii. 	
102 Plotinus (c. 204/5 – 270). Likely born in Egypt, studied in Alexandria, travelled to 
Persia and India. Primary source of biographical information contained in Porphyry’s 
Vita Plotini. Considered the founder of Neoplatonism, he formed a school in Rome in the 
household of Gemina where he taught men and women, politicians and scholars. Like 
Augustine, scholarship on Plotinus is vast. For manuscript tradition and references to 
commentaries and bibliographic works, see Plotinus, Enneads. Edited and translated A. 
H. Armstrong. 7 volumes. Loeb Classical Library 440 – 445, 468 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1969 – 1988), xxviii – xxxiii. 	
103 Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234 – c. 305). Born Phoenicia (now Lebanon), studied in Athens 
and Rome. Student of Plotinus, fellow student (and early teacher) of Iamblichus. 
Compiler of Enneads. For biographical information, see Robert M. Berchman, Porphyry 
Against the Christians (Leiden: Brill, 2005). 	
104 Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 245 – c. 325). Born in Syria, studied with Porphyry in Rome 
or Sicily. Known especially for his use of theurgy (ritual) and Egyptianizing disputation 
with Porphyry (De Mysteriis). See Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The 
Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1995): Afonasin, E. V., John M. Dillon, and John F. Finamore, eds. Iamblichus and the 
Foundations of Late Platonism. Leiden: Brill, 2012. 	
105 Hermetica refers to second through fifth-century Graeco-Egyptian philosophical texts 
attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, compiled by Byzantine and Renaissance scholars, 
including the Papyri Graecae Magicae, portions of the Nag Hammadi Codices, and some 
Armenian texts. Hermetic texts are mentioned by Tertullian (early 3rd c.), Lactantius 
(3rd/4th c.), Cyril of Alexandrian (5th c.), Clement of Alexandria (5th c.), Augustine (5th c.), 
and Michael Psellos (11th c.). Reintroduced (in part) to Europe by Ficino as the Corpus 
Hermeticum in Latin translation (1471). Recent translations and commentary include 
Mead, Festugière and Nock (Budé), Mahé, Scott, Copenhaver, and Litwa. For 
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 This is not a dissertation about Augustine or City of God but rather about some of 
the sources Augustine read that constitute the archive for this study. But, it is important to 
understand Augustine’s debate with the “pagan” 106 philosophers in Books 8 – 10. The 
archive is not random, Augustine assembles it for the purpose of refuting pagan 
philosophers and pointing them toward Christianity, the “true philosophy” in his view. He 
objected to the Platonic understanding of the relationship between the person and divinity 
which lead to practices, to the extent that he understood them, of worshipping “demons” 
and of “making gods” (i.e. statues) (Augustine, De civitate Dei 8.23).107 As we shall see, 
the Late Antique writers and readers at hand were more concerned with getting to know 
                                                                                                                                            
introduction to historical context, manuscript traditionary, and commentaries, See 
Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a New English 
Translation, with Notes and Introduction. Edited and translated by Brian P. Copenhaver 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xiii – lix. The related Papyri Graecae 
Magicae are Graeco-Roman Egypt papyri, spells, formulae, hymns and rituals, composed 
between the second century BCE and fifth century CE. For manuscript tradition, 
historiography, and historical context, see Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, 
Including the Demotic Spells. Edited and translated by Hans Dieter Betz (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), xli – liii. For manuscript tradition, historiography, 
and historical context, see Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, Including the Demotic 
Spells (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), xli – liii. 	
106 “Pagan,” although commonly used by modern scholars to describe traditional, non-
Christian people in late antiquity, was a polemical terms used by Christian writers with a 
certain amount of disdain. The full title of City of God is City of God Against the Pagans 
(De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos). As an alternative, some modern scholars (after the 
Emperor Julian) have used the term “Hellenes” to describe non-Christians in this period, 
particularly elite, literate ones. See discussion in Dylan M. Burns, Apocalypse of the alien 
god: Platonism and the exile of Sethian Gnosticism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 
 
107 “To unite, therefore, these invisible spirits to visible objects of bodily substance by 
some strange technique, so that the result is something like animated bodies, idols 
dedicated and subject to these spirits, this, Hermes says, is ‘making gods,’ and this great 
and miraculous power, he adds, of making gods has been given to men.” Wiesen, trans. 
(Hos ergo spiritus invisibiles per artem quandam visibilibus rebus corporalis materiae 
copulare, ut sint quasi animata corpora illis spiritibus dicata et subdita simulacra, hoc 
esse dicit deos facere eamque magnam et mirabilem deos faciendi aecepisse homines 
potestatem). 
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their personal daimon and becoming a god.  In fact, making gods (or becoming a god 
oneself) was not an uncommon thing in the ancient world.108 Indeed, Augustine’s god 
“makes gods of his worshippers” as well (De civitate Dei 10.1).109   
 Divinity in the Graeco-Roman world was a relative categorization.110 The world 
was full of “gods” of all kinds that humans made (and unmade) every day.111 A god could 
be a stone, an Emperor, an abstraction. The rituals of god-making and the prescriptions of 
god recognition varied over time from place to place. The Stoics, for example, believed 
that the whole universe was made of a “divine” material so everything in it was, by 
definition, “divine” including humans and their material soul stuff.112 Cicero’s comment 
on the Roman custom of deification captures the ancient psychology of making gods: 
“[In many cases] some exceptionally potent force is itself designated by the title of god” 
(De natura deorum 2.23.61).113 The transcendent and ineffable “god” of the Platonists 
had little to do with the Emperor as a “god” or “Terminus,” the Roman god of 
                                               
108 I will confine my remarks to a small subset of how the term god was used in antiquity, 
focusing on the Greco-Roman intellectual traditions without considering the Jewish, early 
Christian, and Zoroastrian concepts. 
 
109 Wiesen, trans. “deus facitque suos cultores deos.” Cf. biblical references to “sons of 
god.” Notably, Psalm 82:6: “I said, you are gods; you are all sons of the Most High.” 
 
110 Litwa, Transformed, 39.  
 
111 To focus on beliefs about the gods is, in some to sense, “already ‘Christianizing’ the 
material. Litwa, Transformed, 39. 
 
112 This is not all that different from the Platonic position except that the Stoics conceived 
of the invisible power as having a subtle material substance while the Platonists viewed 
their divinity as being other than material. 
 
113 The psychological and social process that makes a “god” a “god” might best be 
understood as a process of sacralization (see discussions in chapters 2 and 5). 
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boundaries,114 except in the sense that these “gods” were made by humans who named 
them as such, who “set them apart,” sacralized them, rendered them sacer (see chapter 2) 
as some exceptionally potent force.115  In this study, I am re-examining Augustine’s 
archive to understand how the “Platonists”—Apuleius, Hermes Trismegistus, Plotinus, 
Porphyry, and Iamblichus—conceived of the relationship between the human and the 
divine and how in their system of thought a person could become divine. At the same 
time, I will suggest ways for modern people to understand how this might be 
accomplished in ways that, I hope, do justice to their worldviews.  
 
                                               
114 See Siculus Flaccus, De Agrorum Conditionibus et Constitutionibus Limitum: “When 
the Romans set up boundary stones (termini), they stood them erect on firm ground, close 
to the place where they had dug the hole in which they were about to fix them, and they 
adorned/crowned (coronabant) the stones with ointment and fillets and garlands 
(coronae). Above the hold in which a stone was to be set a sacrifice was made 
(sacrificium factum) and a victim was immolated and set ablaze with flaming torches; its 
blood was allowed to run down into the hold, and incense and fruit (or grain, fruges) 
were thrown into the hole as well. So also honeycombs and wine and other things, which 
it was customary to dedicate to the god Terminus (Termini sacrum fieri) were added. 
When the whole sacred meal had been burned by the fire (consumptisque omnibus 
dapibus), the stone was let down upon the still warm remains of the sacrifice and settled 
firmly and with great care. Pieces of stone were laid about it and tamped won hard, 
whereby it might be still more firmly fixed. This sacrifice was made by the owners 
(domini) of the property between which a boundary ran.” Thulin trans. (Cum enim 
terminus disponerent, ipso quiden lapides in solidam terram restos conlocabant proxime 
ea loca in quibus fossis fractis defixuri eos errant, et unguento velaminibusque et coronis 
eos coronabant. In fossis autem (in) quibus eos posituri errant, sacrificio facto hostiaque 
immolate adque incense facibus ardentibus, in fossa cooperti sanguinem instillabant, 
eoque tura consuetudo est Termini sacrum fieri, in fossis adiciebant. Consumptisque igne 
omnibus dapidus super calentes reliquias lapides conlocabant adque ita diligenti cura 
confimabant. Adiectis etiam quibusdam saxorum fragminibus circum calcabant, quo 
firmius starent. Tale ergo sacrificium domini, inter quos fines firimebantur, faciebant). I 
thank Carlin Barton for this reference. 
 
115 In the first century CE, Aetius provides a taxonomy of gods: manifest gods (the sun, 
moon, etc.); harmful gods (Erinyes, Ares); beneficent gods (Zeus, Demeter); abstractions 
(Victory, Luck); deified passions (Eros, Aphrodite); the gods of mythology; and gods 
who were once men (Hercules, Dionysus). See Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta 
2.1009. Apuleius presents a similar scheme in De Deo Socratis. 
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Excursus on Religio  
 I will briefly address the problem of “religion,” since for most modern readers, 
the term dangles dangerously above my project. Most moderns likely to read this 
dissertation would think that the topic of personal divinity in late antiquity is a “religious” 
topic. However, as Carlin Barton has shown, “religion” in the modern sense, hadn’t quite 
been invented yet. Religio, the Latin word most scholars have translated “religion,” had 
begun to shift in meaning and discursive use by the time Augustine was writing City of 
God. It was, even in Augustine’s time, a term very much in flux. In City of God, Book 
10.1, he struggles to find a word that accurately describes the theory and practice of 
Christianity as he envisions it. “Religion” isn’t it. Augustine writes: 
For this is the worship that we owe to divinity or, if we must speak more 
explicitly, to deity. Since there is need for a single word to describe this I shall 
slip in a Greek word where necessary to convey my meaning. To be sure, 
wherever latreia occurs in the holy scriptures, our translators have rendered it 
‘service.”….Consequently, if we were simply to use the Latin word cultus, this 
seems to mean service not reserved for God alone.…Moreover, the very term 
religio too, although it would seem to indicate more precisely not any worship of 
God—and this is the reason why our translators have used it to render the Greek 
word threskeia—yet in the Latin usage, and that not of the ignorant but of the 
most cultured also, we say that religio is to be observed in dealing with human 
relationships, affinities and ties of every sort….Pietas, too, which the Greeks call 
eusebeia, is usually understood in its strict sense to refer to the worship of God. 
Yet this word is also used of obligations dutifully performed towards parents” 
(Augustine, De civitate Dei 10.1) 116 
 
                                               
116 Wiesen, trans. “Hic est enim diuinitati uel, si expressius dicendum est, deitati debitus 
cultus, propter quem uno uerbo significandum, quoniam mihi satis idoneum non occurrit 
Latinum, Graeco ubi necesse est insinuo quid uelim dicere. λατρείαν quippe nostri, 
ubicumque sanctarum scripturarum positum est, interpretati sunt seruitutem….Proinde si 
tantummodo cultus ipse dicatur, non soli Deo deberi uidetur….Nam et ipsa religio 
quamuis distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare uideatur (unde isto nomine 
interpretati sunt nostri eam, quae Graece θρησκεία dicitur: tamen quia Latina loquendi 
consuetudine, non inperitorum, uerum etiam doctissimorum, et cognationibus humanis 
atque adfinitatibus et quibusque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio….Pietas 
quoque proprie Dei cultus intellegi solet, quam Graeci ευσεβειαν uocant. Haec tamen et 
erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur.” 
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It would be inadvisable for me to take on the massive and thorny issue of mapping 
“religion” in this study, especially given the fact that my advisor, Carlin Barton, has done 
it in her recent book.117 I will sidestep the question of the relationship between “religion” 
and “magic,” whether or not “theurgy” should be classified as “magic” or “religion,” and, 
while I’m at it, I will ignore the problem of identifying “religious” overtones in the 
Neoplatonic, Hermetic, and Apuleian texts at hand. A number of studies have already 
been done that give due credit to the complexities involved.118  
 Furthermore, following Barton’s advice, I scrupulously avoid the term “religion” 
(and for that matter, “magic”) in this dissertation almost entirely unless I am quoting 
another scholar whose use serves my own. There is good reason for this because thinking 
in terms of “religion” tends to color the fresh attention we might give to our sources.  In 
any case, these can be more or less classified as ideologies and should not either be taken 
to refer to discrete areas of activity or concern (whatever they may mean) apart from any 
other sphere. Everything was “religious” or “magical” to the point of meaninglessness 
unless viewed from the modern point of view on such matters which has neatly detached 
and abstracted the behaviors we might be tempted to label as such.  
 However, I would like to present one modern definition of “religion” that I find 
useful, but which shall remain far in the background of my study or at least buried in the 
notes. It is from William James who defines “religion” as: “The feelings, acts and 
experiences of individual men (sic) in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves 
                                               
117 Carlin A. Barton and Daniel Boyarin, Imagine No Religion: How Modern 
Abstractions Hide Ancient Realities (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2016).  
118 Surveyed by James B. Rives, “Graeco-Roman Religion in the Roman Empire: Old 
Assumptions and New Approaches,” Currents in Biblical Research 8, no. 2 (2010): 240-
299; H.S. Versnel, “Reflections on the Relationship Magic-Religion,” Numen 38, no. 2 
(1991): 177-197. 
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to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”119  What I appreciate about 
this statement is the focus on individuals, solitude, and the relativity of the “divine.” The 
divine is personal. This characterization resonates with my own interest in the same and 
somehow connects to the “ideal reader” I am conceptualizing in this study which borrows 
heavily from reader-reception theory and ancient rhetorical theory (see chapter 1). 
Indeed, the concern with the inner thoughts and experiences of individuals relates to how 
I understand, via Collingwood, history writing itself as a “spiritual exercise” and a 
transformative philosophical practice, a topic I will take up in more detail in my 
conclusion to the dissertation.  
 
“Ways of Hermes”: A Trail Map for the Dissertation  
  Chapter 1, “Neoplatonism and the ‘Vehicle of the Soul’ (Map IS Territory)” 
takes us deeper into the Platonism that so influenced Augustine. In this chapter, I discuss 
imagination in the Neoplatonic context. The “vehicle of the soul” (ochêma pneuma) was 
a Neoplatonic technology for attaining personal divinity. This luminous soul vehicle was 
also understood to be the seat of phantasia (“imagination”) and the “organ” by which 
sensual and divine perceptions were apprehended. For the Neoplatonist, active 
imagination itself was the vehicle for the soul—or even, the soul itself—much like 
Blake’s “divine body of man.” Ancient and modern theories of rhetoric and reading 
                                               
119 William James, The varieties of religious experience.: a study in human nature : being 
the Gifford lectures on natural religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902 (New York: 
Modern Library, 1929), 31 – 32. Martin Jay (2005) places James’ interest in “experience” 
in the context of a larger phenomenological movement around 1900 that posited 
“religious experience” as a sui generis category, a position that has been criticized for 
“essentialism” by many scholars since the “linguistic turn.” Ann Taves has qualified the 
Jamesian approach by looking at “religious experience,” rather as “experiences deemed 
religious.” Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building-Block Approach to the Study 
of Religion and Other Special Things (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3, 4, 
8, 14. 
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including Quintilian, Longinus, reader-reception theory and cognitive poetics taken with 
the Neoplatonic understanding of phantasia as a cognitive function help us understand 
how the language of the Neoplatonists could induce a heightened self-reflexivity that, 
when “inwardly turned,” results in a sense of self as divine.   
 Chapter 2, “Making Sacred Selves in the Corpus Hermeticum” responds to 
Augustine’s attacks on Hermes Trismegistus, the Graeco-Egyptian mystagogue of late 
antiquity, for “making gods” or idol worship. It provides a “redescription” of theos in the 
Hermetic texts. However, the Graeco-Egyptian Hermetists were more concerned 
with making themselves into gods: "This is the final good for those who have received 
knowledge: to be made god" (Corpus Hermeticum 1.26)120 For Hermetists, apotheosis 
(“deification”) was part of a hermeneutics of self-knowledge or a "technology of self." 
The Hermetica offered a method of self-transformation that allowed one, in Hadot's 
words, to become “one's own master, to possess oneself, and to find one's happiness in 
freedom and inner independence.”121 I will argue that what scholars have characterized as 
an “inward turn” in late antique literature—perhaps most famously articulated by 
Plotinus (eis to eiso; epistrephein pros to eiso) 122—is a turn toward self-sacaralization 
largely informed by Neoplatonic psychology and anthropology. This chapter explores 
reading and imagination in Hermetic texts as “spiritual exercises” and argues that making 
gods (or reading about them) is a form of self-deification.  
 Chapter 3, “Divination is Divinization: Oracles in Late Antique Egypt,” which 
responds to Augustine’s quarrel with Hermes Trismegistus, looks at pharaonic Egyptian 
                                               
120 See chapter 2 for original Greek. 
 
121 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a way of life: spiritual exercises from Socrates to 
Foucault, trans. Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford; New York: Blackwell, 1995), 211. 
 
122 Plotinus, Enneads 1.6.8.4; 5.8.11.12; 6.9.7.18. 
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“traces” in late antique Graeco-Roman Egyptian divination techniques that relate to 
personal divinity. Whether performed publicly as a part of state cult or privately for elite 
(or non-elite) clients, divination in Egypt often suggested the possibility of personal 
divinity for those involved. To bring this possibility of personal divinity into greater 
relief, this chapter will interpret two divination practices, the late antique Egypt “Mithras 
Liturgy” and the ancient Egyptian pḥ-nṯr oracle. I will make the case that self-deification 
as expressed in late antique Graeco-Egyptian cultic, magical and philosophic literature 
was not the exclusive domain of Hellenized philosophical elites such as Plotinus, but 
rather, part of a more general cultural milieu of traditional Egyptian temple thought and 
cultic practice.  
 Chapter 4, “The Philosopher in Late Antique Alexandria.” portrays the 
Neoplatonic classroom in Alexandria and the characters that populated the institutional 
histories. The purpose of this section is to provide historical and social context for the 
types of writers I am discussing in this dissertation and to get a sense of the (textual) 
communities that, in some cases we know, gathered around them. It is also intended to 
bring life to the people behind the ideas.  
 Chapter 5, “Isis, the Cultus of self, and the Genius of Apuleius,” responds to 
Augustine’s attack on Apuleius’s demonology. This chapter explores the construction of 
sacred identity in Apuleius’s second-century Latin novel, Metamorphoses, in view of his 
Platonic work, The god of Socrates. In a close reading that draws from recent studies in 
cultural anthropology and religious studies, I explore the construction of sacred identity 
with special attention to imagination as a “technology of self” and the nuances of “chosen 
subjection.” In this chapter, I develop a theory of interiority and inwardness that is 
explicit in The god of Socrates and implicit in Metamorphoses.  
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 In the conclusion to the dissertation, I elaborate on the role of embodiment in 
personal divinity and how my study fosters compassion for ancient mentalities. 
Extending key concepts developed by Durkheim and Otto, I will present a theory of the 
sacred that has emerged from my work with these sources, and finally, drawing on 
Collingwood, suggest how the writing of history, informed by a reflexive philosophy of 
history functions much like the “spiritual exercises” that constitute my source texts. 
Writing history is a transformative practice that leads to self-knowledge in the present. 
Following this is the “Poetic Postlude” referred to above and four appendices including a 
short essay on Augustine’s education, additional details about his quarrel with the 
Platonists, a return to the Alar of Victory controversy invoked in the “Historical Prelude” 
(below), and finally, a broad historiographical essay about late antiquity as a field of 
study with an emphasis on Anglophone scholarship. 
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Historical Prelude  
 Many were shocked when a disgruntled former Roman commander, now Visigoth 
king, famously sacked the “eternal city” in 410.123 The old guard placed the blame on 
Christianity, the new cult steadily rising in might since Constantine (272 – 337).124 
Eighteen years earlier, Roman Christians removed the Altar of Victory from the Roman 
Senate along with funding for the traditional state cults. The aristocrat Symmachus’s plea 
(335 – 402) to return the altar in the name of tolerance for ancient custom —“It is not by 
one way alone that we can arrive at so sublime a mystery” (Symmachus, Relatio 13):125—
fell on Valentinian II’s deaf ears (371 – 392), muffled by Ambrose (340 – 397), the 
powerful Bishop of Milan.126 In 384, two years after the Altar of Victory was removed, a 
young Manichaean, Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) moved from Carthage to Milan after 
receiving an invitation from that same Symmachus on behalf of the imperial court in 
Milan to serve as a professor of rhetoric, a move that also brought Augustine in contact 
with his future confessor, Ambrose.  In 387, Augustine returned to his native Africa, a 
                                               
123 Alaric I (370/375-410). Averil Cameron questions the extent of the “sack”:  “There is 
archaeological confirmation of burning in some areas, and there was no doubt much 
individual suffering, but there was no widespread destruction and the Goths were bought 
off after three days; they may never have intended an invasion” in Gillian Clark, “City of 
Books: Augustine and the World as Text” in The Early Christian Book, eds. William E. 
Klingshirn and Linda Safran (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
2007), 123; See also Neil Christie, “Lost Glories” Rome at the End of the Empire,” in 
Ancient Rome: The Archaeology of the Eternal City, ed. Jon Coulston and Hazel Dodge 
(Oxford, 2000), 306-32, note 22. 
 
124 Edict of Milan (313), which decreed tolerance for Christian practice, with the Edict of 
Thessalonica (380) during the joint reign of Theodosius I, Gratian, and Valentinian II 
when Christianity was made the official state cult. 
 
125 Symmachus, Relationes 13: “uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande 
secretum.” 
 
126 Valentian’s mother, the Empress Justina and Theodosius I, whose influence over the 
child emperor was immense, likely take more credit for the refusal. 
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Christian. If blood on the curial altar had insured the protection of Rome for 800 years, as 
some believed (Augustine argued that it hadn’t) that policy expired in 410.  
 In 412, shortly after the attack on Rome, Augustine wrote a letter to Volusian, a 
Roman “pagan” official living in Africa Proconsularis (Numidia) about his plans to write 
City of God, the magnum opus he would complete over the next thirteen years. 127 The 
City of God is Augustine’s response to those who blamed the sack of Rome on the 
abandonment of the traditional gods and their temples in favor of an imperial 
Christianity. Near the end of his life in 427, Augustine would again see frontier foederati 
“Vandalizing” Roman cities, even besieging the gates of his own Hippo Regius. During 
this time, he wrote The Retractions, emending his body of work before his death in 430. 
Recalling the sack of Rome in 410, Augustine reflects on the response that initially 
motivated the City of God: “The worshippers of many false gods, whom we call by the 
customary name pagans, attempting to attribute its destruction to the Christian religione, 
began to blaspheme the true god more sharply and bitterly than usual” (Augustine, 
Retractiones 69.1).128  
 In twenty-two books, City of God, “ranges over the moral and philosophical 
heritage of Graeco-Roman culture, the history of the world and of God’s people within it, 
the purpose and limitations of human society, and the distinctive teachings of Christian 
theology.”129 Augustine referred to it as “this huge book” (Augustine, De civitate Dei 
                                               
127 I will retain Augustine’s use of the term “pagan” in parts of this dissertation in 
reference to adherents and practitioners of tradition classical cult and culture when seen 
through Augustine’s eyes. 
 
128 Bogan, trans. “cuius euersionem deorum faslorum multorumque cultores, quos usitato 
nomine paganos uocamus, in Christianam religionem referre conantes solito acerbius et 
amarius deum uerum blasphemare uel errors libros de ciutate dei scriber institui.” 
 
129 Clark, “City of Books,” 118. 
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22.30).130 The first ten books refute Roman ideas about the gods, five books devoted to 
popular cult and five to the philosophers. The remaining twelve develop the idea of the 
two cities, the earthly city and a “heavenly” one. In Book 3, Augustine lists scores of 
calamities that befell the ancient Romans centuries before the sacking of Rome: “[T]heir 
gods did not prevent the occurrence of those evils which they alone fear, even when they 
worshipped them unhampered” (3.1).131 In a striking passage, he hammers his readers 
repeatedly: “Where were they (i.e. the “pagan” gods) when…? Where were they 
when…?,”132 each time listing yet another historical tragedy taken from Livy, displaying 
                                                                                                                                            
 
130 In a letter to Firmus written in 426/7, Augustine offers advice to copyists. Epistula 
1*a, 1: “There are twenty-two books which are rather too bulky to be bound tougher into 
one volume. If you wish for two volumes, they must be divided up so that one volume 
has ten books and the other, twelve. In the first ten, the vanities of the impious have been 
refuted and in the other twelve, our religion has been described and defended although, 
where it was more opportune, I have undertaken the defense in the first ten, as well as the 
refutation in the last twelve.” Eno, trans. (Nes sunt XXII quos in unum corpus redigere 
multum est; et si duos uis codices fieri, ita diuidendi sunt, ut decem libros habeat, unus, 
alius duodecim. Decem quippe illis uanitates refutatae sunt impiorum, reliquis autem 
demonstrata atque defensa est nostra religio, quamuis et in illis hoc factum sit ubi 
opportunius fuit, et in istis illud.) 
 
131 McCracken, trans. “Sed neque talia mala, quae isti sola formidant, dii eorum, quando 
ab eis libere colebantur, ne illis acciderent obstiterunt.” 
 
132 McCracken, trans. “Ubi ergo erant illi dii, qui propter exiguam fallacemque mundi 
huius felicitatem colendi existimantur, cum Romani, quibus se colendos mendacissima 
astutia venditabant, tantis calamitatibus vexarentur? Ubi erant, quando Valerius consul 
ab exulibus et servis incensum Capitolium cum defensaret occisus est faciliusque ipse 
prodesse potuit aedi Iovis quam illi turba tot numinum cum suo maximo atque optimo 
rege, cuius tempmm liberaverat, subvenire? Ubi erant, quando densissimis fatigata 
civitas seditionum malis, cum legatos Athenas missos ad leges mutuandas paululum 
quieta opperiretur, gravi fame pestilentiaque vastata est? Ubi erant, quando rursus 
populus, cum fame laboraret, praefectum annonae primum creavit, atque illa fame 
invalescente Spurius Maelius, quia esurienti multitudini frumenta largitus est, regni 
adfectati crimen incurrit et eiusdem praefecti instantia per dictatorem L. Quintium aetate 
decrepitum a Quinto Servilio magistro equitum cum maximo et periculosissimo tumultu 
civitatis occisus est?” 
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his mastery of Latin literature.133 Jason Moralee remarks: “Augustine rarely missed the 
chance to ridicule Roman claims that [they were] especially graced by the gods. In his 
City of God, Augustine wonders whether the gods of Troy, who were entrusted with 
Rome’s protection, were elsewhere when the siege started but returned just in the nick of 
time, drawing on the widely accepted view that absent gods and goddesses were unable 
to protect their own temples.”134 The Roman gods, it turns out, were not much help with 
or without the Altar of Victory but nor was the Christian god to the dismay of the 
Christians. Augustine’s point is that all earthly cities will get sacked, save the “city of 
God.” This dissertation is concerned with Augustine’s refutation of the philosophers, 
particularly his ambivalent engagement with the Platonists in Books 8 - 10. Augustine 
sought a refuge for the woes of the world, much like the philosophers, a safe haven he 
found in what he considered the “true philosophy” in Christian teachings. But the 
problem of “salvation”—ultimately, liberation from death—was one his Platonici and 
theurgici were equally familiar with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
133 James. J. O’Donnell suggests that Augustine was “using the authors as references 
works, rather than enjoying them as literary creations” in J.J. O’Donnell, “Augustine’s 
Classical Readings,” Recherches Augustiniennes 15 (1980): 161. See my Appendix A. 
 
134 Jason Moralee, Rome's Holy Mountain: the Capitoline Hill in Late Antiquity (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 155. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
NEOPLATONISM AND THE “VEHICLE OF THE SOUL”:  
MAP IS TERRITORY135 
 
 Neoplatonism is a term used by scholars since the nineteenth century to describe a 
philosophical movement in the late Roman Empire between the third and sixth centuries 
that interpreted Plato but also drew from Aristotle, the Stoics, the Chaldean Oracles, and 
responded to Christianity. While there are important differences between the various 
Neoplatonists, they share a number of assumptions observed by Pauliina Remes, two of 
which I will mention here: 1) a commitment to an ineffable first principle, the One (hen), 
the source of all being and becoming and the idea that the Divine Mind (nous) can be 
known and 2) the idea that philosophy was a “way of life” that leads to becoming “god-
like,” what I am calling “personal divinity.”136 Aaron Hughes adds an important third 
assumption:  
 [M]any of the authors we today deem Neoplatonists seemed to have shared an 
assumption that the reader of a philosophical text must be an active participant. 
The meaning of the text can only be understood when the reader clarifies his or 
her own situation in the light of the text….A Neoplatonic reading, therefore, must 
be an active reading because one reads not so much for the message but for the 
experience.137  
 
The “vehicle of the soul” (ochêma pneuma) was a Neoplatonic technology for 
attaining personal divinity. This soul vehicle was also understood to be the seat of 
                                               
135 Homage to Jonathan Z. Smith, Map Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of 
Religions. (Leiden: Brill, 1978). Smith writes: “The historian’s task is to complicate not 
to clarify…The historian provides us with hints that remain too fragile to bear the burden 
of being solutions” (290). 
 
136 Pauliina Remes, Neoplatonism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), 7-10. 
 
137 Aaron W. Hughes, and Abraham ben Meïr Ibn Ezra, The Texture of the Divine: 
Imagination in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2004), 53.  
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imagination (phantasia) and the “organ” by which both sensual and “divine” (or non-
sensual) perceptions were apprehended and experienced. It was a mode of perception and 
kind of consciousness that navigated the invisible world by making it visible. For the 
Neoplatonist, the active imagination itself was the vehicle for the soul—or the soul 
itself—much like William Blake’s “divine body of man.”138 With ancient and modern 
theories about reading and the imagination in mind—from Quintilian139 to Cognitive 
Poetics—this chapter interrogates the way reading (or hearing) texts, particularly those 
that discuss ideas about personal divinity, function as “spiritual exercises” that serve to 
cultivate personal divinity. In the Neoplatonic context, divinity is a quality of the “One,” 
the ultimate source of being and becoming for the Neoplatonists, sometimes called 
“Beauty,” (kalon) “God” (theos), or, after Plato, the “Good” (agathon). Divinity, in this 
context, might more easily be understood simply as “invisible, intelligent, immortal 
power.” Personal divinity, I suggest, was the identification and participation in the 
invisible, intelligent power of the divine Mind (Nous), an emanating feature of the One. 
Reading (or hearing) Neoplatonic texts as spiritual exercises was an imaginative 
engagement by philosophers with ideas about divinity that offered a method—through 
the vehicle of the soul—of achieving personal divinity. 
 
 Famously attempting to harmonize Aristotle with Plato (a point that will become 
critical to the exercise I offer at the end of the chapter), the Neoplatonists’ concept of the 
                                               
 
138 “Annotations to Berkeley’s Siris” (1744) in William Blake, David V. Erdman, and 
Harold Bloom, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1982), 663. 
 
139 Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (c. 35 – c. 100). Roman educator and rhetorician, born in 
Roman province of Hispania, died in Rome. 	
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vehicle of the soul links the “star-chariots” in Plato (Timaeus 41d-e)140 with the “starry 
pneuma” of Aristotle (De generatione animalium 736b 35-9).141 E.R. Dodds describes the 
ochêma pneuma as “an inner envelope of the soul, which is less material than the fleshly 
body and survives its dissolution, yet has not the pure immateriality of mind.”142 The 
vehicle of the soul became a feature on the Neoplatonic map of the soul’s journey. 
Despite the important technical differences between how it was theorized by individual 
Neoplatonists and despite its complicated evolution from earlier thinkers such as Galen 
and Poseidonius (nicely summarized by John Dillon),143 the vehicle of the soul generally 
fulfills three functions. Quoting John Finamore: “[I]t houses the rational soul [i.e. 
“mind”) in its descent from the noetic realm to the realm of generation; it acts as the 
organ of sense-perception and imagination; and, through theurgic rites, it can be purified 
and lifted above, [as] a vehicle for the rational soul’s return through the cosmos to the 
gods.”144   
                                               
140 “And when He had compounded the whole He divided it into souls equal in number to 
the stars, and each several soul He assigned to one star, and setting them each as it were 
in a chariot.” Bury, trans. (ξυστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλε ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις ἔνειμέ 
θ᾿ Eἑκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα.) 
 
141 “And the natural substance which is in the pneuma; and this substance is analogous to 
the element which belongs to the stars.” Peck, trans. (καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, 
ἀνάλογον οὖσα τῷ aτῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ.) 
 
142 E. R. Dodds, Stoicheiōsis Theologikē = The Elements of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963), 315. 
 
143 John Dillon, “Plotinus and the Vehicle of the Soul,” in John Turner, John Douglas, 
Kevin Corrigan, and Tuomas Rasimus (eds.), Gnosticism, Platonism and the late ancient 
world: essays in honour of John D. Turner (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
 
144 John F. Finamore, Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul (Chico, CA: 
Scholars Press, 1985), 1. See note 65 for discussion of theurgic rites. 
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 Although the vehicle of the soul was discussed explicitly by Porphyry, 
Iamblichus, and Proclus, there is a suggestion of such a body in Plotinus, where he 
discusses the descent of the soul: “…when the soul leaves the noetic realm, it goes ‘first 
into heaven and receives there a body through which it continues into more earthy 
bodies” (Plotinus, Ennead 4.3.15.1-3).145 Unlike Porphyry, Iamblichus thinks that the 
vehicle of the soul is immortal. The difference between Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ 
position on the vehicle can be summarized as follows: “[F]or Porphyry the vehicle is 
created from portions of the bodies of the visible gods and perishes when these portions 
are sloughed off, whereas for Iamblichus it is ethereal and created whole by the 
Demiurge, and not subject to destruction or dissolution of any kind.”146 For the 
Neoplatonists, the soul vehicle was also key to realizing personal divinity. Gregory Shaw 
shows how  “[t]he doctrine of the ‘soul vehicle’ in the Platonic tradition is essential for 
understanding the manner in which the later Platonists visualized immortality…the 
perfection of this aetheric and luminous body effected the soul’s immortalization.”147 The 
key term here is “visualized.” When readers visualized a vehicle, they mentally inhabited 
the means by which they could extend conscious existence beyond the limits of the 
physical body. 
 
 
 
                                               
145 Armstrong, trans. “Ἴασι δὲ ἐκκύψασαι τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς οὐρανὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ σῶμα 
ἐκεῖ προσλαβοῦσαι δι᾿ αὐτοῦ ἤδη χωροῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γεωδέστερα σώματα.” 
 
146 Finamore, Iamblichus, 27. 
 
147 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 51.  
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The Seat of Phantasia 
 Turning to the vehicle’s function as an organ of sense perception, the vehicle of 
the soul was understood as the seat of phantasia, the image-making faculty of 
consciousness.  Synesius, a Christian Neoplatonist (373 – 414) and student of Hypatia (d. 
415), later identified the luminous body of the soul with the imagination itself.148 Robert 
Berchman describes how the Neoplatonic imagination, in the best sense, functions:  
The imagination (phantasia) receives the products of thought (logoi) and 
perception (aesthesis). These products are then passed on to the reasoning faculty 
for processing. Imagination is, accordingly, based on something far more 
profound than an awareness of physical conditions. It carries a meaning close to 
the idea of consciousness. This means that the imagination is a power of 
perceptive awareness that transcends sensation. Significantly, it refers to that 
mental faculty which provides knowledge of the intelligibles above and within the 
soul.149  
 
 Indeed, apprehension of an invisible divine power required imagination. But make 
no mistake: the discussion of imagination in the texts is more often critical than not. 
Gerard Watson notes that the Neoplatonists were suspicious of the imagination for its 
tendency to amplify passions such as anger and desire, but they also accepted “the 
(Aristotelian) understanding of [the imagination] as a middle between sense and intellect, 
and even [welcomed] it as a possible help to a glimpse of a higher world.”150 Operating 
between sense and intellect, Neoplatonic imagination partakes of both sense and intellect 
as a cognitive function, “close to the idea of consciousness.”  
                                               
148 Synesius, De Insomiis 1.134a,1. See Donald Andrew Russell, Ursula Bittrich, Börje 
Bydén, and Heinz-Günther Nesselrath. On prophecy, dreams and human imagination: 
Synesius, De insomniis (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014). 
 
149 Robert M. Berchman, Porphyry against the Christians (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 102.  
 
150 Gerard Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought (Galway: Galway Univ. Press, 1988). 
96. 
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 Despite the cautions expressed above, the view that the imagination 
“penetrates…what the mind cannot conceive,” to quote Kevin Corrigan, persists in 
Neoplatonic thought.151 While on the one hand phantasia is a highly technical term with 
positive and negative connotations in the texts, it can loosely be understood as 
imagination. Imagination and thought work together. Again, Corrigan: “As a borderland 
between the material world and the purely immaterial world of the intellect, this space of 
the imagination offers a transitional domain that the mind can come to inhabit. This 
visionary space does not contain external object nor illusions nor hallucinations. Rather, 
it is above all a realm of self-illumination….”152 Imagination, therefore, served to elevate 
consciousness beyond its normal capacities. Indeed, one might ask how imagination and 
consciousness are different at all. 
 Imagination in this period does not have the connotation of something that is “just 
made up” or “untrue” as it does in the modern sense.153  For the Neoplatonists on the 
other hand, imagination was a cognitive faculty that gave shape to sense perceptions so 
                                               
151 Kevin Corrigan, and Plotinus, Reading Plotinus: A Practical Introduction to 
Neoplatonism (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2005), 232. 
 
152 Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 173. 
 
153 Henry Corbin comments on the fate of imagination in modernity: “Imagination is 
confounded with fantasy. The notion that the Imagination has a noetic value, that it is an 
organ of knowledge because it ‘creates’ being, is not readily compatible with our habits 
….The degradation of the Imagination into fantasy is complete. An opposition is seen 
between the fragility and gratuitousness of artistic creation and the solidity of ‘social’ 
achievements, which are viewed as the justification and explanation of developments in 
the artistic world. In short, there has ceased to be an intermediate level between 
empirically verifiable reality and unreality pure and simple. All indemonstrable, invisible, 
inaudible things are classified as creations of the Imagination, that is, of the faculty 
whose function it is to secrete the imaginary, the unreal. In this context of 
agnosticism…all forms of divinity are said to be creations of the imagination, hence 
unreal.” Henry Corbin, Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 
Arabi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 180 – 181. Divinity is “real” for us 
but not without us. Whatever it is, it needs us. 
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that the mind could make judgments. It also gave shape to the “higher” soul’s 
apprehension of the gods and the Forms in the intelligible realms. Gregory Shaw notes: 
“On the horizontal level phantasia was merely the play of the discursive mind, but if 
properly purified and trained, the vertical dimension that sustained it could be 
awakened.”154 In Sara Ahbel-Rappe’s words: “Plotinus relies upon a series of thought 
experiments embedded within the text, whose purpose is to foster the potential for self-
awareness and so orient the student upon a path of self-knowledge.”155The purification 
and training was achieved through “spiritual exercises” or imaginative technologies of 
self-transformation that led to an exalted self-perception and access to knowledge.  
 Often it seems the Neoplatonists tended to patrol the border between intellect and 
imagination. The Neoplatonists often divide up cognitive features into “higher” and 
“lower” because of their suspicion of imagination, a point taken up by Crystal Addey 
who offers an important critique of the modern (and ancient) tendency to dichotomize 
ways of knowing, privileging certain kinds of knowledge over others.156 Despite this 
tendency, the Neoplatonists return again and again to a notion of imagination that is a 
kind of cognition in its own right. Intellect required imagination. Can one imagine 
thinking without it? Plotinus addresses this relationship:  [T]he image-making 
power…show[s] the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension 
and persistence and memory of it. Therefore, even though the soul is always moved to 
                                               
154 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 221. 
 
155 Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 79. 
 
156 Crystal Addey, “In the Light of the Sphere: The ‘Vehicle of the Soul’ and Subtle-
Body Practices in Neoplatonism,” in Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West: 
Between Mind and Body, ed. Geoffrey Samuel and Jay Johnston (Hoboken: Taylor and 
Francis, 2013), 156-7.  
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intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the image-making power that we 
apprehend it” (Plotinus, Ennead 4.3.30.10-16)157  On the one hand, the “higher” mind on 
Plotinus’ map is always already in contemplation, although unknown to itself. Only 
through imagination does it realize it is doing so. On the other hand, Plotinus’ discussion 
betrays the irony of the Neoplatonic attempt to downgrade imagination to a “lower” 
status.  
 Aaron Hughes explains the import of the imagination to the Neoplatonic 
philosophical project of visualizing and identifying with invisible divine power:  
[Imagination] is the faculty that is ultimately responsible for the creation of 
images or symbols that capture certain perspectives of the divine’s ineffability. 
The imagination now becomes the primary vehicle whereby the individual grasps 
that which exists without matter…. As a result, the imagination ultimately 
becomes responsible for giving the transcendental an appropriate phenomenality. 
But this is not simply a translation of something ineffable into a communicable 
form. Rather, the imagination’s gaze is the main component of the experience.158  
 
Divine union or co-activity with the mind of god—which was the Neoplatonic aim—
must be imagined as a possibility to begin with, if it is to be a possibility. Imagination is 
not simply a vehicle, it is the soul, it is what the soul does, or, more to the point: the soul 
is what it does. The more we look, the more the vehicle of the soul as active imagination 
begins to look like the soul. The imaginative function is more than a feature on a map, it 
is the territory itself. Despite all their caution, the soul’s vehicle remains a technology of 
self-transformation for the Neoplatonist, a pathway for personal divinity, a way to 
                                               
157 Armstrong, trans. “τὸ φανταστικὸν ἔδειξε τὸ νόημα οἷον ἐν κατόπτρῳ, καὶ ἡ ἀντίληψις 
αὐτοῦ οὕτω καὶ ἡ μονὴ καὶ ἡ μνήμη. διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ κινουμένης πρὸς νόησιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅταν 
ἐν τούτῳ γένηται, ἡμῖν ἡ ἀντίληψις. ἄλλο γὰρ ἡ νόησις, καὶ ἄλλο ἡ τῆς νοήσεως 
ἀντίληψις.” 
 
158 Hughes, Texture of the Divine, 4-6. 
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participate in and identify with the divine, what Neoplatonists mapped out as the unseen 
and ineffable source of being in its intellective capacity.  
 
  
Spiritual Exercises and Rhetoric  
 To better understand the imaginative gaze, let us consider an under-examined 
aspect of how the Neoplatonic texts, when read or heard, function as “spiritual exercises.”  
The appeal to imagination as a rhetorical strategy learned in the late ancient schools of 
rhetoric—combined with the Neoplatonic understanding of imagination’s role in the map 
of the soul—helps us appreciate how these texts function as imaginative technologies of 
self-transformation that constructed an experience of personal divinity for their audience. 
The Neoplatonists were men and women of paideia.159 Edward Watts discusses how the 
philosophers had “separated themselves from the average [person] by their knowledge of 
and appreciation for the worlds, ideas, and texts of classical antiquity.”160 In the late 
antique Roman world, education for the aspiring elite “consisted of study at a school of 
                                               
159 Notably, Hypatia and Sosipatra. See Maria Dzielska, Hypatia of Alexandria 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995); Sarah Iles Johnston, “Sosipatra and 
the Theurgic Life: Eunapius Vitae Sophistorum 6.6.5-6.9.25,” in Reflections on Religious 
Individuality: Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian Texts and Practices, eds. Jörg Rüpke 
and Wolfgang Spickermann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012). Robert Lamberton writes: “The 
combination of Porphyry’s emphasis on the philosophical commitment of the two 
Geminas and of Amphicleia (Plot. 9.1-3) with his insistence on the openness of the 
school (Plot. 1.13) seems to tip the scale in favor of [women’s] presence in the lectures 
and discussions. Plato’s Academy, according to the traditions that went back at least to 
Dicaearchus (fr. 44 Wehrli), included women, and the Platonic teachers of the fourth and 
fifth centuries clearly included women (Hypatia) and we know that women were among 
their students.” Richard Lamburton, “The Schools of Platonic Philosophy of the Roman 
Empire: The Evidence of the Biographies,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, 
ed. Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 441. 
 
160 Edward Jay Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006), 2. 
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letters” where basic literacy was taught.161 Those with means continued with a 
grammarian, learning the grammatical rules, acquiring an introductory knowledge of the 
canon. Some ventured further working through the progymnasmata where composition 
was practiced.  
 The next phase was the school of rhetoric where literary allusions (and their moral 
and historical significance) and oratorical strategies were taught. The final destination for 
a few was the school of philosophy.162 The course of study pursued under teachers of 
rhetoric and philosophy was costly, lengthy, and rigorous: “Indeed, of the fifty-seven 
students of Libanius whose term of study is known, fully thirty-five dropped out by the 
end of their second year.”163 Porphyry studied with Plotinus in his school of philosophy 
and it seems Iamblichus studied for a time under Porphyry. The lineage of students and 
teachers is represented in Eunapius’ The Lives of the Philosophers and Damascius’ 
                                               
 
161 Watts, City and School, 2. On Roman Egypt in particular: “As in the rest of the 
contemporary Graeco-Roman world, education in Roman Egypt was a privately 
organized affair, unregulated by the state. Parents had to arrange, monitor, and determine 
the extent of their children’s education, depending on their means, the local availability 
of teachers, and the expected future roles of their children in society…The physical 
setting of education could be rather informal and depended on the individual 
teacher…Despite its non-institutional character, education followed a broadly uniform 
cultural matrix throughout the Greek world, including Egypt.” Amin Benaissa, “Greek 
Language, Education, and Literary Culture,” in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Egypt, 
ed. Christina Riggs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 528. 
 
162 For education generally, see Henri Irénée Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956); Robert A. Kaster, Guardians of Language: The 
Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988); Yun Lee Too, Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2001). 
 
163 Watts, City and School, 5. 
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Philosophical History. 164  We know something of Plotinus’ later education. Porphyry 
recounts thirty years after his teacher’s death:  
In his twenty-eighth year Plotinus became eager to study philosophy and it was 
recommended that he go to the most renowned teachers in Alexandria at that time. 
He came away from their lectures so full of sadness that he communicated his 
experiences to a friend. That friend, who understood the desire of his heart, sent 
him to Ammonius, who he had not yet tried. Plotinus, upon going and hearing 
him speak one time, told his friend, ‘This is the man I was seeking’ (Vita Plotini 
3, 7-13).165  
 
While we don’t know the details of the philosophers’ earlier grammatical and rhetorical 
educations, we can assume that in order to enter a school of philosophy, they would have 
become learned in the rhetorical strategies of ekphrasis and enargeia that were taught in 
rhetoric handbooks of Aristotle and Quintilian.166 Ekphrasis and enargeia refer to the use 
of vivid language to affect the mind of the reader or listener and persuade them by 
appealing to the imagination.167  
 Ruth Webb explores how the use of vivid language in oratory and writing to 
describe an object or scene brings it to life in the imagination. Ekphrasis and enargeia are 
                                               
164 See Philostratus, Eunapius, Wilmer Cave Wright, Philostratus, the lives of the 
Sophists; Eunapius, lives of the Philosophers (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1921); Damascius le Diadoque, and Polýmnia Athanasiádī. The philosophical history 
(Athens: Apamea, 1999); Marinos of Neapolis and Al. N., Oikonomides, trans. The Life 
of Proclus and the Commentary on the Dedoma of Euclid (Chicago: Ares Publishers, 
Inc., 1977). 
 
165 Armstrong, trans. “Εἰκοστὸν δὲ καὶ ὄγδοον ἔτος αὐτὸν ἄγοντα ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν 
καὶ τοῖς τότε κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν εὐδοκιμοῦσι συσταθέντα κατιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἀκροάσεως 
αὐτῶν κατηφῆ καὶ λύπης πλήρη, ὡς καί τινι τῶν φίλων διηγεῖσθαι ἃ πάσχοι· τὸν δὲ συνέντα 
αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ βούλημα ἀπενέγκαι πρὸς Ἀμμώνιον, οὗ μηδέπω πεπείρατο. Τὸν δὲ 
εἰσελθόντα καὶ ἀκούσαντα φάναι πρὸς τὸν ἑταῖρον· τοῦτον ἐζήτουν.”  
 
166 Aristoteles, and John Henry Freese, The "Art" of Rhetoric (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994); Quintilian, and Harold Edgeworth Butler, The Institutio oratoria 
of Quintilian (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1920). 
 
167 Ruth Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and 
Practice (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 88.  
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used as “a means of arousing the emotions and as a figure of speech which has the 
particularly vital role of ensuring that the listener is swayed by the speaker’s case.”168 
Patricia Cox Miller characterizes ekphrasis and enargeia using Hayden White’s terms: 
“They are figuratively real—that is, they are narrative pictorial strategies that seduce the 
reader in to forgetting that these are images in texts.”169 Our best source for 
understanding ekphrasis and enargeia is Quintilian who explains how the orator “should 
achieve enargeia through the use of mental images.”170 He writes:  
What the Greeks call phantasiai (we shall call them ‘visiones’, if you will) are the 
means by which images of absent things are represented to the mind in such a 
way that we seem to see them with our eyes and to be in their presence. Whoever 
has mastery of them will have a powerful effect on the emotions. Some people 
say that this type of man who can imagine in himself things, words and deeds well 
and in accordance with truth is ‘good at imagining’ (Institutio Oratoria 6.2.29-
30).171 
 
 “[A]wareness of visualization as an important element of both reading or listening to 
others’ work and creating one’s own” was central to a rhetorical education.172 Indeed, the 
hope was that orators (and writers) could “predict and control such a seemingly 
individual and subjective process.”173 The rhetorically trained Neoplatonic philosophers 
likely deployed ekphrasis and enargeia with the aim of persuading their students and 
                                               
168 Webb, Ekphrasis, 88. 
 
169 Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 109.  
 
170 Webb, Ekphrasis, 88. 
 
171 Russell, trans. “Quas φαντασίας Graeci vocant (nos sane visiones appellemus), per 
quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cernere oculis ac 
praesentes habere videamur, has quisquis bene ceperit is erit in adfectibus potentissimus. 
Quidam dicunt εὐφαντασίωτον qui sibi res voces actus secundum verum optime finget: 
quod quidem nobis volentibus facile contingent.” 
 
172 Webb, Ekphrasis, 96. 
 
173 Webb, Ekphrasis, 107. 
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readers. Bringing the faculty of imagination to life by offering vivid language and 
imaginative exercises is more than image-making, it is, in the Neoplatonic context, soul-
making. Such imaginative “activation” of the soul made it possible for the Neoplatonist 
to apprehend and participate in the invisible divine power constitutive of the Neoplatonic 
god, the One (hen) and its Mind (nous). 
 
Cognitive Poetics  
 Modern theories of the imagination and reading also help us understand how the 
Neoplatonic discourses on personal divinity function as imaginative technologies of self-
transformation. Cognitive poetics (and its predecessors, reader-response and reader-
reception theory)174 offer an approach with roots in ancient theories of reading and 
rhetoric that, like ekphrasis and enargeia, are concerned with the effect of language on 
the imagination of the reader.175 In his study of reading in the medieval period, Duncan 
Robertson draws from the reader-response criticism of Stanley Fish and Wolfgang Iser.176 
Setting forth the basic premise of the approach, he writes: “The partnership between the 
reader and the text is where the reader ‘participates both in the production and the 
comprehension of the work’s intention.’”177  Pamela Bright’s study of reader-reception 
                                               
174 Stanley Eugene Fish, “Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,” New Literary 
History 2, no. 1 (1970): 123-162; Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of 
Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
 
175 See Peter Stockwell, Texture: A Cognitive Aesthetics of Reading (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
 
176 Duncan Robertson, Lectio Divina: The Medieval Experience of Reading (Trappist, 
Ky: Cistercian Publications, 2011). 
 
177Robertson, Lectio, 32. Wolfgang Iser notes: “If reading removes the subject-object 
division that constitutes all perception, it follows that the read will be ‘occupied’ by the 
thoughts of the author, and these in their turn will cause the drawing of new ‘boundaries.’ 
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theory in Augustine describes how “[t]he world of reading creates and encourages 
contemplative ‘spaces’ for the reader’s imagination; it is at once a contemplative world 
and a world charged with energy and engagement.”178  
 Adding fresh insight from cognitive science to the humanities, Hugo Lundhaug 
explores personal divinity in the Christian and Gnostic contexts. Lundhaug presents an  
“interpretation from the perspective of how the human mind makes sense of a text by 
means of the creation and integration of multiple mental representations. Acknowledging 
the universal underlying mechanics of thought may…enable us to analyse the intellectual 
products and patterns of thought of peoples and cultures far removed from our own with 
an adequate degree of methodological clarity….”179 To be sure, any text will incite a 
multiplicity of “reader-responses,” informed by and negotiated according to personal, 
                                                                                                                                            
Text and reader no long confront each other as object and subject, but instead the 
‘division’ takes place within the reader himself. In thinking the thoughts of another, his 
own individuality temporarily recedes into the background, since it is supplanted by these 
alien thoughts, which now become the theme on which his attention is focused. As we 
read, there occurs an artificial division of our personality, because we take as a theme for 
ourselves something that we are not. Consequently, when reading we operate on different 
levels. For although we may be thinking—it will merely remain a more or less powerful 
virtual force. Thus, in reading there these two levels—the alien ‘me’ and the real, virtual 
‘me’—which are never completely cut off from each other. Indeed, we can only make 
someone else’s thoughts into an absorbing theme for ourselves, provided the virtual 
background (the real ‘me’) will take on a different form, according to the theme of the 
text concerned. This is inevitable, if only for the fact that the relationship between alien 
theme and virtual background is what makes it possible for the unfamiliar to be 
understood” in Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach,” 
in Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane P. 
Tomkins (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). 67. 
 
178 Pamela Bright, “Augustine and the Ethics of Reading the Bible,” in The Reception and 
Interpretation of the Bible in Late Aantiquity: Proceedings of the Montréal Colloquium in 
Honour of Charles Kannengiesser, ed. Charles Kannengiesser, Lorenzo DiTommaso, and 
Lucian Turcescu (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 64. 
 
179 Hugo Lundhaug, Images of Rebirth: Cognitive Poetics and Transformational 
Soteriology in the Gospel of Philip and the Exegesis on the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 64, 
4-5.  
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social, historical, and material contexts.180 Lundhaug echoes Margaret Freeman who 
cautions us that “literary texts are the products of cognizing minds and their 
interpretations the products of other cognizing minds in the context of the physical and 
sociocultural worlds in which they have been created and read.”181 We should remember 
that the effectiveness of ekphrasis and enargeia relied to some degree on a system of 
shared knowledge in a social context and that the “cognizing mind” has both individual 
and social aspects. Individual experience is not necessarily a product of social experience 
even as it may be informed by it. 
 
The Sacred and the Sublime  
 Earlier I described personal divinity in the Neoplatonic map of the soul as a 
“sacred status.” More needs to be said about the process of self-sacralization where 
human consciousness becomes “divine.” Through an analysis of linguistic and ritual 
context, Roman historian Carlin Barton has developed a new understanding of the social 
and psychological dyanmics of the “sacrificial system” (see chapter 2 for detailed 
discussion). Barton writes: “Forces, powers, functions needed to be isolated, defined, 
carved out of nature and harnessed in order for the charges on them to be either 
                                               
180 Isabella Sandwell uses the sermons of John Chrysostom and the letters of Libanius to 
complicate identity in late antiquity and offers a new approach to thinking about 
Christianization. Relying on the social anthropology of Fredrik Barth and T.H. Eriksen, 
she makes the case for multiple fluid social identities and allegiances. While John 
Chrysostom is unambiguous about what differentiates Christians from Greeks or Jews, 
the writings of Libanius suggest a range of degree in cultic and ideological identification. 
See Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews, and Christians in Antioch 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
181 Lundhaug, Cognitive Poetics, 51. 
 
	 63	
augmented and reinforced or debilitated and dispersed…. Absolutely anything or anyone 
could be sacralized or desecrated….”182   
 Building upon Barton’s insights, I argue that the “inward turn” in Late Antique 
Neoplatonic texts is a turn toward sacralization of self-reflexivity itself.183  Imaginative 
engagements with personal divinity heightened self-reflexivity. By becoming “aware of 
awareness,” reflexivity is “set apart” (sacralized, rendered sacer). Such reflexivity took 
philosophers to the heart of a strange, sometimes overwhelming, recognition of the fact 
of existence where self becomes the mysterium tremendum et fascinans that Otto ascribes 
to the divine “Wholly Other.”184 This point is key to the whole project of personal 
divinity. 
 Robert Doran would agree. He describes a “structure of experience” theorized by 
first-century rhetorician Longinus as “sublimity” (hypsos, literally “elevated”).185 
                                               
182 Carlin A. Barton, “The Emotional Economy of Sacrifice and Execution in Ancient 
Rome,” Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques. 29, no. 2 (2003): 346. 
 
183 In an essay that charts the development of the phrase “epistrophe pros heauton” 
(return or reversion to self) from Heraclitus to Aquinas, Lloyd Gerson defines “self-
reflexivity” as “roughly awareness or cognition of one’s own occurrent cognitive or 
affective states.” “Epistrophe pros heauton: History and Meaning,” Studi Sulla 
Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 7 (1997), 2. 
 
184 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy; An Inquiry into the Non- Rational Factor in the 
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1936). 
 
185 The author and date of Peri hypsos are uncertain although the current consensus 
attributes it to a first-century Pseudo-Longinus. See Robert Doran, The Theory of the 
Sublime from Longinus to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 29-31. 
The influence of Longinus on early modern writers and the “subjective turn” of modern 
aesthetics are clear. While the fact that Longinus is unattested in other ancient sources 
until the tenth century makes him appear unique, it is unlikely that his thought appeared 
independently of an intellectual community. Other ancient authors such as Caecilius, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Philo of Alexandria take up related themes using similar 
language. Longinus was concerned, like Quintilian, with the effect of language on the 
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According to Longinus, the use of “sublimity” as a rhetorical strategy produces “the 
paradoxical experience of being at once overwhelmed and exalted….”186 Like ekphrasis 
and enargeia, hypsos is intended to affect the mind of reader (or hearer). “Elevating” 
language was used to instill a feeling of grandeur (megethos) or high-mindedness 
(megalophrosyne) that characterized sublimity (hypsos). In his rhetoric handbook, On the 
Sublime, Longinus writes: 
For grandeur produces ecstasy (ekstasis) rather than persuasion in the hearer; and 
the combination of wonder (thaumasion) and astonishment (ekplexis) always 
proves superior to the merely persuasive and pleasant. This is because persuasion 
is on the whole something we can control, whereas amazement (ekplexis) and 
wonder (thaumasion) exert invincible power and force and get the better of every 
hearer (Longinus, Peri Hypsos 1.4).187  
 
This “invincible power and force” elevates the mind above its normal state, literally 
“standing outside” (ekstasis).188 The use of “elevating” rhetoric by describing the actions 
of heroes or volcanoes, Longinus argues, “lifts us toward the mighty mind 
(megalophrosynes) of god” (Peri Hypsos 36.1).189 Sublimity, through its combination of 
wonder and astonishment, produces a state that is both overwhelming and exalting—a 
heightened self-reflexivity, a mysterium tremendum et fascinans within and directed 
inwardly toward the self. Neoplatonic texts deliberately provoked self-sacralizing awe. 
                                                                                                                                            
mind of both orator and audience, and, like the Neoplatonists, on the “divinity” of those 
who approached the sublime. 
 
186 Doran, Longinus to Kant, 4. 
 
187 Russell, Literary trans. “οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ᾿ εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ 
ὑπερφυᾶ· πάντη δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν ἀεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ 
θαυμάσιον, εἴγε τὸ μὲν πιθανὸν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ταῦτα δὲ δυναστείαν καὶ βίαν 
ἄμαχον προσφέροντα παντὸς ἐπάνω τοῦ ἀκροωμένου καθίσταται·” 
 
188 James Porter prefers “inward ecstasy” when looking at the rhetoric of sublimity in 
Plotinus. The Sublime in Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 608. 
 
189 Russell, Loeb trans. “τὸ δ᾿ ὕψος ἐγγὺς αἴρει μεγαλοφροσύνης θεοῦ.” 
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“Do this at home”  
 In order to highlight the central role imaginative reading as a technology of self-
transformation plays in my argument, I want to offer the reader an exercise of the 
imagination that will help illustrate the Late Antique mentality I seek to uncover. A 
dissertation about “spiritual exercises” should do no less. To follow is a Neoplatonic map 
of the soul’s journey. Let’s say you are a Neoplatonic philosopher. Within you and 
beyond you, there is an invisible, ineffable source of being, the One, the All. It is, in 
Damascius’ words, an “unknowable darkness” (Damascius, De Principiis 17.125.4).190 
Then, there is the Nous, conceived of as the “Divine Mind,” which, after creating the 
Forms and the gods, emanates psyche or the individual soul. Your thinking and imagining 
soul, which is immaterial, has a vehicle. It’s your imagination. Now, your soul wants to 
be god-like, like Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover,” the work of the Nous is to be engaged in 
an imaginative exercise of cosmic proportions, to “reflect on itself” (Metaphysica 1074b, 
34-5).191 When you engage in thought, which requires imagination, you mirror this divine 
self-reflexive Nous.192 But, how do you go “through the looking glass”? How do you 
raise yourself to the level of the divine? You need purification. If, like Plotinus, you 
                                               
190 My trans. “Σκότος ἂγνωστον.” Cf. Ramesside Period hymn to Amun-Re in Leiden 
Papyrus I 350 (17 – 18): “One is Amun, who hides himself from them, / who hides 
himself from the gods, no one knows his essence./ He is more distant than the sky, / and 
deeper than the netherworld./ No god knows his true form, / his image is not unfolded in 
the papyrus rolls. / He is too mysterious to be disclosed, / too great to be investigated, / 
too mighty to be known… / No god can call him by his name.” Hornung, trans.  
 
191 Tredennick, trans. “ἡ νόεσις νοήσεως νόησις.” 
 
192 Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism,128. See Plotinus on mirror in note 151. 
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purify yourself by always working on your “inner statue” (Ennead 1.6.9)193, chipping 
away all that is not what you really are or if, like Iamblichus, you achieve a “restoration 
of [your] own essence” through prayer and theurgic ritual reconnection with the gods (De 
Anima 43).194 Then, when you imaginatively contemplate Nous, you become “the object 
of your knowing” (Plotinus, Ennead 5.4.2)195—an Aristotelian notion that the 
Neoplatonists adapted freely to achieve their aim.196 Indeed, knowledge was always self-
knowledge. Is this just a word game for the mind? I don’t think so. What the Neoplatonist 
philosopher sought required transformative experience. That’s where heightened 
reflexivity and the sacralization of the self come in. In moments of heightened self-
awareness—as, say, in a thunder and lightning storm, when you become in awe of its 
power and then, reflecting on the awesomeness of your capacity to be in awe, you realize 
you are part of the power of the storm. You become a highly-charged, set-apart, self, 
aware of its sacred status. This is a moment of attaining personal divinity. Like the 
experience of personal divinity sought after by the Neoplatonists, Longinus courted 
                                               
193 A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 260-
1. 
 
194 Finamore and Dillon, trans. “ἀπόδοσις τῆς οόκείας οὀσίας.” 
 
195 Armstrong, trans. “Intellect itself is its objects, granted that it does not get their forms 
from somewhere (for where could it get them from?). But it is here with its objects and 
the same as and one with them: the knowledge of things without matter is its objects.” 
(αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ μὴ εἴδη αὐτῶν κομίζεται. πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλ᾿ ἐνταῦθα μετὰ 
τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἕν· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ πράγματα). 
 
196 See Aristotle’s “identity theory” of knowledge in Aristotle, De Anima, 3.7, 431a and 
8, 431 b (Hett, trans.). Pauliina Remes comments: “In Metaphysics, God is said to think 
of itself, of intelligibility, and thereby becoming that intelligibility… Plotinus’ synthesis 
is to treat only the perfect knower, nous, and its objects as identical, but this ideal thinker 
resides in every human soul.” Pauliina Remes, “Inwardness and Infinity of Selfhood: 
From Plotinus to Augustine,” in Ancient Philosophy of the Self, eds. Pauliina Remes and 
Juha Sihvola. (Dordrecht: Spring, 2008), 158. 
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rhetorical moments (kairos) of reflexive intensity where “…a well-timed flash of 
sublimity shatters everything like a bolt of lightning (skeptou)” (Longinus, Peri Hypsos 
1.4). 197 The “shattered” reader (or hearer) became elevated to a new state of awareness 
and self-knowledge conceived as divine. 
Conclusion: Ways of Knowing  
 Historian Monica Black, following Dipesh Chakrabarty,198 wants to go  “a step 
beyond the kind of ethnographic empathy that has become an established part of the 
practice of many historians…to find a way of proceeding in…inquiries into human 
experience and culture that permits the existence, agency, and reality of the unseen.”199 
So do I. The Neoplatonists permitted the reality of the unseen. They imagined it. Whether 
speaking about Neoplatonism, Hermetism, or other similar movements, accounting for 
imaginative engagements with texts about personal divinity—and the resultant 
heightened self-reflexivity—complicates how scholars interpret esoteric maps of the soul. 
Like Carolyn Dinshaw, “I acknowledge that there are different knowledge cultures, 
different ways of knowing and sources of knowledge, and different purposes and goals, 
and I join in the critique, therefore, of expert knowledge production.” 200  
 For me, “what is crucial in historical study is to give us and our students a 
heightened capacity to appreciate the multiplicity and complexity of human experience, 
                                               
197 Russell, Literary trans. “ὕψος δέ που καιρίως ἐξενεχθὲν τά τε πράγματα δίκην σκηπτοῦ 
πάντα διεφόρησεν.” 
 
198 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
 
199 Monica Black, "The Supernatural and the Poetics of History,” The Hedgehog Review 
13.3 (2011): 73. 
 
200 Carolyn Dinshaw, How Soon Is Now?: Medieval Texts, Amateur Readers, and the 
Queerness of Time (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 38. 
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past and present, and to come to some understanding of the various processes by which 
one symbolic order comes to be prized over another or erased altogether.”201 The 
Neoplatonic commitment to an “invisible power” accessible through the imagination may 
be an “erasure” we can now re-imagine or understand in new ways. In her discussion of 
imagination in late antiquity, Patricia Cox Miller (after Bachelard) suggests that “images 
(and the imagining process) do not passively reproduce ‘reality’: they actively create 
it.”202 This strikes at the heart of why the Neoplatonists could not really do without 
imagination. If imagination was the vehicle for the soul, it also was its reality. In a map of 
the soul, where imagination is the soul, the map is the territory. 
 
  
                                               
201 Black, “Poetics,” 75. 
 
202 Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 179; Gaston Bachelard, Earth and Reveries of Will: 
An Essay on the Imagination of Matter (Dallas: Dallas Institute of Humanities and 
Culture, 2002). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MAKING SACRED SELVES IN THE CORPUS HERMETICUM 
 
 This chapter redescribes the “sacred” in Late Antique Hermeticism in terms of 
individual experience rather than social function. “Redescription” is “a form of 
explanation that privileges difference and involves comparison and translation, category 
formation and rectification, definition and theory.”203 Using the sections from the Greek 
Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius that Augustine cites in Books 8 and 9 in City 
of God, I will demonstrate how the Hermetic literature can be read as a method of self-
sacralization or personal divinity. This chapter is divided in two parts, treating the Greek 
and Latin Hermetic tractates in turn. Let us first consider some of the problems associated 
with the Hermetic literature. 
 
Hermetica  
The Hermetica are a collection of Graeco-Egyptian texts produced between the 
early first and late third centuries CE between the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and 
Diocletian.204 They are attributed to (or at least center upon) Hermes Trismegistus, a 
                                               
203 Ron Cameron and Merrill P. Miller. Redescribing Paul and the Corinthians (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 1. Thanks to Gerhardus van den Heever, University 
of South Africa for his comments about redescription in relation to my approach. 
 
204 Although beyond the scope of this chapter, it would be interesting to explore how 
Neoplatonism, the Hermetica, and early Christian literature respond to the “Crisis of the 
Third Century,” a time of great political, military, economic, and social instability for the 
Roman Empire. Stephen Greenblatt, writing about the complex tension between 
individual agency and the constraints of social structures, comments: “This tension 
cannot be resolved in any abstract theoretical way, for in given historical circumstances 
structures of power seek to mobilize some individuals and immobilize others. And it is 
important to note that moments in which individuals feel most completely in control may, 
under careful scrutiny, prove to be moments of the most intense structural determination, 
while moments in which the social structure applies the fiercest pressure on the 
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“mystagogical figure who represents a blending of the Egyptian god Thoth…with the 
Greek god Hermes.”205 Early Christian writers such as Lactantius and Augustine cite the 
Hermetica extensively.206 Hermetic writings are referred to by the Neoplatonists Plotinus, 
Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Damascius.207 The Hermetica—or Corpus Hermeticum as 
Renaissance Neoplatonist translator Marcilio Ficino titled them, include a group of 
seventeen tractates in Greek as well as the Asclepius, a Latin version of an original Greek 
text, various fragments from the fifth-century Stobaeus, a few texts excerpts from the 
Nag Hammadi Codex, and many of the “Theban cache” that has come to be known as the 
Papyri Graecae Magicae. A portion of the Theban collection includes demotic (late 
phase Egyptian) material as well which has been excluded from most scholarly studies 
until recently.208 A concern with cosmology and the relationship between the individual 
and divine characterizes most of the texts although many of the texts offer practical 
strategies in ritual format (“spells”) for negotiating the concerns of day-to-day life such 
love, healing, protection and revenge.  
                                                                                                                                            
individual may in fact be precisely those moments in which individuals are exercising the 
most stubborn will to autonomous movement.” Stephen Greenblatt, Cultural Mobility: A 
Manifesto (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 251-2. See Garth 
Fowden’s discussion of Max Weber’s “Laienintellektualismus” in Fowden, Egyptian 
Hermes, 189. 
 
205 Ronald R. Cox, By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in Hellenistic Judaism and 
Early Christianity (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 284. 
 
206 See Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones 1.61, 7.13.4; Augustine, De civitate Dei 8. 
 
207 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 8.1; 8.4; 8.5. 
 
208 Hans Dieter Betz includes them in The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, 
Including the Demotic Spells. Edited by Hans Dieter Betz (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992). See Janet H. Johnson’s introduction to the Demotic papyri. 
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Scholars since André-Jean Festugière have divided the Hermetica into “technical” 
and “philosophical” texts. The term “technical” refers to the use of symbolic actions and 
materials along with performative utterances. The “philosophical” texts seem closer to 
what one would expect from Platonic writers. The philosophical texts generally posit, to 
use Brian P. Copenhaver’s words, “a theory of salvation through knowledge or 
gnosis.”209 Peter Kingsley comments: 
There is a tendency nowadays to replace the distinction between ‘philosophical’ 
Hermetica and ‘magical’ or alchemical ones, which was used by an older 
generation of scholars, with a distinction between the ‘theoretical’ and the 
‘technical’. This is a step forward, because it lays less weight on an imagined 
dichotomy between the rational and irrational. And yet it is still not quite 
adequate. We can call these ‘philosophical’ texts theoretical, if we want. But that 
is only because we choose to stay at the level of theory. Viewed in their own 
context, they shared an intensely practical purpose. They were meant to engage 
not just the mind and intellect but – often through the power of example – one’s 
whole life and being.210  
 
Copenhaver has rightly pointed out the lack of any “clear, rigid distinctions” in the 
ancient world between “lofty” teachings about the “fate of the soul” and texts and 
practices that strike some “as a merely instrumental device of humbler intent” because of 
their interest in the practicalities of daily life.211 Copenhaver suggests that the technical 
texts are equally concerned with salvation as “the resolution of man’s fate where it finds 
him.”212  
                                               
209 Brian P. Copenhaver, Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin 
Asclepius in a New English Translation, with Notes and Introduction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), xxxvii. 
 
210 Peter Kingsley, “An Introduction to the Hermetic: Approaching Ancient Esoteric 
Tradition,” in From Poimandres to Jacob Böhme: Gnosis, Hermetism and the 
Christian Tradition, edited by Roelof van den Broek and Cis van Heertum 
(Amsterdam: In the Pelikaan, 2000), 33. 
 
211 Copenhaver, Hermetica, xxxvii. 
 
212 Copenhaver, Hermetica, xxxvii. 
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 Ronald Cox describes Hermetic salvation as “self-recognition” (gnothi seauton)213 
which puts the Hermetic project in a Platonic milieu. Garth Fowden has also challenged 
the dichotomy between “philosophical” and “technical” texts and suggests that if we are 
to understand the Hermetica as the product of a practicing community on the ground, 
these two kinds of texts need to be considered in tandem: “Hermetism can only be 
properly understood if the technical and philosophical books are seen as enshrining 
related aspects of Man’s attempt to understand himself, the world around him, and God—
in fact, as a practical spiritual ‘way.’”214  
 The Papyri Graecae Magicae divination ritual known as the “Mithras Liturgy” 
(examined in chapter 3) is a central point of comparison for Garth Fowden with the 
“philosophical” Corpus Hermeticum: “The technical Hermetica, developing stage by 
stage the doctrine of sympathy [e.g. “As above, so below”] in its application to man both 
body and spirit, thus provide a propaideia to the philosophical Hermetica, whose peculiar 
preoccupations and style they occasionally approach.”215 The doctrine of sympathy 
would find its highest expression in the Egyptianizing, theurgical, hermetic, 
Neoplatonism of Iamblichus who described his approach as a continuation of the “way of 
Hermes.”216  
Since the 1980s, most scholars concede that “hermetic manuscripts, technical as 
well as philosophical, reflect the influence of genuine Egyptian prayers, texts, and modes 
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of transmission…”217 For example, the translation of the title of Corpus Hermeticum 1, 
“Poimandres,” is now accepted as an Egyptian rendering of “mind of Re” instead of the 
Greek, “shepherd.”218 Furthermore, the suggested social context depicted in the text 
points to Egyptian sources: “The teacher at the centre of the tractates is not a philosopher 
engaged in intellectual debate with his disciples in the Graeco-Roman manner. He is 
more like a priest imparting ancient wisdom within the precincts of a great temple.”219 
The idea that a teacher could also be like a ritual expert shall become more important as 
we explore the Egyptian approach to personal divinity as an imaginative technology of 
self-transformation, taken up in chapter 3.  
 
The Making of the Sacred  
 In order to understand the self-sacralizing aspect of the Corpus Hermeticum, let 
us first consider the dynamics of the “sacrificial system” as developed by Carlin Barton. 
Barton’s investigation into the emotional life of ancient Romans has explored honor, 
                                               
217 Gregory Shaw, “Taking the Shape of the Gods: A Theurgic Reading of Hermetic 
Rebirth,” Aries 15, no. 1 (2015): 3. See also Ian S. Moyer, Egypt and the Limits of 
Hellenism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jacco Dieleman, Priests, 
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shame, violence, the gaze, and gender, among other things.220 Her focus on emotions is 
far from sentimental. Emotions, she demonstrates, are also ideas that shape cultural 
ideology and practice. Echoing anthropologist Edward Hall, Barton assumes that 
‘[c]ulture hides much more than it reveals, and strangely enough what it hides, it hides 
most effectively from its own participants.”221 Indeed, considering the complicated nature 
of human emotions—which cannot often be separated from thoughts—Barton offers a 
fresh view of the skeleton of culture. Her vision of cultural and social life is that of an 
archaeologist. She brings a sensitivity to layered modes of thought and an emotional 
stratigraphy that continue to influence new layers built upon them.  
 Barton’s work engages “the sacred” or, as she puts it, “the sacrificial system.” Her 
examination of the “sacrificial system” does not rely on any conventional or assumed 
concept of “religion.” Rather, through an analysis of linguistic and ritual context, Barton 
has developed a new understanding of the social and psychological dyanmics of 
sacrificare (from sacer, “set apart,” and sacere, “to make sacred”) outside of the sphere 
of “religion” as modern scholars have understood it:  
The Roman sacrificial system was an elaborate physics of binding, capturing, 
taming and domesticating energy with the purpose of enhancing and 
concentrating it, in order, finally, to direct that energy back into the community. 
Conversely, the sacrifical system was a way of binding and capturing, taming and 
domesticating energy with the purpose of ‘de-sacralizing,’ i.e., desecrating and 
diminishing that energy in order, finally, to exclude or eliminate, ‘execute’ or 
‘exterminate’ it from the community…Forces, powers, functions needed to be 
                                               
220 Carlin Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster 
(Princeton University Press, 1992); Carlin A. Barton, Roman Honor: The Fire in the 
Bones (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001): Carlin A. Barton, “Being in the 
Eyes: Shame and Sight in Ancient Rome” in The Roman Gaze, ed. David Fredrick 
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221 Edward Hall, The Silent Language (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), 39. Quoted  
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isolated, defined, carved out of nature (like the walls of Romulean Rome) and 
harnessed in order for the charges on them to be either augmented and reinforced 
or debilitated and dispersed….Charges could be almost infinitely raised or 
lowered or simultaneously raised by some and lowered by others. Absolutely 
anything or anyone could be sacralized or desecrated….222 
 
For Barton, what scholars have tended to describe as “sacred” for the Romans was not 
distinct from “the secular”: “What might be outside the sacred frame in one perspective 
could be within the frame of an other.” 223 The line between sacred and secular will blur 
for those who follow Carlin’s line of inquiry into the foreign emotional country of the 
Romans. 
 Recent research by Carlon Barton and Daniel Boyarin recover the ambiguity of 
“religio,” “deus,” “threskeia,” “theos,” terms that have been  “set apart, sacralized, and 
calcified” by “almost eighteen hundred years of linguistic development.”224  They argue: 
“the flexible, undefined, and less formalized powers and play of emotions exercised in 
the Latin religio...will be suppressed in an increasingly defined, disciplined, regimented 
system of governent legitimated by reference to a notion of an ultimate authorizing 
power.”225  This new work challenges how many of us look at “the sacred” in antiquity 
and its pressumed co-conspirator, “religion.”  
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Sacrificing God 
 Building on Barton’s understanding of the ancient Roman sacrificial system and 
Barton and Boyarin’s critique of “religion,” I offer comments on the archive Augustine 
assembles in City of God, Books 8-10 where he engages Apuleius’ The god of Socrates, 
works attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, as well as the late Platonism of Plotinus, 
Porphyry, and Iamblichus. These works share a concern with an inner self, its 
relationship to “god” (more on this term in a moment), and the prospect of apotheosis, 
becoming a “god,” what I am calling in this chapter “making a sacred self,” understood 
as personal divinity. Augustine has been credited with the invention of the inner self but 
discussions that express a strong sense of interiority certainly predate him and his archive 
above reflects this “inward turn.”226  Apuleius’s concern with the inner daemon, the 
importance of inner vision in the Hermetic tractates, and the “innerworldliness”227 of the 
Neoplatonists call Augustine’s credit into question.  
 For our purposes, I will be looking at selected fragments from the Hermetica, a 
collection of dialogues between Hellenized Egyptian deities that display the syncretic 
spirit of late antique Alexandria in its cast of characters and intellectual influences. 
                                               
226 Phillip Carey, Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian 
Platonist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Pauliina Remes offers a compelling 
counter to Carey et al. arguing that Augustine’s debt to Plotinus is greater than generally 
acknowledged by modern scholars. Although she is concerned with the limits of 
individuality in Plotinus and Augustine, she points out that the notion of an inner space or 
inner realm is not universal. She writes: “Personhood, many argue, was understood as 
communal and tied to the cosmic and divine, rather than private or individual.” Remes, 
“Inwardness,” 160. I don’t see these apparent poles as mutually exclusive, the Platonists 
as well as the Stoics conceive of the self as tied to the cosmic (nous/logos) and individual 
(daimon) at the same time. 
 
227 Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity: AD 150-750 (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1971), 71. 
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Rather than focusing on the transition that religio underwent as a strategy for state 
formation, as Barton does, I will focus on the person apart from the state. The Hermetic 
approach to sacralization was not, as in the Ciceronian-turn of religio, a “necessary 
means to the end of social order.”228 It was a personal approach set apart from—albeit, 
co-existing with—the concerns of social life. 
 In approaching the Hermetic texts, this chapter asks: What can we see when we 
remove “God”—with all its “religious” connotations—from the equation? Rather than 
translating the Greek word theos using the Germanic word “God,” let us look at how the 
Hermetic texts define (or set apart?) theos in order to, like Barton and Boyarin, 
“conceptualize it anew and speak [of a culture] without invoking the anachronistic 
concept of religion.”229 While a longer study would chart the use of theos starting with 
the pre-Socratics, even in a short chapter, we can begin to “take off the scrim of religion” 
as Barton puts it; that is, to take off the overlays of translation, reception, and 
commentary beginning with the Church Fathers and into the last century.  
 By removing “God” from the equation, from a context where it may not really 
belong, we can see how “the sacred,” that is, the sacrificial system formulated by Barton, 
operates outside of a “religionizing” understanding of the ancient world. In the selected 
Hermetic fragments below, I will be looking at how the texts define, set-apart, and 
sacralize theos and then how (and, importantly, why) the Hermetic reader identifies with 
this highly charged idea to become theos, sacralizing the self. In particular, I will be 
focusing on Greek passages that describe theos as invisible, requiring inner vision and 
imagination in order to be seen and known. The “invisible world is materialized in 
                                               
228 Barton and Boyarin, Imagine No Religion, 51. 
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images, that is to say, in figurative language or world-pictures that are crucial for 
knowledge, since what is considered to be ‘real’ is a function of the pictorial 
imagination”230 The Hermetic way of seeing this invisible theos demonstrates an 
imaginative technology of self-transformation through reading as a spiritual exercise. 
 
Defining Theos  
 Theos first appears inwardly to Hermes as a thought, “an enormous being 
completely unbound in size,” saying, “I know what you want, and I am with you 
everywhere.” (Corpus Hermeticum 1.1).231  Yet, its enormity is bound by that fact that it 
occurs as a thought in Hermes’ mind. Inwardly imagined as thought unbound, theos is 
bounded by the imagination.  Theos is set apart as an imagined thought. The 
unboundedness of theos might at first conjure up a transcendent reality but its 
boundedness as a thought occurring within the mind suggests that theos is an immanent, 
embodied, inner reality. In this same passage, theos is set apart as an intimate, inner 
feature of Hermes, knowing his thoughts and feelings, ever present, similar to Apuleius’ 
inner daemon in The god of Socrates:  “that particular type of divinity, identical with the 
mind of each and every person” (De deo Socrates 15.3)232 that watches “everything with 
                                               
230 Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 82. 
 
231 Copenhaver, trans. “Ἐννοίας μοί ποτε γενομένης περὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ μετεωρισθείσης 
μοι τῆς διανοίας σφόδρα, κατασχεθεισῶν μου τῶν σωματικῶν αἰσθήσεων, καθάπερ οἱ 
ὕπνῳ βεβαρημένοι ἐκ κόρου τροφῆς ἢ ἐκ κόπου σώματος, ἔδοξά τινα ὑπερμεγέθη μέτρῳ 
ἀπεριορίστῳ τυγχάνοντα καλεῖν μου τὸ ὄνομα καὶ λέγοντά μοι, Τί βούλει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ 
θεάσασθαι, καὶ νοήσας μαθεῖν καὶ γνῶναι; — φημὶ ἐγώ, Σὺ γὰρ τίς εἶ; — Ἐγὼ μέν, φησίν, 
εἰμὶ ὁ Ποιμάνδρης, ὁ τῆς αὐθεντίας νοῦς· οἶδα ὃ βούλει, καὶ σύνειμί σοι πανταχοῦ.”  
 
232 Harrison, trans. “quod is deus, qui est animus sui cuique, quamquam sit immortalis, 
tamen quodam modo cum homine gignitur.” 
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close attention” (16.6).233   Indeed, we soon learn, theos is Hermes’ mind. Theos tells 
him,  “I am…mind, your theos,” explaining, “your mind is theos” (Corpus Hermeticum 
1.6).234 Apprehending Mind with the mind leaves the witness “trembling, terrified, out of 
[her] wits” (1.8)235  
 Theos cannot be seen by the “uninitiated” (ἀμύητος), literally “those who do not 
shut their eyes” (Corpus Hermeticum 5.1).236 Like Plotinus’s imperative in The Enneads 
to  “shut your eyes and change to and wake another way of seeing, which everyone has 
but few use…” (Ennead 1.6.8).237 the Hermetist must imagine theos inwardly in order to 
see and understand theos. Hermetic seeing occurs through the “eyes of the mind” (Corpus 
Hermeticum 5.2).238 To see the invisible theos with the mind’s eye is to see what “seems 
invisible to the multitude” as “entirely visible” (5.1).239   Hermetic seeing is making the 
invisible inwardly visible. Theos seems invisible to the “multitude” because they look for 
                                               
233 Harrison, trans. “quin omnia curiose ille participet.” 
 
234 Copenhaver, trans. “Τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ἐγὼ Νοῦς ὁ σὸς θεός.”  
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238 My trans. “τοῦ νοῦ ὀφθαλμοῖς” 
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it through bodily eyes instead of the eyes of the mind, through outer vision rather than 
inner vision.  
 A difficult passage in Corpus Hermeticum navigates the nuances of inner and 
outer seeing for the Hermetists: “Everything that has appeared [to the bodily eyes] 
(phainomenon) has come into being because at some point it appeared [to bodily eyes] 
(ephane). But the invisible (aphanes) is always [invisible], it does not need to come to be 
seen [outwardly]” (5.1)240  Invisible things, things that do not appear outwardly, are seen 
inwardly. The passage continues:  “The very entity that makes this visibility [of theos, the 
mind] does not make itself visible; what makes [sense perception] apparent is not itself 
apparent; what presents images of everything (i.e. imagination) is not present to sense 
perception.”241  “Only thought (noesis), because it…is invisible, sees the invisible…your 
mind’s eye will see it” (5.2).242  “Can you see thought and hold it in your hands?” 
(5.2).243  The “entity that makes visibility” is theos the mind, the mind’s eye. Theos is not 
an external transcendent entity but an internal immanent entity equated with the 
imagining mind itself.  This “entity” is the imagining mind: “(Theos) is the mind’s eye” 
(13.17).244  The Hermetist acknowledges the role of inner vision, of imaginative 
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243 Copenhaver, trans. “νόησιν ἰδεῖν καὶ λαβέσθαι αὐταῖς ταῖς χερσὶ.” 
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thought—which is itself invisible—in processing images and assigning meaning to those 
images, as theos. The Corpus Hermeticum, in Sarah Ahbel-Rappe’s words,  “[points] the 
reader toward a conception of interiority in which the experience of imaginative 
production” sets apart the “the imagination as the object.”245  Or, to put it another way in 
Pauliina Remes words, imagination “makes the mind which receives perceptions aware 
of both the external object of perception and the mind itself.”246 Self-reflexive thinking, 
imagining, and seeing is acting as theos. Turning inward (eis to eiso; Plotinus, Ennead 
1.6.8.4) like Aristotle’s self-reflexive theos who thinks about thinking (noesis noeseos; 
Metaphysica 1074b, 34-5), the Hermetic self, turns the gaze to the mind’s eye—
imagining imagination—becoming theos.247 
 The late antique theory of phantasia (imagination) also helps us parse the 
ambiguities of inner and outer vision in this era. Phantasia was understood in two ways: 
it was the image-making faculty of consciousness, an organ of sense perception that 
presented images to the mind but it also created images independent of sense perception. 
Because of this dual meaning, Robert Berchman argues that phantasia is  “based on 
something far more profound than an awareness of physical conditions. It carries a 
meaning close to the idea of consciousness… [Phantasia] is a power of perceptive 
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awareness that transcends sensation.”248  Hermetic imagination shaped sense perception 
but it could also “see” what could not be sensed. 
 
An Imaginative Technology of Self-Transformation  
 Reading or hearing the Hermetic texts was a “spiritual exercise.”249 But, texts that 
offered exercises in self-development (askesis) were deployed in late antiquity by a 
number of traditions including the Stoics, the Neoplatonists, and the Hermetists. In 
spiritual exercises, thought “takes itself as its own subject-matter, and seeks to modify 
itself…[Unlike the word “spiritual”] the word ‘thought’ [Hadot continues] does not 
indicate clearly enough that imagination and sensibility play a very important role in 
these exercises.”250  Indeed, spiritual exercises rely on imagination—the ability to 
visualize things unavailable to the senses. “Spiritual” exercises help the reader (or hearer) 
experience things that are invisible or intangible and therefore require imagination in 
order to be “seen” or known.  
 Imaginative exercises in the Hermetic texts can be explicit, often signaled by the 
use of imperative, subjunctive, or optative moods: “Make yourself grow to immeasurable 
immensity…” (Corpus Hermeticum 11.20) or “Command your soul to travel to India…” 
(11.19).251 In explicit exercises the student in the dialogue and the reader are actively lead 
                                               
248 Berchman, Porphyry Against, 102. 
 
249 The term “spiritual exercises” is taken from Ignatius of Loyola’s sixteenth-century 
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through a series of images, ideas, and emotional and (imagined) physical states in order 
to experience a new ability and sense of self. But, self-transforming exercises can also be 
implicit using vivid language to suggest an image, scenario, or experience without telling 
the reader to actively enter into it. For example:  “In the deep there was boundless 
darkness and water and fine intelligent spirit, all existing by divine power (dynamei theia) 
in chaos” (3.1).252  The reader sees the darkness and water, the power and chaos as inner 
images and processes. In explicit and implicit exercises, the Hermetic reader, similar to 
Hugo Lundhaug’s early Christians, makes sense of the text “by means of the creation and 
integration of multiple mental representations.”253 
 
Making a Sacred Self  
 The self-sacralizing result of this imaginative technology of self-transformation 
takes place when the student transfers the power of seeing and understanding from the 
physical eyes to the eyes of the mind. Theos is seen with inner vision and is constitutive 
of inner vision. Such a transformation is illustrated in statements such as the following 
where the transformed reader explicitly identifies as theos:  “I no longer picture things 
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253 Lundhaug, Cognitive Poetics, 64; Reader-reception theorist, George Poulet, vividly 
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me with a subject not myself.” “Criticism and the Experience of Interiority” in Reader-
Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, edited by Jane P. Tomkins 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 44-45. 
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with the sight of my eyes…I am in heaven, in earth, in water, in air; I am in animals and 
plants; in the womb, before the womb, after the womb; everywhere” (Corpus 
Hermeticum 13.11).254    
 Seeing self as theos in heaven, earth, animals, and plants suggests that theos has 
an external reality permeating all things. But that external reality depends on inner vision, 
theos is projected onto the sensible world as the mind’s eye externalized. Even in the 
Hermetic tractates that portray an “outer” sense of theos (that is, as an invisible, creative, 
ordering force that manifests in and as nature), the reading process makes the imagination 
of this force an inner perception.255 The emphasis of the exercise of Hermetic seeing 
offered by the texts always returns the reader to the eyes of mind.  Patricia Cox Miller 
captures the Hermetic way of seeing in her study of late antique imagination observing 
(after Bachelard) that  “images (and the imagining process) do not passively reproduce 
‘reality’: they actively create it.”256 Becoming theos transforms the inner self257 and 
                                               
254 Copenhaver, trans. “οὐχ ὁράσει ὀφθαλμῶν ἀλλὰ τῇ διὰ δυνάμεων νοητικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἐν 
οὐρανῷ εἰμι, ἐν γῇ, ἐν ὕδατι, ἐν ἀέρι· ἐν ζῴοις εἰμί, ἐν φυτοῖς· ἐν γαστρί, πρὸ γαστρός, μετὰ 
γαστέρα, πανταχοῦ.” 
 
255 “Every act of perception is to some degree an act of creation, and every act of memory 
is to some degree an act of imagination.” Gerard M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, 
Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (London, Penguin Books, 2000), 101. 
Antoine Faivre writes that “It is partly under the inspiration of the Corpus 
Hermeticum…that memory and imagination are associated to the point of becoming 
identical, part of the teaching of Hermes Trismegistus consisting in ‘interiorizing’ the 
world in our mens.” Antoine Faivre, Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition: Studies in 
Western Esotericism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), xxiii. 
 
256 Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 179. 
 
257 “Imagination produces effects so real that they can ‘mold’ the imagining subject.” 
Corbin, Alone, 180. British Idealist A.S.  Pringle-Pattison describes the relationship 
between self and the world it inhabits: “The self exists only through the world and vice 
versa, that we might say with equal truth the self is the world and the world is the 
self…So the self and the world are only two sides of the same reality; they are the same 
intelligible world looked at from two opposite points of view. But, finally, it must not be 
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world the Hermetist inhabits.258 Even when theos seems external to the reader—in 
passages that depict theos as “the Craftsman” (demiurgos) of an ordered cosmos (Corpus 
Hermeticum 5.8, passim)259— such an external depiction must be imagined internally in 
the mind of the reader. The transcendent theos is always immanent. Indeed, following 
Gregory Shaw, the Hermetic sacred self creates the world it inhabits as a demiurgic 
mind.260 Theos possesses the power of imagination, by imagining the universe, theos 
created it.261 When the Hermetist thinks about theos as an unbounded kind of thought, as 
including everything the mind’s eye could imagine, including the mind’s eye itself, the 
thinker becomes “the object of… [its] knowing” (Plotinus, Ennead 5.4.2)262—an 
Aristotelian notion263—adopted enthusiastically by the Neoplatonists and present in the 
                                                                                                                                            
forgotten that it is only from the point of view of the self or subject that the identity can 
be grasped; this, therefore, is the ultimate point of view which unifies the whole…The 
transcendental self, as the implicate of all experience, is, for a theory of knowledge, 
simply the necessary point of view from which the universe can be unified, that is, from 
which it become an universe.” “Philosophy as Criticism of Categories,” in Essays in 
Philosophical Criticism, eds.  A.S. Pringle-Pattison and R. B. Haldane Viscount Haldane 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1883), 38. 
 
 
258 “Yet the development of phantasiai as something in the middle between the subject 
and the objects in the world can be seen as one step among many in the gradual 
movement towards the idea of an individual soul which interprets the world in a manner 
particular to just him or her – an inner realm proper to one individual.” Remes, 
“Inwardness,” 166. My emphasis. 
 
259 My translation. “δημιουργός.”  
 
260 Shaw, “Hermetic Rebirth,” 136-169. 
 
261 After Corbin, Alone, 182. 
 
262 Armstrong, trans. “ἀλλ᾿ ἐνταῦθα μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἕν· καὶ ἡ 
ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ πράγματα.” 
 
263 Pauliina Remes brings nuance to Plotinus’ use of Aristotle’s “identity theory” of 
knowledge and the divinely reflexive νόεσις νοήσεως νόησις: “Knowledge is, rather, a 
peculiar form of self-intellection or self-thinking…The answer to the criticism that the 
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Corpus Hermeticum:  “That which is known by thinking is equal to the thought” (2.5).264 
(To my knowledge, this Hermetic parallel to Aristotle’s “identity theory” of knowledge 
has not been pointed out by scholars until now).  
 Understanding the invisible nature of theos and the need for inner vision in order 
to see and know theos, the Hermetic student equates her own inner vision with that of 
theos:  “Thus, unless you make yourself equal to theos, you cannot understand theos; like 
is understood by like” (Corpus Hermeticum 11.20).265  To understand theos, Mind 
implores Hermes to actively imagine theos:  “So you must think of a god in this way, as 
having everything—the cosmos, itself, [the] universe—like thoughts within itself.” 
(11.20).266  Theos contains all things, including itself, including the mind’s eye, in itself 
as thoughts…especially the thoughts of the one thinking about theos. Once that 
understanding is achieved, the very apparent (phanerotatos) world is seen with new eyes 
as theos, having the attributes of theos. Through the exercise of reading, theos is 
simultaneously imagined in and as the thoughts of the reader: “I see the universe and I 
see myself in mind” (13.13).267   
                                                                                                                                            
self of the self-intellection of this sort is not special or personal enough to be a self, and 
that its self-reflexivity would hardly qualify as knowledge of a self, becomes both yes 
and no. Intellect’s self-knowledge does not yield any personal or individual information. 
What it reveals in addition to the objects of knowledge is subjectivity.” Remes, Pauliina. 
Plotinus on Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157-158, 170, 173. See 
Plotinus, Ennead 4.4.2.3 – 11. 
 
264 Copenhaver, trans. “Τὸ γὰρ νοητὸν τῶ νοοῦντι νοητόν ἐστιν.” 
 
265 Copenhaver, trans. “ἐὰν οὖν μὴ σεαυτὸν ἐξισάσῃς τῷ θεῷ, τὸν θεὸν νοῆσαι οὐ δύνασαι· 
τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ νοητόν.” 
 
266 Copenhaver, trans. “εἶτα σὺ μὲν δύνασαι ταῦτα, ὁ θεὸς δὲ οὔ; τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον 
νόησον τὸν θεόν, ὥσπερ νοήματα πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, τὸν κόσμον, ἑαυτόν, <τὸ> ὅλον.” 
 
267 Copenhaver, trans. “Πάτερ, τὸ πᾶν ὁρῶ καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐν τῷ νοΐ.” 
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 Barton writes that for the Romans “[t]he charge within a person, the sacred thing 
within a person, was equivalent to the honor in which she or he was held. Animus, spirit 
or will, was its source.”268 For the inward-turning Hermetists, honor in the eyes of 
another no longer mattered, the animus sidestepped social relations. The Hermetists could 
be self-consciously theological (theologesomen; 17). They did not consider theos “an 
ultimate authorizing power” that legitimized authority, but a notion of self that authorizes 
the individual; not a “transcendental reality,” but an immanent, embodied one, a spacious, 
creative inner being of the imagining self read as theos, set apart, made sacred.  
 
The Latin Asclepius  
In Book 8 of the City of God, after a friendly tribute to Platonism as the 
philosophy that prefigured Christianity, Augustine of Hippo rails against fellow North 
African, Apuleius, the second-century rhetor and late Platonist, and also against Hermes 
Trismegistus, the eponymous “author” of the third century Graeco-Egyptian 
Hermetica.269 Commenting on The god of Socrates, Augustine accuses Apuleius of 
demon worship (cultu daemonum) and practicing the art of magic (magicae artes). 
Quoting extensively from a section of the Hermetic Latin Asclepius for evidence, he 
charges Hermes with making statues into gods (deos facere). As a writer in the Christian 
tradition, it is no surprise that Augustine would object strenuously to suggested practices 
                                                                                                                                            
 
268 Carlin Barton, “Honor and Sacredness in the Roman and Christian Worlds,” in 
Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion, ed. Margaret Cormack 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 24-5. 
 
269 Although the so-called Hermetica are anonymous, I will follow Augustine’s 
convention by referring to the author as “Hermes” for the purpose of this dissertation.  
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involving demons or idol worship. It is surprising, however, given his Neoplatonic bent, 
that he would fail to note the concern with inner divinity in the works of Apuleius and 
Hermes, which, incidentally, might well have been included together in the same codex 
on Augustine’s bookshelf.270 Augustine’s reading of the Asclepius is painfully selective, 
though that of a master apologist. The point of the Asclepius, and of The god of Socrates 
for that matter, as Francis Clooney observes, is about “the need to cultivate the higher 
self and to exercise one’s freedom in choosing a life of wisdom….[This] should be 
acceptable to Augustine, but still he passes over it in silence.”271  Indeed, the Graeco-
Egyptian Hermetists were more concerned with making themselves into gods: “This is 
the final good for those who have received knowledge: to be made god” (Corpus 
Hermeticum 1.25).272 
In a close reading of the Latin Asclepius, I will interrogate the relationship 
between the imagination and the construction of self in relation to the divine. I would like 
to offer a reading of Asclepius with a certain understanding of imagination in mind, that 
is, how imagination functions as a technology of self. Drawing attention to the 
inseparability of “the self” and “the sacred,” I will suggest that imagination is more than a 
function of what theurgic Neoplatonists refer to as the “vehicle of the soul” (ochema 
pneuma) but rather it is the vehicle itself (see chapter 1).  
 
                                               
270 Vincent Hunink, “Apuleius and the ‘Asclepius,’” Vigiliae Christianae 50, no. 3 
(1996): 290. 
 
271 Francis X. Clooney, “Augustine, Apuleius, and Hermes Trismegistus: The City of God 
and Advice on How (Not) to Read Hindu Texts” in Augustine and World Religions, 
edited by Brian Brown, John Doody, and Kim Paffenroth, 141-172 (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2008.), 150. 
 
272 Copenhaver, trans. “τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τέλος τοῖς γνῶσιν ἐσχηκόσι, θεωθῆναι.” 
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Performing Deus  
 In a performative utterance that we can only imagine, Hermes describes a unified 
cosmos in which soul and matter are stirred so “the whole might seem to be one and that 
all might seem to be from one” (Asclepius 2).273 This cosmology is not an empirical 
description of a physical landscape. It is a map of cosmic proportions that must be drawn 
in the mind. It must be imagined. It is not here (pointing down like Aristotle in Raphael’s 
The School of Athens), it is not here (pointing up like Plato) at least as far as we can see 
with our eyes open, it is here (pointing to the head). In imagining it we become players in 
a “mental theater” or practitioners of an “immaterial demiurgy.”274 If Hermes is going to 
initiate Asclepius, Tat, and Hammon into this cosmology, he has to do more than 
describe it. He has to prescribe it. Hermes’ anthropology is equally suggestive and 
impressive to a seeker. Humanity is conjoined to heavenly gods, airy demons, and earthly 
nature: “Everything is permitted him: heaven itself seems not too high, for he measures it 
in his clever thinking as if it were nearby. No misty air dims the concentration of his 
thought; no thick earth obstructs his work; no abysmal deep of water blocks his lofty 
view. He is everything, and he is everywhere” (6).275 Such an expansive, ekphrastic, 
rhetorical strategy posits an imaginal world as fact and orients the audience in that world. 
We are told what we are, where we are, and what we can do there…with our eyes closed. 
This world is “figuratively real” because, as Patricia Cox Miller has observed, the 
                                               
273 Copenhaver, trans. “ut totum unum et ex uno Omnia esse videantur.” 
 
274 For “mental theater” see Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 85; For “immaterial theurgy,” 
see Gregory Shaw, “Eros and Arithmos,” Ancient Philosophy 19, no. 1 (1999): 121-143. 
 
275 Copenhaver, trans. “Omnia illi licent; non caelum videtur altissimum, quasi e proximo 
enim animi sagacitate metitur…intentionem animi eius nulla aeris caligo confundit, non 
densitas terrae operam eius inpedit, non aquae altitude profunda despectum eius 
obtundit. Omnia idem est, et ubique idem est.” 
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“narrative pictorial strategies…seduce the reader into forgetting that these are images in 
texts.”276  
 Put to the imagination, pictorial narratives serve as so-called spiritual exercises. 
The classic example would be Plotinus’s “sphere exercise”:  
Let there be, then, in the soul a shining imagination of a sphere, having everything 
within it, either moving or standing still, or some things moving and others 
standing still. Keep this, and apprehend in your mind another, taking away the 
mass: take away also the places, and the mental picture of matter in yourself, and 
do not try to apprehend another sphere smaller in mass than the original one, but 
calling on the god who made that of which you have the mental picture, pray him 
to come (Enn. 5.8.9).277 
 
In this exercise, “Plotinus appears to be engaged in an introspective experiment in both 
self-consciousness and metacognitive self-awareness.”278 Plotinus offers the “sphere 
                                               
276 Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 109. Also see Hayden V. White, Figural Realism: 
Studies in the Mimesis Effect (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
 
277 Armstrong, trans. “ἔστω οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φωτεινή τις φαντασία σφαίρας ἔχουσα πάντα 
ἐν αὐτῇ, εἴτε κινούμενα εἴτε ἑστηκότα, ἢ τὰ μὲν κινούμενα, τὰ δ᾿ ἑστηκότα. φυλάττων δὲ 
ταύτην ἄλλην παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφελὼν τὸν ὄγκον λάβε· ἄφελε δὲ καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὸ τῆς 
ὕλης ἐν σοὶ φάντασμα, καὶ μὴ πειρῶ αὐτῆς ἄλλην σμικροτέραν λαβεῖν τῷ ὄγκῳ, θεὸν δὲ 
καλέσας τὸν πεποιηκότα ἧς ἔχεις τὸ φάντασμα εὖξαι ἐλθεῖν.” James Porter comments: 
“What the reader is being asked to reproduce in her mind is an image of the world 
conceived in it totality as pure form and pure immanence—the complete immanence of 
intelligible reality to the whole of reality. … The whole is the fruit of a spiritual exercise. 
But we should not assume that on this purer version of things the highest beauty lies in 
the mere ascent to the Good, the Form, and the Beautiful and in the movement away from 
matter and sensation....On the contrary, in its most compelling form, the highest Beauty 
requires the descent, as it were, of these higher realities into the rest of being.” Sublime, 
603 – 604. 
 
278 Brian Stock, The Integrated Self: Augustine, the Bible, and Ancient Thought 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 118. John Cavadini challenges 
Stock’s contention that reading for Augustine displaces Neoplatonic self-transformation. 
Cavadini point out that for Augustine it is the reading of one particular text, Christian 
scriptures. J.C. Cavadini, “[Review of] Stock, Brian. Augustine the Reader: Meditation, 
Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 7, 
no. 1 (1999): 165. 
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exercise” as an explicit practice, cuing the reader with the hortatory subjunctive, “Let 
there be….”  
 
Self-Identification with Deus 
 On the other hand, the self-identifications with the god we see throughout the 
Hermetica, function as implicit exercises. Offering no cue to the reader to perform a 
visual exercise, there are nonetheless performative. In one love spell from the hermetic 
Papyri Graecae Magicae, we find two instances where divine identity is formed in order 
to empower the aim of the performer: “For you are I, and I am you; your name is mine, 
and mine is yours. For I am your image” and “I know you, Hermes, and you know me. / I 
am you, and you are I” (Papyri Graecae Magicae 8.37-38, 49-50).279 In one tractate of 
Corpus Hermeticum we see a forceful statement equating self-knowledge with self-
deification: “So you must think of a god in this way, as having everything—the cosmos, 
himself, [the] universe—like thoughts within himself. Thus, unless you make yourself 
equal to god, you cannot understand god; like is understood by like” (11.20).280 For 
Wouter Hanegraaff, the final salvation of the Hermetic material—to become divine—
“consists not so much in unification with the divine as in the recognition that he has 
always been one with it. … In looking at this ultimate divine reality, he finds that he is 
looking at himself.”281 The emphasis shifts from “ultimate divine realty” to “self.” 
                                               
279 Betz, trans. “σὺ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἐγὼ σύ, τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν σόν· ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι 
τὸ εἴδωλόν σου” and “οἶδά σε, Ἑρμῆ, καὶ σὺ ἐμέ. ἐγώ εἰ<μι> σὺ καὶ σὺ ἐγώ.” 
 
280 Copenhaver, trans. “εἶτα σὺ μὲν δύνασαι ταῦτα, ὁ θεὸς δὲ οὔ; τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον 
νόησον τὸν θεόν, ὥσπερ νοήματα πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, τὸν κόσμον, ἑαυτόν, <τὸ> ὅλον.” 
 
281 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “Hermes Trismegistus and Hermetism” in Encyclopedia of 
Renaissance Philosophy, ed. M. Sgarbi (Springer International Publishing, 2018), 3-4.  
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 Those who understand “the divine” to be something that is transcendent and 
beyond the self might be tempted to think of the self as a subset of that ultimate realty. I 
am trying to put that view—which may be more a Christian overlay—on its head: In this 
case, the ultimate reality is something that is rather a part of self, an inner experience, 
immanent. It is not as if there is an outer, other being that the self approaches and seeks 
union with but rather that “being” is an inner, familiar capacity that just needs to be 
understood the right way. These exercises help the Hermetist develop the inner vision 
needed to navigate an inner cosmology and to impress that understanding upon the 
perceptible world.  The spiritual world is an imaginal world and its first founding 
inhabitants are not gods or demons or angels but rather our thoughts.  
 
Consciousness is Divine  
 Hermes tells us that consciousness is made not from the four perceptible elements 
but from invisible ether (Asclepius 6). Consciousness, like thought, is invisible, 
immeasurable except in its effects, interior, private. Consciousness is, Hermes reveals, “a 
great subject and very holy, no less than an account of divinity itself” (6).282 
Consciousness is divinity itself. Indeed, Hermes insists, it takes a “godlike concentration 
of consciousness” to follow such a fluid account of divinity, “most like a river running in 
torrent from a height, sweeping, plunging, so that its rapid rush outraces our 
concentration…” (3).283 A discourse on the divinity of consciousness requires a 
consciousness of divinity, it seems, a concentration of god-like self-consciousness.  
                                               
282 Copenhaver, trans. “est enim sanctissima et magna, et non minor quam ea quae est 
divinitatis ipsius.” 
 
283 Copenhaver, trans. “torrenti simillima est fluvio e summo inpronum praecipiti 
rapacitate currentis; quo efficitur ut intentionem nostrum.” 
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Some might object that I am overstating humanity’s apotheotic telos according to 
the Hermetists. After all, for Hermes, the “true, pure and holy philosophy” is to “adore 
the godhead with simple mind and soul and to honor his works, also to give thanks to 
god’s will” (14).284 The highest god, the “master and shaper of all things” (8)285 seems 
much like the familiar king-god. Theurgy is divine work but it is explicitly conceived as 
“being worked upon by the gods.”   Indeed, Sarah Iles Johnston’s characterization of 
“[t]he pious Iamblichaean theurgist [who] subordinated himself to the gods, allowing 
them to work upon him” could equally be applied to the theurgic Hermetist.286 This 
representation appears again and again in the sources. But what if we were to read this 
subordination from the point of view of a self armed with an imaginative, performative 
technology? Subordination to a seemingly external power may be more nuanced than at 
first it seems.  
In his study of self-formation in the late antique The Fathers according to Rabbi 
Nathan, J. Wyn Schofer observes the strategy of attaining “the character of a sage 
through subordination to particular authorities with the goal of, in various senses, 
internalizing aspects of them.”287 There is a fine and porous line between serving power 
and being an agent or avatar of it, a line that has much to do with how one represents 
                                                                                                                                            
 
284 Copenhaver, trans. “Simplici enim mente et anima divinitatem colere eiusque facta 
venerari, agree etiam dei voluntati gratias.” 
 
285 Copenhaver, trans. “Dominus et omnium conformator.” 
 
286 Sarah Iles Johnston, Hekate Soteira: A Study of Hekate's Roles in the Chaldean 
Oracles and Related Literature (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990), 79. 
 
287 J. Wyn Schofer,  “Self, Subject, and Chosen Subjection: Rabbinic Ethics and 
Comparative Possibilities,” Journal of Religious 33, no. 2 (2005): 256; Solomon 
Schecter, and Menahem Kister, Avoth de Rabbi Nathan: Solomon Schecter Edition (New 
York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1997). 
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oneself. In imagining a god that is of a “higher order,” though a distant relative in the 
spectrum of divinity (more on that in a moment)—say, a god whose “willing and 
achievement are complete for him at one and the same moment of time” (Asclepius 
8)288—the Hermetist imagines having that state in him or herself.289  
I want to suggest that the emphasis we often see put on human subjugation to a 
superior god is an inverted imaginative strategy that serves to stretch the identity of the 
subject beyond its normal bounds. Imagining god is imitating god. Furthermore, if all the 
levels of reality from matter to God “become levels of inner life, levels of the self” then, 
Pierre Hadot concludes, “the human self is not irrevocably separated from its eternal 
model….This true self—this self in God—is within ourselves…[W]e can identify 
ourselves with it. We then become this eternal self….”290 All sacralization contains an 
element of self-sacralization because it is self-reflexive awareness that recognizes or 
inscribes perceived power. It is not the sacred, conceived as a powerful external force 
that is Otto’s mysterium tremendum et fascinans, but rather the self-reflexive awareness 
itself, which creatively names power sacred in the first place. That is our mysterious and 
frightening “Wholly Other.”291 Durkheim helped us to see that in those organized 
sacralizing behaviors we have come to call “religion,” a society effectively adores itself. 
                                               
288 Copenhaver, trans. “Voluntas etenim dei ipsa est summa perfection, utpote cum 
voluisse et perfecisse uno eodemque temporis puncto compleat.” 
 
289  Schofer’s dynamic of chosen subjection will be taken up more pointedly in ch. 5’s 
discussion of Apuleius’ Metamorphoses and De deo Socratis. 
 
290 Pierre Hadot, Plotinus, or, The Simplicity of Vision (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 27. 
 
291 “Fearful and fascinating mystery.” Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy; An Inquiry into 
the Non- Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. 
John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1936). 
. 
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These collective efforts also require individual agents who are self-reflexively aware. If 
all sacralizing behaviors contain an element of self-sacralizing and if, as a sacralizing 
behavior, apotheosis is self-sacralizing, then the sacred is society writ large, yes, but 
more so, the sacred is self-reflexive awareness—the self— writ large.  
  
Self as Statue  
 Abruptly Asclepius interrupts Hermes: “Are you talking about statues, 
Trismegistus?” who responds, “Statues, Asclepius, yes. See how little trust you have!” 
(Asclepius 24).292 Now I think we can talk a bit about the statues that so irked our Bishop 
of Hippo who chides the theurgists for idolatry (“making gods”). Hermes says just as god 
“is maker of heavenly gods, so it is mankind who fashions the temple gods…” (23).293 
Yet, god still serves as the “eternal model” for mimesis: “Humanity persists in imitating 
divinity, representing its gods in semblance of its own features, just as the father and 
master made his gods eternal to resemble him” (23).294 What appears to be making gods 
and idolatry, as it did to Augustine, is actually the symbolic enactment of an inner 
change. Making gods makes you a god: “What we have said of mankind is wondrous, but 
less wondrous than this: it exceeds the wonderment of all wonders that humans have been 
                                               
292 Copenhaver, trans.  “Statuas dicis, O Trismegiste? Statuas, O Asclepi. Videsne 
quatenus tu ipse diffidas?” 
 
293 Copenhaver, trans. “deus ut effector est deorum caelestium, ita homo factor est 
deorum qui in templis sunt humana proximate contenti.” 
 
294 Copenhaver, trans. “in illa divinitatis imitation perseverat, ut, sicuti pater ac dominus, 
ut sui similes essent, deos fecit aeternos, ita humanitas deos suos ex sui vultus 
similitudine.” 
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able to discover the divine nature and how to make it” (37).295 In an analogy I doubt was 
lost on the Hermetists, just as gods, demons, or angels can inhabit statues, so the divine 
souls of humans inhabit human bodies. Animating statues reflects an inner imaginal 
process, “working on one’s inner statue” in Plotinus’s words (Ennead 1.6.9)296, toward 
apotheosis, theurgic divinization, theothenai. 
 
Conclusion 
In Asclepius, the imagination is a technology for embodying what both Hermetic 
writers (and the Neoplatonists who followed them) viewed as the soul’s inheritance: to 
become a god. For the late antique Hermetist, apotheosis was an imagined, embodied 
state: “We rejoice that you have deigned to make us gods for eternity even when we 
depend on the body” (Asclepius 41).297  
I’d like to propose a new term: “autourgos,” usually translated as “farmer,” 
literally, “self-worker.” Gregory Shaw has argued that apotheosis, or theurgic 
divinization, is demiurgy.298 That is, the “divine work” of theurgy is not only changing 
one’s imaginal state to that of god but also identifying as co-participant, divine crafter, in 
creating the cosmos. Theourgos is dēmiourgos. Extending this equation—that the 
theurgist is demiurgist, I would add that theurgist is also “autourgist”— theourgos is 
                                               
295 Copenhaver, trans. “Minus enim moranda, etsi Miranda sunt, quae de homine dicta 
sunt <cetera>; omnium enim mirabilium vincit admirationem, quod homo divinam potuit 
invenire naturam, eamque efficere.” 
 
296 Armstrong, trans. “μὴ παύσῃ τεκταίνων τὸ σὸν ἄγαλμα.” 
 
297 Copenhaver, trans. “gaudemus quod nos in corporibus sitos aeternitate tua fueris 
consecrare dignatus.” 
 
298 Shaw, “Hermetic Rebirth,” passim. 
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autourgos. No, not the “farmer” but literally, the “self-worker” who “works alone”! 
Corpus Hermeticum 2.14.4 says as much: “Working alone, he is in his work eternally 
since he is what he makes.”299 
In Symposium 1, Xenophon used the expression “autourgos tes philosophias” for 
“one that has worked at philosophy by himself, without a teacher.”300 But, philosophy as 
a way of life is always eventually worked at without a teacher if it is to fulfill the aim of 
self-transformation. We have to do the intellectual, and the imaginative, “heavy lifting” 
ourselves. Theurgy is the work of the autourgos, the self-worker, cultivating inner 
divinity, whose “seed” is the imagination.  
                                               
299 Copenhaver, trans. “αὐτουργὸς γὰρ ὤν, ἀεί ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ, αὐτὸς ὢν ὃ ποιεῖ.” 
 
300 Marchant and Todd, trans. “ἡμᾶς δ᾿ ὁρᾷς αὐτουργούς τινας τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὄντας.” 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DIVINATION IS DIVINIZATION: ORACLES IN LATE ANTIQUE EGYPT 
 
 
While traveling in Egypt, the first-century Greek doctor, Thessalos of Tralles, 
sought a “direct divination,” an “eye-witness” oracle with Asclepius, the god of healing, 
to advise him on the medical uses of plants. In a letter to Emperor Augustus, he writes: 
Arriving, then, in Diospolis (Thebes) — I mean the most ancient city of Egypt which also 
has many temples — I was residing there, for there were scholarly high-priests 
(archiieris) and elders ascribing to various teachings there. Now as time advanced and 
my friendship with them increased, I was inquiring whether any magical operation 
(magikes energeias) was still preserved. I observed the majority protesting strongly 
against my rashness concerning such an expectation. Nonetheless, one man, who could 
be trusted because of his patient manner and the measure of his age, did not throw away 
the friendship. This man professed to have the ability to perform direct (autoptiken) 
divination by means of a bowl (Thessalos 1.12-15).301 
 
When it comes to divination in late antique Graeco-Roman Egypt, it is difficult to 
separate the “priest” from the “magician,” “religion” from “magic,” or philosophy from 
all of the above. Whether performed publicly as a part of state cult or privately for elite 
(or non-elite) clients, divination often suggested divinization—the possibility of personal 
divinity—for those involved. To bring this possibility of personal divinity as understood 
by the Egyptians into greater relief, this chapter will interpret two divination practices — 
the New Kingdom Egyptian pḥ-nṯr oracle in its public and private guises and the Late 
Antique Graeco-Egyptian “Mithras Liturgy.” I will attend to the Egyptian concept of ḥk3 
and those who deployed it in the context of Greek and Egyptian cultural interactions.  I 
                                               
301 Friedrich, trans. “Γενόμενος οὖν ἐν Διὸς πόλει - ἀρχαιοτάτην <λέγω> τῆς Αἰγύπτου 
πόλιν καὶ πολλὰ ἰερὰ ἔχουσαν – διέτριβον αὐτόθι· ἦσαν γὰρ <ἐκεῖ> καὶ ἀρχιιερεῖς 
φιλόλογοι καὶ <γέροντες> ποικίλοις κεκοσμημένοι μαθήμασιν. προβαίνοντος δὲ τοῦ 
χρόνου καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτούς μοι φιλίας μᾶλλον αὐξανομένης, ἐπυνθανόμην, εἴ τι τῆς 
μαγικῆς ἐνεργείας σῴζεται. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ἐπαγγελίας ὁμοίας τῇ προπετείᾳ μου 
<ἐπι>φερόντων κατέγνων· ἑνὸς δέ τινος διὰ τὸ <οὐ> σοβαρὸν τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τὸ τῆς 
ἡλικίας μέτρον πιστευθῆναι δυναμένου οὐκ ἀνεχαιτίσθην τῆς φιλίας. ἐπηγγείλατο δὲ οὗτος 
αὐτοπτικὴν ἔχειν λεκάνης ἐνέργειαν.” 
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will make the case that personal divinity as expressed in late antique Graeco-Egyptian 
oracular literature—even when written in Greek—was not an interpretatio graeca or 
“Hellenization” but rather part of a more general cultural milieu of traditional Egyptian 
temple thought and cultic practice. This chapter demonstrates the contribution of 
Egyptian thought to Late Antique discourses on personal divinity seen in Hermetic texts 
as well as in the theurgic attitude of the Neoplatonists.302  Finally, I will suggest that 
divination is divinization—that divination bestows a “sacred status” upon the querent 
(and the audience)—giving him or her access to powers and states of being normally 
attributed to the Egyptian gods—in both explicit and implicit ways. Divination rituals, 
performed publicly or privately, can be read as texts that function as imaginative 
technologies of self-transformation that suggest personal divinity. 
 
The Egyptian “Priest-Philosopher”  
The ritual expert in Egypt like the one in the Thessalos anecdote above, 
performed divination rites that embraced the roles of “priest,” “magician,” and 
“philosopher.” However, except from the point of view of Roman legislation in Egypt 
that condemned magia, “magician” or “magic” may not be the most helpful terms to use 
in our discussion. Indeed, “magician” and “magic” carry a long history of polemical 
baggage, often being used by historical agents and scholars alike to sanction certain 
practices while condemning others, and then with reference to that equally slippery term, 
“religion,” a category that the Egyptians didn’t have either in the way moderns have 
                                               
302 Theurgy = “divine work.” See chapter 1 for detailed discussion of theurgy. 
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tended to apply it to them—“etically.”303 Neither category—“magic” or “religion”—was 
indigenous to the Egyptians.  
Beginning in the reign of Diocletian (c. 244-311), divination and other related 
practices were reclassified as illicit magia.304 By 359, an Egyptian oracle prompted the 
emperor Constantius II (317 – 361) to abolish oracles throughout the empire.305 Egyptian 
cult practices were negatively recast in the Roman Christian mind. Writing in the fifth 
century, the Christian polemicist Zacharias Scholasticus accused Neoplatonist theurgist 
Isidore of using rituals and words of power for malefic purposes (i.e. “sorcery”).306 The 
lines between categories like “religion,” “philosophy,” “theurgy,” and “magic,” blur and 
change over time—especially so in the great confluence of cultural identities that was late 
antique Egypt. The Neoplatonic theurgist used many of the same methods as the Egyptian 
“priest” including invocations, words of power, and natural materials. The theurgists 
utilized materials that indexed the gods, “the symbola that [the gods] themselves have 
sown in the cosmos.”307  Engaging these sacred symbols, theurgic rituals of supplication 
were seen to raise practitioners “gradually to the level of the object of supplication”308 
                                               
303 Ian Moyer, “Thessalos of Tralles and Cultural Exchange,” in Prayer, Magic, and the 
Stars in the Ancient and Late Antique World, eds. Scott Noegle, Joel Walker, and 
Brannon Wheeler (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). 
 
304 James B. Rives, “Magic in Roman Law: The Reconstruction of a Crime,” Classical 
Antiquity, vol. 2, no. 2 (2003): 334. 
 
305 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3356. 
 
306 Garth Fowden, “The Pagan Holy Man in Late Antique Society,” The Journal of 
Hellenic Studies, vol. 102 (1982): 47. 
 
307 John Dillon, “Iamblichus Defense of Theurgy: Some Reflections,” The International 
Journal of the Platonic Tradition 1 (2007): 35. 
 
308 Dillon, trans. “ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἱκετείας κατὰ βραχὺ πρὸς τὸ ἱκετευόμενον ἀναγόμεθα.” 
 
	 101	
That is, the practitioners became divine. Especially for the Iamblichan “philosopher,” 
ritual engagement with the material expressions of the divine as they are manifest in 
nature was seen equally as engaging the imagined, invisible, transcendent, expression of 
the divine as an achievement of personal divinity. 
Let us perhaps use the Egyptian term normally translated into “magic,” ḥeka, 
instead. Unlike magia, ḥeka had no unorthodox, illegal, or deviant connotations. Rather, 
as both a cosmic force and a deity of that force, ḥeka was “a primary and necessary 
element of creation, used naturally by the gods, and granted as a…benefit to 
[hu]mankind.”309 The hieroglyph means, “power.” As a god, Ḥeka had official cult status 
in the temple at Esna in Upper Egypt even in Roman times and was invoked equally as a 
“destructive force of compulsion…[a] generative harvest deity, and [a] patron of 
oracles.”310 Egyptologist Robert Ritner comments: “Serving both generative and 
destructive ends, Ḥeka/ḥeka represents an amoral force inherent in the created order, a 
power which could be tapped by appropriate words and gestures. There is no ‘black’ vs. 
‘white’ magic; both gods and demons may use its force.”311  On the identity of the 
practitioner of ḥeka, Ritner rightly argues against the hotly debated image of the 
“itinerant” or “freelance” magician in Egypt. He says: 
Preconceived notions of the magician…on the outskirts of tradition are totally 
inappropriate for Egypt where the magician was invariably a literate priest, the 
very source of tradition. The common Egyptian term for magician signified 
                                               
309 Robert K. Ritner, "Egyptian Magical Practice under the Roman Empire: the Demotic 
Spells and their Religious Context," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt: 
Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung 2.18.5, eds. W. Haase 
and H. Temporini, (2000): 3353. 
 
310 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3353-4. 
 
311 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3354. 
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‘lector priest’, the ritualist who recited the written spells. Such spells were temple 
property, composed, edited, and stored in the temple scriptorium.312 
 
So, we might also use ḥry-tp, the native term for this “lector priest”—who was ritual 
expert and practitioner of ḥeka—as an alternative to the awkward hybrid, “priest-
magician-philosopher.” Using such native terms as ḥeka and ḥry-tp avoids many 
misunderstandings of Egyptian thought and practice that stem from Greek and Roman—
as well as modern scholarly—biases.  
 
Greek and Egyptian Interactions  
In order to understand the Egyptian contribution to late antique discourses about 
personal divinity evident in the transition from the public pharaonic-era oracles (pḥ-nṯr) 
to private oracles (such as the “Mithras Liturgy”), we need to address the problem of 
accessing Egypt through Greek (linguistic) hands. After the conquest of Alexander, 
Egypt is said to have become “Hellenized.” The term “Hellenization” carries with it two 
assumptions: 1) Greek culture is superior to Egyptian culture; 2) Egyptians assimilated to 
Greek culture, rather than appropriated it. Recently scholars have begun to consider a 
more nuanced encounter between Greeks and Egyptians than simple “Hellenization.” 
Arguing against the Hellenization model, Glen Bowersock suggests that rather “[t]he 
Egyptian elite was probably quick to seize the instrumental advantages of learning Greek 
already under the Ptolemies, and by the third century it had fully internalized the 
conquerors’ culture.”313 Egyptian elites didn’t stop being Egyptian, just because they 
learned Greek. Taking advantage of new cultural currency hardly means abandoning all 
                                               
312 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3354. 
 
313 Bowersock, Hellenism in Late Antiquity, 9. 
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of the old. Robert Ritner challenges the idea that the use of Greek language suggests the 
primacy of Greek influence:  
Greek language does not necessarily imply Greek culture. One must not confuse 
the Greek-speaking world with the Greek cultural world, any more than one 
should assume a unity of cultural outlook in English writings from London, 
Navaho reservations, Botswana, and New Delhi.314 
 
As an example, Ritner points to the oldest Papyri Graecae Magicae spell, written in 
Greek by an Egyptian woman of Greek descent before the arrival of Alexander that 
follows standard temple uses and protocols.315 Ritner challenges Hellenizing 
triumphalism by pointing out the Egyptian mythic and theological elements—specifically 
solar in nature—that underlay the Papyri Graecae Magicae. He asserts: “Confronting the 
divine powers or ascending to join them, engendering favor and controlling one’s 
enemies—are not newly spawned by contemporary ‘philosophies,’ but derive from 
unbroken Egyptian traditions far older than Greek philosophy, indeed older than Greek 
culture itself.”316 While the notion of “unbroken tradition” remains controversial—flying 
in the face of current thinking about cultural mobility, perhaps—it should be considered 
cautiously but seriously.317 In the study of culture, we ought not disregard the resiliency 
of habitus nor the “transmissibility” of cultural memory.318 
Native Egyptian constituencies appropriated elements of Hellenism to form a 
“subtle interpenetration” in order to maintain a cultural identity distinct from 
                                               
314 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3360. 
 
315 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3360. 
 
316 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3360. 
 
317 See Greenblatt, Cultural Mobility, 2010. 
 
318 See Jan Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, 
and Political Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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Hellenism.319 Ian Rutherford reminds us: “For ancient Greek writers themselves the 
similarities and differences between Greek and other peoples, real or imagined, was a 
central concern, not only because this is a way of defining what it means to be Greek, but 
also because in the hyper-connective ancient Mediterranean, encounters with other 
cultural traditions was central part of lived experience.”320 Reassessing Arnaldo 
Momigliano’s thesis of Egyptian decline under Greek rule “through an intellectual 
imperialism that exoticized and dominated Egypt, its customs, and its wisdom through 
representations that served Greek needs or desires…,”321 Ian Moyer revisits Herodotus’s 
meeting with Egyptian priests in Thebes, Manetho’s composition of an Egyptian history 
in Greek, the arrival of Egyptian gods on the Greek island of Delos, and a Greek doctor’s 
magical revelation in Egypt as “four transactional moments—moments when Egyptian as 
well as Greek discourses, actions, and representations produced the historical 
outcome.”322 In the process, he shows how much of the scholarship on Hellenistic Egypt 
has drawn from nineteenth-century colonial concerns especially those of Johann Gustav 
Droysen.323  
                                               
319 David Frankfurter, “The Consequences of Hellenism in Late Antique Egypt; Religious 
Worlds and Actors,” Archiv für Religionsgeschichte (2000): 163. 
 
320 “Introduction: Interaction and Translation between Greek Literature and Egypt,” in 
Greco-Egyptian Interactions: Literature, Translation, and Culture, 500 BCE – 300 CE, 
ed. Ian Rutherford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1. 	
321 Moyer, Limits of Hellenism, 2. See Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of 
Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
 
322 Moyer, Limits of Hellenism, 2. 
 
323 Moyer, Limits of Hellenism, 11-36. Droysen was a nineteenth-century German 
historian known for his study of Alexander the Great. See Robert Southard, Droysen and 
the Prussian School of History (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1995). 
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Garth Fowden’s argument for the prominence of Egyptian intellectual influence in 
the post-pharaonic Hermetica, although largely accepted today, challenges the dominant 
thinking for most of the twentieth century. While Hellenism held sway politically, 
Egyptianism permeated cultural expression so much so that “the product of their 
interaction was at least as much Egyptian as Greek.”324 Greek and Roman writers such as 
Lucian, Lucan, Plutarch, Porphyry, and Iamblichus acknowledged this autochthonous 
intellectual primacy. Acknowledging that literary references might be more than appeals 
to the authority of timeless Egyptian wisdom allows us to consider such evidence as 
genuine expressions of identity, tradition, thought, and practice. 
The interaction between Greeks and Egyptians is as complex as the resultant 
dynamic syncretism. Syncretized figures such as Hermes-Thoth were nothing new to the 
Egyptians. The internal syncretism of the Egyptians can be seen in deities such as Amun-
Re or Atum-Khepri that predate Hermes Trismegistus considerably. The practice of 
absorbing foreign gods is also well attested and can be seen in Baal-Set during the 
Canaanite occupation and in Zeus-Ammon under the Ptolemaic Greeks. Syncretic 
cultural expressions go much deeper than names of deities. The Hermetica express a 
more general “fusion of Egyptian and Greek ways of thought” which occurred after the 
conquest of Alexander in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods. Peter Struck offers ample 
examples of Jewish, Christian, Platonic, and Egyptian elements in Late Antique Roman-
Egyptian literary productions.325 There is little question that the Hermetica as a whole 
display manifold traditions together. 
                                               
324 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 14. 
 
325 Peter T. Struck, “Hermetism,” in Religions of the Ancient World: A Guide, ed. S.I. 
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By the fifth century, “traditional Egyptian…temple culture was mixed 
inextricably with classical culture, spectacle, and a thorough syncretism of sacred 
idioms.”326  The Alexandrian intellectual culture was elite, urban, and for the most part 
Hellenistic. However, certain Egyptian-identified luminaries stood out such as 
Chaeremon in the first century, the Panopolitan family of Aurelius Petearbeschinis in the 
fourth century, and the family of Horapollon in the fifth century (see detailed discussion 
in chapter 4).327 The example of the ethnically Egyptian family of Horapollon who taught 
in the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria as “Hellenized” elites is helpful in understanding 
how Egyptian thought made its way into Hermetic texts. These Egyptian thinkers were 
raised in families “familiar with the temple culture, trained in temple rituals, but 
individually dedicated to expressing their traditions in Hellenistic literary and 
philosophical forms.”328 But, the Egyptianizing elements in Neoplatonic philosophy were 
established from the beginning, emphasized by Iamblichus, and enacted by families such 
as Horapollon’s.  
The Egyptian temple ḥry-tp in his or her Hellenistic form had become the illicit 
magos under Diocletian, casting a new light on traditional practices. At the same time 
Neoplatonists such as Horapollon sought to “claim links with indigenous temples in order 
                                               
326 Frankfurter, “Consequences of Hellenism,” 172. 
 327	Like many families tied to temple cult of the fifth century, they attempted to preserve 
Egyptian cultural identity while gaining stature as Hellenic intellectuals. The Corpus 
Hermeticum material that would have been well known to Horapollon and the 
Alexandrian Neoplatonists is a likely heir to at least some Egyptian esoteric teachings. 
Garth Fowden has argued that the “hybrid late antique theosophical system of Hermetism 
was the project of none other than Egyptian ḥry-tp who understood Greek models of the 
philosophical life as complementing perfectly their own values and pursuits.” Egyptian 
Hermes, 156. 	328	Frankfurter, “Consequences of Hellenism,” 191. 	
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to promote values quite different from indigenous temple culture.”329 Neoplatonist 
philosopher and historian Damascius describes Horapollon’s family “earnestly pursuing 
the…traditions of their (native Egyptian) heritage with … passion….”330 The question 
remains as to what extent the Neoplatonic theurgists were invoking the authority of 
“eternal Egyptian wisdom” or drawing on current practices that complemented, or 
perhaps, were at the root of Neoplatonism. While the expediency of repackaging native 
wisdom for Hellenized consumers is easily overstated, it almost certainly played its role 
in the centuries since Alexander, transforming the performance of “Egyptian wisdom” 
first encountered or imagined by Plato and Pythagoras.  
A more nuanced understanding of Hellenism offers an opportunity to find 
“[t]races of the Egyptian voices in the long history of dialogue between Greece and Egypt 
[that] are there to be found, even in texts designed to erase or supplant them….”331 
Indeed, Hellenism provided a “creative translation of traditional texts, practices, and 
ideas into a new cultural idiom, not their obliteration in the face of higher culture.”332 
These traces in translation provide clues that help us to recover lost or rejected 
intellectual and cultural contributions, for our purposes particularly in regards to personal 
divinity and imaginative technologies of self-transformation. A close reading of our two 
sites of divinization, the pḥ-nṯr oracle and the “Mithras Liturgy,” confirms this. 
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Popular Piety and Personal Divinity 
 In order to understand the public performance of the pḥ-nṯr oracle as a 
“transformative text,” we need to consider the nature of public piety in ancient Egypt. 
The archeological record favors material culture produced by and for elites but evidence 
for workshop and personal piety resides in fragmentary votive offerings, penitential 
inscriptions, and literary or visual accounts of public festivals and oracles.333 In the Old 
Kingdom common people performed temple service in assigned rotations, after the New 
Kingdom formal religious rituals were primarily conducted by a professional class. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that over the long stretch of time access to divinity became 
“democratized”334: “[S]ources that originated in royal and priestly circles later came to be 
translated, often reformulated, and popularized.”335 Progressively, “mysteries associated 
with divine kingship became available to deceased mortals as royal esoteric texts and 
myths were incorporated in the mortuary literature of commoners.”336 In the Middle 
Kingdom, this trend continued through the Book of the Dead, in some cases adapted to 
particular trades or occupations including “spells designed to transform an individual into 
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a divine entity and those containing statements baldly identifying the speaker with a high 
deity such as Re or Atum.”337  
In the New Kingdom, commoners had access to the Book of Amduat that 
“included references to its efficaciousness on earth for the living person who knows its 
contents, and it is stated that such an individual is the likeness of the great god.”338 A 
Late Period Demotic text, Setne Khamwas and Naneferkaptah, describes a seeker of 
wisdom in search of the “Book of Thoth” that bestows godlike powers upon the owner.339 
The themes of self-transcendence, divine visions, and even union with the divine that 
appear in early Royal liturgy become the concerns of non-elite populations before the 
Ptolemaic period.  
In the Roman period, temple culture revolved around local cults.340  Certain 
aspects of cultic life expanded from elite circles to included popular audience. Gaëlle 
Tallet suggests that, “deprived of previous revenues and privileges, the clergy was highly 
dependent on private income.”341 Especially in the changing spiritual climate of the 
second and third centuries, when such private incomes were revoked by law, “the 
intimate contact with the One God that could be attained by members of a cultural elite 
after years of rigorous intellectual training was not going to be confined to the tiny 
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minority that had the necessary wealth and education to qualify for membership.”342 
Russell observes in the sources a growing demand for esoteric teaching “amongst the 
many merchants, artisans, and government official who thronged the major cities of the 
empire….”343 One can imagine a range of responses to such demand, exemplified in the 
Thessalos vignette above, from sincere to opportunistic and everywhere between. 
However, our attention to the opportunistic impulse need not overshadow the sincere 
ones. 
 Popular piety in Egypt included some notion of god-like immortality. While it 
was common in the ancient world to expect some kind of survival after death, for most of 
the ancient world “the lot of the dead was rather dismal.”344 However, “[t]he great 
exception to common beliefs about the afterlife was provided by ancient Egypt.”345 The 
prospect of immortality was built in to Egyptian anthropology:  
Humans were perceived as composites of physical and nonphysical aspects or 
modes of existence. The most important of these were the physical body and the 
heart and the incorporeal entities called the ka and ba. Each of these kheperu 
(manifestation) could act as the vehicle for survival after death….The ba, 
originally the manifestation of an entity’s distinctive powers, came to signify the 
capacity of the deceased to move freely between the earthly realm and that of the 
gods.346  
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While in second-century Rome, “deification could be taken for granted as following 
upon death without any implied claim to high social status”; in Egypt “this process of 
‘democratization’ had been going on for many centuries.”347 Progressively, “mysteries 
associated with divine kingship became available to deceased mortals as royal esoteric 
texts and myths were incorporated in the mortuary literature of commoners” as noted by 
Edward Wente.348  
 
The pḥ-nṯr Divination Oracle 
An Egyptian divination ritual was an opportunity to ask questions of the “gods,” in 
Egyptian, the nṯrw, conceived of as active powers or energies in life. By means of an 
oracle, statues embodying the powers of the nṯrw could be approached by common 
people to answer important questions on matters of health, marriage, and work and to 
make judgments in legal matters.349 From the New Kingdom onward, “the primary way 
to consult the gods was to appeal to them during their public appearances outside the 
temple, either personally or through the mediation of a [ḥry-tp].”350 These public oracles 
were known as pḥ-nṯr “the standard expression for an oracular consultation of a divine 
statue”351—meaning “god’s arrival” or “reaching god.”352 Gaëlle Tallet describes the pḥ-
nṯr: 
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The procession of divine statues gave inquirers the opportunity to seek an oracle, 
and once the god had ‘approved’ the request, the procession stopped and the 
consultation could start. This kind of consultation could work through spoken 
address or through the medium of writing, whereby written questions and names 
were placed before the god…In oracles, the god is often said to nod his 
head…some movement on the part of the priests carrying the shrine would have 
been required to…indicate yes or no by moving forwards or backwards.353 
 
 
Oracles and festivals provide compelling evidence for a prototypical idiom of 
personal divinity among non-elites before and during the period of hermetic synthesis: 354 
“While the ritual innovations particular to elite classes in Roman Egypt remain a rich 
topic for synthetic discussion…it is clear that … practices lay on a continuum across 
classes, both in the observance of traditional … and, ultimately, in Christian practices as 
well.”355 Since the New Kingdom, oracles had been connected with personal piety 
because they were a “privileged mode of direct contact with gods.”356 Public temple 
festivals  “permitted individuals to enter into direct personal relations with god….”357   
Personal piety was exemplified by ritual expressions of intimacy, in Fowden’s 
words, “shading into self-identification” with the god.358 Jan Assmann observes: “This 
[personal] expression is so typical of the new movement that we can legitimately accord 
                                                                                                                                            
352 Ritner, "Magical Practice,” 3346. 
 
353 Tallet, “Oracles,” 401-402. 
 
354 Significant dissent from this position is expressed by Roger Bagnall who asserts that 
evidence for festivals is weak in the fourth century. See Roger S. Bagnall, Egypt in Late 
Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 269. 
 
355 Frankfurter, “Religious Practice and Piety,” 331. 
 
356 Tallet, “Oracles,” 409. 
 
357 Assmann, Mind of Egypt, 232. 
 
358 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 25. 
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it the rank of a self-designation and equate personal piety with ‘giving god into one’s 
heart.’”359 A similar sentiment can be seen in a prayer ostracon from Amenophis II: “I 
have given you into my heart because you are strong, …[you] protector, behold: I no 
longer know fear.”360 Votive offering like these were “placed in the path of the god as he 
set out on his procession; thus, individuals could address the god ‘in person’ (that is, his 
processional image) without the mediation of cult and state.”361 Though unlikely that 
common people attending oracles and festivals would aspire to the level of divinity 
attributed to the pharaoh, the notion of continuing a personal relationship with a cult 
figure is idiomatic.362   
Once divination was prohibited under Roman rule at the end of the second 
century,363 pḥ-nṯr practices were “driven underground, becoming instead a private 
practice.”364 Like the public oracle, private oracles too expressed personal piety. While 
“[i]ntrinsically ‘private’—eliciting answers, revelations, and aid for purely personal 
concerns—the [private] oracular procedure was no less sacerdotal…” nor were they less 
                                               
359 Assmann, Mind of Egypt, 230. 
 
360 G. Posener, “Ostracon Cairo 12217,” Revue d’Égyptologie 27 (1975): 206 – 209. 
Quoted in Assmann, Mind of Egypt, 231.  
 
361 Assmann, Mind of Egypt, 231. 
 
362 Wilkinson, Complete Gods, 51. 
 
363 By decree of Q. Aemilius Saturninus, prefect of Egypt under Septimus Severus (193-
211 CE).  
 
364 Robert K. Ritner, "Egyptian Magical Practice under the Roman Empire: the Demotic 
Spells and their Religious Context" in Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt: 
Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung vol. 2, pt. 18, sec 5 
(2000): 3356. 
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an expression of personal piety and intimacy with the gods.365 The story of Thessalos’s 
consultation with an Egyptian ḥry-tp is an example of such a private pḥ-nṯr. Ritner 
describes it in its private guise:  
[T]he most common goal of the procedures…was the direct petition of a god for 
revelation, using lamps, bowls, mediums, or dreams. ‘Bowl [ḥeka]’ is attested in 
Egypt from the New Kingdom onward, specifically in spells for beholding the 
solar bark and the gods of the underworld. The bottoms of shallow bowls are 
painted with scenes of the sun god or other deities whom the ritualist intends to 
visualize.366 
 
Importantly, the oracular procedures in the Hermetic Papyri Graecae Magicae such as 
the “Mithras Liturgy” bear a striking similarity to the pḥ-nṯr. Although private, they 
display a ritual tradition rooted in native Egyptian public temple practice.367  
 
The “Mithras Liturgy” 
The so-called “Mithras Liturgy” is both oracle and ritual of apathanatismos 
(“immortalization,” a feature of personal divinity). This oracular ritual is part of the 
“Theban cache” known by scholars since Karl Preisendanz in the early 20th century as the 
Papyri Graecae Magicae.368 As a “direct divination,”369 it is a descendent of the New 
                                               
365 Ritner, Mechanics, 215. 
 
366 Ritner, "Magical Practice,” 3346-3347. 
 
367 As a counter-point, Frankfurter suggests that while the pḥ-nṯr share structural 
similarities with the divination spells of the Papyri Graecae Magicae and, indeed, with 
divinizing visions of the Corpus Hermeticum, they change in context—from priestly 
performance to private, individual or pedagogical practice—suggesting Graeco-Roman 
“spiritual ambitions for wisdom, a cosmic or super-cosmic dimension….” “Consequences 
of Hellenism,” 181. 
 
368 Karl Preisendanz and Albert Henrichs, Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die Griechischen 
Zauberpapyri. Herausgegeben Und Übersetzt (Stutgardiae: in aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 
1973); For the recent English translation, see Hans Dieter Betz, The Greek Magical 
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Kingdom pḥ-nṯr at home with other Theban cache divination rituals in the Papyri 
Graecae Magicae. The name “Mithras Liturgy,” so-called, derives from Albrecht 
Dietrich who believed that the text was used in the ancient cult of Mithras, a thesis now 
generally dismissed. The more recent translation by Hans Dieter Betz370 suggests 
substantial Greek Middle Stoic influence in contrast with Garth Fowden and Robert 
Ritner who have ably identified its Egyptian underpinnings.  
Addressed to a daughter, a female ritual expert (whose appearance confirms that 
women were Hermetic practitioners, a point that has been given surprisingly little 
attention by scholars), the ritual structure of the “Mithras Liturgy” consists of a complex 
series of “ascension” visualizations taking the operator from the elemental world to 
become a “rising star” (“Mithras Liturgy” l.574) passing through the gate of the sun disk 
(l.576) into the realm of various gods including seven snake-headed maidens (or tychai, 
2.663-673) and seven bull-headed youths (or “pole lords,” 2.674-693), all stellar figures 
related to Egyptian cosmology, to consult the god Helios-Mithras.371 Importantly, the 
vision of the sun disk here resembles pḥ-nṯr bowl oracles that utilized painted scenes of 
the solar Re on the bottom of bowls to aid visualization. The “visualizations” are multi-
sensory which intensified the inner experience rendering a more effective “spiritual 
exercise.” The supplicant is exhorted to “see” (in Greek, opse, “you will see,” passim) 
                                                                                                                                            
Papyri in Translation: Including the Demotic Spells (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992). The section known as the “Mithras Liturgy” is PGM 4.475-820. 
 
369 A ritual that approaches the oracular deity directly allowing autoptiken (an “eye-
witness account” as in the Thessalos vignette above). 
 
370 Hans Dieter Betz, The “Mithras Liturgy”: Text, Translation and Commentary 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). 
 
371 Betz, Mithras Liturgy, 174-180. 
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various images but also to feel sensations such as the quaking of thunder (“you will hear 
thundering and shaking in the surrounding realm…you will experience yourself being 
shaken,” 1.622-3).372   
In addition to visualizations and imagined sensations, ritual techniques of the 
“Mithras Liturgy” include performative utterances (“I am going to envision with 
immortal eyes,” l.516),373 ritual gestures (“at once put your right finger on your mouth,” 
l.557),374 words and names of power (the often untranslatable voces magicae, passim), 
and breathing (“Draw in breath from the rays three times, drawing in as much as you 
can,” l.538).375 Performative utterances include identification with the source of creation 
(“Origin of my origin…first beginning of my beginning…,” 2.488-489),376 identification 
with the five elements, and identification as a god (“I am PHEROURA MIOURI,” 
l.724).377 The visualizations, utterances, and attendant ritual actions reinforced the 
practitioners’ sense of being divine. Following the process of self-divinization in the 
“Mithras Liturgy” described above, the divination proper begins—but, becoming god-
like was a precondition for receiving knowledge of the oracle.  Again, in Norman 
Russell’s words, “to obtain an oracle directly from the god…can only be done if the 
human mind is raised to the level of the divine.”378 
                                               
372 Betz, ML trans. “αὶσθηθήσει ταπασσόμενον.” 
 
373 Betz, ML trans. “κατοπτεύειν…ὄμμασι.” 
 
374 Betz, ML trans. “δάκτθλον ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα.”    
 
375 Betz, ML trans. “ἀχτίνων πνεῦμα γ´ἀνασπῶν, ὅ δύνασαι.”    
 
376 Betz, ML trans. “Γένεσις πρώτη τῆς ὲμῆς γενέσεως...ἀρχὴ τῆς ὲμῆς ἀρχὴς πρώτη.” 
 
377 Betz, ML trans. “Ἐγώ εὶμι φεροθρα μιουρι.” 
 
378 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 50. 
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Self-Identification with the God  
Garth Fowden observes that “self-identification with a god…is an authentically 
Egyptian trait” that can be seen across Egyptian ritual texts from all periods.379 Robert 
Ritner explains: “Identification of ritualist…and deity is fundamental to all Egyptian 
spells. The pattern is continued without break in the [Papyri Graecae Magicae], where 
the expression ‘I am (NN)’ is still usually written in Egyptian as ANOK.”380  The 
pharaonic inscription on the statue of thirteenth-century Ramesside Prince Khaemwaset 
testifies to the antiquity of the notion: “He [Setne] hath caused thee to become great of 
form, he liveth through thee, O god, and thou livest through him.”381 Later, in one Papyri 
Graecae Magicae love spell, we find two instances (cited previously) where divine 
identity is formed in order to empower the aim of the performer: “For you are I, and I am 
you; your name is mine, and mine is yours. For I am your image” and “I know you, 
Hermes, and you know me. / I am you, and you are I” (8.37-38, 49-50).382  
One example, “Thanksgiving Prayer,” appears in the Papyri Graecae Magicae, 
the Corpus Hermeticum, and the Nag Hammadi codices.383 While the “Thanksgiving 
                                                                                                                                            
 
379 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 26. Ritner, "Magical Practice,” 3346.  
 
 
380 Ritner, "Magical Practice,” 3346-3347. “NN” = “name of the deceased.” “ANOK” = 
“I am.” In this example, the practitioner identified with a divine, immortal ancestor. 
 
381 A.W. Shorter, “The statue of Khā’emuas in the British Museum,” in Studies presented 
to F. Ll. Griffith (London 1932), 130. 
 
382 Betz, PGM trans. “σὺ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἐγὼ σύ, τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν σόν· ἐγὼ γάρ 
εἰμι τὸ εἴδωλόν σου” and “οἶδά σε, Ἑρμῆ, καὶ σὺ ἐμέ. ἐγώ εἰ<μι> σὺ καὶ σὺ ἐγώ.” 
 
383 The discovery of the Nag Hammadi Codices refuted “Festugiere’s contention that 
there was no hermetic community and that hermeticism was simply a literary 
phenomenon” in Shaw, “Hermetic Rebirth,” 2. 
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Prayer” is appended to a ritual in the Papyri Graecae Magicae, the ritual part is omitted 
in the Latin Asclepius, again calling into question the line that had been drawn between 
technical and philosophical Hermetica (see chapter 2). In the Nag Hammadi version, the 
prayer follows a rare Hermetic tractate, similar to the Corpus Hermeticum, but also 
includes the trademark voces magicae or vocalic chant of the Papyri Graecae Magicae, 
perhaps a surviving bridge between philosophical and technical Hermetic text.384 
Scholars have taken this as evidence of “‘a certain amount of sharing between 
Hermeticists and the magicians who produced the Greek Magical Papyri.’”385 The 
current consensus is that there was considerable overlap. The “Thanksgiving Prayer” also 
provides one of the best examples of apathanatismos—self-identification with a god 
while still embodied. In its Papyri Graecae Magicae form we find: “We rejoice because 
you showed yourself to us; we rejoice because while we are / [still] in bodies you deified 
us by the knowledge of who you are” (3.598-601).386 Similarly, in the Latin Asclepius 41: 
“And we who are saved387 by your power do indeed rejoice because you have show 
                                               
384 Patricia Cox Miller write about the use of vocalic chant in the PGM in her essay, “In 
Praise of Nonsense”: “Clearly the vowels of the alphabet designate that point at which the 
human and divine worlds intersect, at least from the perspective of this text. To speak this 
language is not only to invoke the God; it is also to sound the depths of one’s own primal 
reality. These strings of vowels are hymnic recitations of praise to the God and to human 
Godlikeness.” The Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity: Essays in Imagination and 
Religion (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2001), 224. 	
385 William Grese, “Magic in Hellenistic Hermeticism,” in Hermeticism and the 
Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe, eds. Ingrid 
Merkel and Allen G. Debus (Washington: London: Folger Shakespeare Library: 
Associated University Presses, 1988), 51-55.  
 
386 Betz, PGM trans. “χαίρομ[ε]ν, ὅτι σεαυτὸν ἡμῖν ἔδειξας, χαίρομεν, ὅτι ἐν πλάσμασιν 
ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἀπεθέωσας τῇ σεαυτοῦ γνώσει.” 
 
387 Salvati in Scott, Hermetica 1, p. 374. Scott offers a line-by-line comparison of the 
Greek PGM version with the Latin Asclepius. 
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yourself to us wholly. We rejoice that you have deigned to make us gods for eternity even 
while we depend on the body.”388 In the Nag Hammadi Codex (6.7) in Coptic (though 
probably copied from the Greek), the parallel “Prayer of Thanksgiving” passage reads: 
“We rejoice, having been illuminated / by your knowledge. We rejoice / because you 
have shown us yourself. We rejoice / because while we were in (the) body, you have 
made us / divine through your knowledge.”389 Iamblichus shares a similar understanding 
in On the Mysteries, his defense of theurgy and homage to the way of Hermes: “The 
benevolent and gracious gods shine their light generously on theurgists, calling their 
souls up to themselves, giving them unification, and accustoming them, while they are 
still in their bodies, to be detached from their bodies and turned to their eternal and noetic 
principle” (1.12).390 The many examples of embodied personal divinity in our sources 
point to a basic precept in the Egyptian imagination. 
 
Conclusion 
To access and understand the privileged knowledge the oracle provides, the 
practitioner must become like the source of the oracle in perspective. You must become 
godlike. Through a series of visualizations, ritual actions, and performative utterances—
notably, an explicit statement of self-identification with a god, the practitioner of ḥeka 
                                               
388 Copenhaver, trans. “Gaudemus quod te nobis ostenderis totum, gaudemus quod nos in 
corporibus sitos aeternitate <tua> fueris consecrare dignatus.” Copenhaver suggests 
that consecrare indicates the “diffidence of the Latin translator about apotheosis,” 260. 
 
389 Brashler, trans. 
 
390 Shaw, trans. “οἱ θεοὶ τὸ φῶς ἐπιλάμπουσιν εὐμενεῖς ὄντες καὶ ἵλεῳ τοῖς θεουργοῖς, τάς 
τε ψυχὰς αὐτῶν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνακαλούμενοι καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐταῖς τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς 
χορηγοῦντες, ἐθίζοντές τε αὐτὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐν σώματι οὔσας ἀφίστασθαι τῶν σωμάτων, ἐπὶ δὲ 
τὴν ἀίδιον καὶ νοητὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν περιάγεσθαι.” 
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identifies as divine and therefore assumes the ability to understand the privileged 
knowledge about to be received. This is achieved through self-identification with the 
oracle’s nṯrw.  
 While the self-identification with the god in the “Mithras Liturgy” is explicit, 
self-identification with the nṯrw in the earlier public festival pḥ-nṯr oracles is implicit, by 
virtue of personal piety. The intimacy of the personal relationship that “shades into self-
identification” through word, visualization, or offering—whereby the deity is understood 
to reside “within the heart” as we saw on the prayer ostracon—is a participation, a form 
of sharing the powers of the deity by internalizing those powers. Public ritual has a 
personal, inner aspect. The tendency toward using self-identification with a god while 
embodied as a technology of self—apathanatismos—in traditional Egyptian temple 
thought and cultic practice becomes fully expressed in the Hermetica, an innovation later 
adopted by Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and Iamblichus who aligned themselves with 
Egyptian intellection tradition.  
We have fully explored the imaginal mechanism—spiritual or imaginative 
technologies of self-transformation—in previous chapters. With all his emphasis on the 
“error” of idolatry, Augustine seems anxiously unaware that the Hermetists who were 
“making gods” (De civitate Dei 8.23) were also making themselves into gods. Although 
Augustine cites the Latin Asclepius at length, but he does not bring the following line to 
our attention: “Not only is he god he also creates gods.”391 From the point of view of the 
Hermetists, “[t]his human fashioning of the earthly gods far from diminishing their 
                                               
391 Cf. Nag Hammadi Codex 6.8 and Asclep. 23. See Copenhaver, Hermetica, 80; The 
Nag Hammadi Library in English, edited by James M. Robinson and Richard Smith (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 333. 
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stature only points to the divine nature of human beings themselves.”392 The Hermetists 
held that a person, through philosophical practice and ritual enactments, could achieve 
apathanatismos, could become immortal and divine while still in a body. But the source 
of this perspective on the self “was probably not earlier Greek philosophical schools, but 
such Egyptian ḥry-tpw as Chaeremon, Anebo, Bitys, or Orion, as expressly claimed by 
the Neoplatonists themselves.”393  
A late fifth-century Egyptian teacher at an elite Alexandria philosophical school, 
surely familiar with the Hermetica,,394 expressed traditional Egyptian popular cultic piety 
when he “went out to an Isis temple in the village of Menouthis for assistance in 
procreation.”395 His understanding of apathanatismos as the aim of the Mithras oracle 
was similar to his understanding of the pḥ-nṯr with Isis: the purpose in both cases was “to 
obtain an oracle directly from the god, which can only be done if the human mind is 
raised to the level of the divine.”396 That fashioning of personal divinity—a sacred self—
occurs through an imaginative exercise of self-transformation placed upon an inner 
landscape of cosmic proportions. 
 Let us return to Thessalos, our Greek doctor who sought Egyptian wisdom. He 
won his direct divination with Asclepius but he doesn’t tell us exactly how the direct 
divination was performed except that he was “led through the god’s secret names”—
                                               
392 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 47. 
 
393 ḥry-tpw	is	the	plural	form.	Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3371. 
 
394 Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3371. 
 
395 Frankfurter, “Religious Practice and Piety,” 331. 
 
396 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 50. 
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presumably a series of voces magicae (Thessalos l. 23).397 But we might know a little 
more.  
 After the main part of the “Mithras Liturgy” oracle ends, optional variations on 
the rite are provided that involve additional participants: “[I]f you wish to show [another], 
after you judge whether his worth as a man is secure, handling the occasion as though in 
the immortalization ritual you yourself were being judged in his place, recite for him the 
first prayer, of which the beginning is “First origin of my origin…[a]nd say the 
successive things…over his head, in a soft voice, so that he many not hear…” (2.739-
747).398  
 It is quite likely that Thessalos’s Egyptian ḥry-tp took this option—being 
uncomfortable with the alien Thessalos’s bold wish for a direct divination and with the 
danger involved in performing an illegal act—instead himself performing the prerequisite 
self-divinization—using a rite similar to the “Mithras Liturgy” on behalf of his client.399 
But, Thessalos seems to have secured a bit of divinity for himself as well. Left alone in 
the room, Asclepius says to him: “Oh blessed Thessalos, attaining honour in the presence 
                                               
397 Friedrich, trans. “προαγαγὼν διὰ τῶν ἀπορρήτων ὀνομάτων τὸν θεὸν.” 
 
398 Betz, ML trans. “ὡς σὺ ὑπὲρ αὺτοῦ χρινόμενος ἐν τῶ ὰπαθανατισμῶ.” 
 
399 J.Z. Smith argues against the standard interpretation that the priests’ hesitance to meet 
Thessalos’ demand for a “face to face” encounter with the deity:  “The propeteia of 
Thessalos does not consist of his inquiry into a forbidden subject which, if exposed, 
might make the priests liable to prosecution; rather it is his faith in the continued efficacy 
of magic itself—a faith which the priests had evidently lost.” Smith, Map, 179. 
Interestingly, Thessalos’ rash demand, monos pros monon (“face to face”), recalls similar 
phrases in Neoplatonic theurgy. See Plotinus, Ennead, 6.9.11; Porphyry, De abstinentia, 
2.49; Proclus, In Timaeus, 1.212, 24; et cetera. 	
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of the god. As time passes, when your successes become known, men will worship you as 
a god” (Thessalos 1. 25).400 
                                               
400 Friedrich, trans. “ὦ μακάριε παρὰ θεῷ τυχὼν τιμῆς θεσσαλέ, προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου 
καὶ γνωσθέντων τῶν σῶν ἐπιτευγμάτων ὡς θεὸν ἄνθρωποί σε θρησκεύ<σ>ουσιν.” 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE PHILOSOPHER IN LATE ANTIQUE ALEXANDRIA 
 
 This chapter will present a “snapshot” of the intellectual and social life of the late 
antique Neoplatonic classroom by focusing on one moment recalled in the sources below 
concerning the family of Horapollon and an incident involving the student Paralius. 
There is much more that could be said about the social life of the Neoplatonists. Richard 
Lim’s work on public disputation in late antiquity offers an important qualification for 
my history of ideas approach particularly in regard to the theme of the Neoplatonic and 
Hermetic pursuit of a “noesis” beyond “logos” that appears throughout this dissertation. 
Lim argues that late antiquity heralded a devaluation of dialectic as a method for arriving 
at truth and legitimizing authority. He writes:  
An intensified advocacy for apophatic simplicity as a paradigmatic virtue was but 
one of the many results of this confluence of competing interests. Many 
individuals and groups sought to domesticate the perceived threat of dissensus in 
public disputing, choosing from various ideological strategies and cultural values 
to mobilize hierarchical form of authority against a culture that validated 
individualistic claims and rational argumentation.401 
 
In this chapter, I hope to strike a balance between reading the sources for the experiences 
they may have engendered (i.e. personal divinity) and presenting something close to an 
emblematic portrayal of the life of the philosophers—Neoplatonic and Hermetic descents 
of the ḥry-tp discussed in chapter 3—in late antiquity on the ground.402  
                                               
401 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 33.  
 
402 Robert Lamburton offers an example of reading the Neoplatonists not only for their 
philosophical value but for what they tell us about daily life in the past: “The Life of 
Plotinus provides important support for the notion that students of philosophy typically 
shopped around, listening to teacher after teacher in one center of learning, and then in 
some cases moving on to other centers. There is little doubt that, by the year 300, this sort 
of philosophical odyssey of inquiry had become a topos, a frequently repeated motif 
suitable to the characterization of the restless, young intellectual in his thirst for 
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 In the 460s, despite a history of occasional persecution--mostly notably the attack 
on the Serapeum in 391 and the murder of Hypatia in 415—Neoplatonism was “a 
generally accepted way of thinking and living in the Eastern Mediterranean; moreover, as 
epitomized by Proclus and Athens, it was a recognizably Greek way.”403  Yet, from its 
Alexandrian beginnings it incorporated cult practices of Hellenized Egypt and Syria in 
tandem with the ideas and prescriptions of Plato and Pythagoras. Adherents considered 
Neoplatonism, in the words of Hierocles, the “purified philosophy of Plato.”404 
Neoplatonism was more than a literary tradition reinvented in the Second Sophistic for 
elite imperial unity as the rhetoricians and grammarians in Alexandria might have led 
their Christian students to believe.  
   
The Family of Horapollon 
 The Alexandrian teacher Horapollon is an interesting case who opens doors to a 
further consideration of resilient heritages, continuities, cultural exchange, and strategies 
of resistance. Until recently scholarship on the effect of Hellenism on Egypt has been 
viewed reductively as “colonizer versus colonized.” More recently scholars have begun 
to consider a more complicated encounter where native constituencies appropriated 
elements of Hellenism to form a “subtle interpenetration” in order to maintain a cultural 
identity distinct from Hellenism (see chapter 3 for detailed discussion of Greek and 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge and truth.” Robert Lamberton, “The Schools of Platonic Philosophy of the 
Roman Empire: The Evidence of the Biographies,” in Education in Greek and Roman 
Antiquity, ed. Yun Lee Too, Leiden: Brill, 2001), 438. 
 
403 Polymnia Athanassiadi, “Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence 
of Damascius,” Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 113 (1993): 1. 
 
404 Fowden, “Pagan Holy Man,” 33. 
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Egyptian interactions).405 Assimilation has two sides. The “other” native cultural identity-
-the Egyptian priest-philosopher (or ḥry-tp, see chapter 3)—became romanticized, 
endowed with “alien wisdom.” On the other hand, especially in Roman times, it was 
feared for its “potential to subvert society and cosmos.”406 
 Horapollon himself emphasized the Hellenistic culture of his upbringing, but 
Damascius describes his father Asclepiades and uncle Heraiscus “earnestly pursuing 
the…traditions of their [native Egyptian] heritage with religious passion….” (Isidori, fr. 
174).407 Like many families of the fourth century tied to temple cult, Horapollon’s 
attempted to preserve Egyptian cultural identity while gaining stature as Hellenic 
intellectuals. The Corpus Hermeticum, material that would have been well known to 
Horapollon and the Alexandrian Neoplatonists, is heir to at least some Egyptian esoteric 
teachings. Garth Fowden has argued: 
Our philosophical texts imply an actual historical milieu that was dedicated to the 
spiritual life. Instruction and initiation were group experiences, even when at the 
highest levels, they involved only the spiritual guide and a solitary pupil; and 
those who participated in these encounters instinctively expressed their solidarity 
and joy through prayer and hymnody, and in such comradely gestures as 
embraces and the sharing of food.408   
 
While the tone of the Corpus Hermeticum is overwhelmingly contemplative and 
dialectic, it also has some philological connections with the theurgic Papyri Graecae 
Magicae of the same era. Horapollon, Heraiscus, and Asclepiades can be seen to 
                                               
405 Watts, City and School, 163. 
 
406 Frankfurter, “Consequences of Hellenism,” 164. 
 
407 Frankfurter trans. in Roman Egypt. 
 
408 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 149. 
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negotiate the intersection between Hellenic and Egyptian intellectual traditions and 
identities evident in Alexandrian Neoplatonism and Graeco-Egyptian Hermeticism. 
Horapollon shared a complex at Kom el-Dikka in Alexandria with his father and 
uncle as well as with other notable Neoplatonist teachers including Ammonius Hermiae, 
Isidore, and Asclepiodotus. Watts imagines lively halls providing a stage for 
interscholastic rivalry where traditionally-minded students “could argue that Plato agreed 
with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world, [while] Christian students 
could counter that Plato’s Timaeus seems to say very much the opposite,” where 
traditional cultists would talk about “trips to the shrine of Isis in Menouthis, [while] 
Christians [would speak] of miraculous cures at the shrine of St. Cyrus.”409 Nonetheless, 
the vibrant heterogeneity of the Neoplatonic classroom and, perhaps, the growing 
exuberance of Horapollon’s interest in traditional cult, proved too much for the young 
Paralius, a new student from Aphrodisius sent to be groomed, most likely, for an imperial 
post. After an unsatisfying encounter at the suburban Menouthis shrine of Isis, Paralius 
broke the taboo against disloyalty to alma mater and is beaten by his peers. Zacharaias, a 
leading anti-Chalcedonian monk at Enaton aided by “schoolyard evangelicals”—
philoponoi—recast the “punishment of an obnoxious teenager into a religious 
persecution.”410 Hearing the complaint, Patriarch Peter Mongus seized the opportunity to 
heal a long “confessional dissonance” with Enaton by inciting an anti-pagan riot in 486 
CE that led to the sacking of the Isis shrine. Horapollon fled temporarily with aid of 
praefectus Entrechius; Neoplatonic headmaster Ammonius Hermiae agreed to curtail 
                                               
409 Edward Jay Watts, Riot in Alexandria: Tradition and Group Dynamics in Late 
Antique Pagan and Christian Communities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2010), 8. 
 
410 Watts, Riot in Alexandria, 11. 
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religious instruction, end ritual sacrifice, and remove the theurgic Chaldean Oracles from 
the curriculum.411 
 
A Philosophical History 
 Damascius (458 – after 538), the last scholarch of the Neoplatonic school in 
Athens, composed the Life of Isidore during the first quarter of the sixth century after he 
had become head of the Academy. An “irreverent hagiography,” it describes the 
intellectual elite in Athens, Alexandria, and Aphrodisias in the tradition of Neoplatonic 
aretalogies.412  Horapollon’s grandfather, Horapollon the Elder, was a cosmopolitan and 
thoroughly Hellenic intellectual who embraced the Classical canon at the Alexandria 
mouseia.413 Damascius describes the elder’s sons, the divine Heraiscus and erudite 
Asclepiades, as more interested in reviving an alternative “Egyptian canon” in the context 
of Iamblichan theurgy: “But by nature Heraiscus had a more godlike form in appearance, 
but the one who was more knowledgeable and skillful in the wisdom of the Egyptians 
(was) Asclepiades, because the latter had been spending so much time studying Egyptian 
wisdom” (Damascius, Vita Isidori, fr. 161).414 Heraiscus explored sacred spaces and rites: 
“and his soul on every occasion dwelt in holy sanctuaries of initiation, practicing not only 
                                               
411 Watts, City and School, 224. The Chaldean Oracles are similar to the Hermetic 
material, of unknown origin. They were referred to by Neoplatonists including Emperor 
Julian. See Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation and Commentary. Edited and translated 
by Ruth Dorothy Majercik. Westbury: Prometheus Trust, 2013. 
 
412 Athanassiadi, “Persecution and Response,” 2. 
 
413 Fowden, “Pagan Holy Man,” 46.; Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 185. 
 
414 My trans. “τὴν μὲν φύσιν θεοειδέστερος ἦν Ἡραί̈σκος, ὁ δὲ τὴν Αἰγυπτίων σοφίαν 
δαημονέστερος, ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης, ἅτε τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὗτος μὲν τῇ Αἰγυπτίων 
προσδιατρίβων.”  
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his native rites in Egypt but also those of the other (nations)” (fr. 174).415 Heraiscus was 
known for his spiritual discernment: “Heraiscus had a natural ability for distinguishing 
between sacred statues that were living and those that were not. For just as he saw one, 
his heart was struck with divine power and he was startled in body and soul, as though 
fallen upon by the god” (fr. 174).416  
 Asclepiades, on the other hand, “reared himself more in the Egyptian books [and] 
was more precisely informed of their native theology” (fr. 161).417 In the spirit of 
Neoplatonic ecumenism, he sought a “harmony of all discourses about the gods” (fr. 
161)418 and “wrote a treatise encompassing the knowledge of the primeval Egyptians” (fr. 
161).419 Damascius was familiar with the written work of Heraiscus and Asclepiades. He 
understood the Egyptian convention of dividing the cosmos into traits of many gods as a 
intellectual gift to the Neoplatonists: “[I]t is possible for those who wish to learn by 
reading their writings, and I speak of the written work of Heraiscus concerning the 
Egyptian teaching in general (that was) written for Proclus the philosopher, and that of 
the Egyptians with the other theologians that was begun to be written by Asclepiades” 
                                               
415 My trans. “ἐν ἀδύτοις ἑκάστοτε καὶ τελεστήριον ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, οὔτι κατ' 
Αἴγυπτον μόνην κινοῦντι τὰς πατρίους τελετάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀλλοδαπῆς.” 
 
416 My trans. “Ἡραῖσκος αὐτοφυὴς ἐγένετο διαγνώμων τῶν τε ζώντων καὶ τῶν μὴ ζώντων 
ἱερῶν ἀγαλμάτων. εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐμβλέπων ἐτιτρώσκετο τὴν καρδίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θειασμοῦ καὶ 
ἀνεπήδα τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κατάσχετος.” 
 
417 My trans. “Ἀσκληπιάδης ἐπιπλεῖον ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις βιβλίοις ἀνατραφεὶς ἀκριβέστερος 
ἦν ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πάτριον.” 
 
418 My trans. “τῶν θεολογιῶν ἁπασῶν τὴν συμφωνίαν.” 
 
419 My trans. “καὶ συγγραφὴν δὲ ἔγραψεν Αἰγυπτίων ὠγυγίων πράγματα περιέχουσαν.” 
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(Damascius, De Principiis 3.3).420 When Heraiscus died, Asclepiades, who had some 
knowledge of traditional funerary rites, prepared the body with a shroud when “at once 
hieroglyphs shone with light on all over the cloth, and around them were seen apparitions 
befitting a god.” (Damascius, Vita Isidori, fr. 174).421 On the miraculous circumstances of 
his birth appropriate to a Neoplatonic saint: “[H]e is said to have been born from his 
mother holding the silencing finger up to his lips, like the Egyptians tell in the sacred 
story about Oros [Horus] and before Oros about Helios” (fr.174).422 The Hellenized 
“Oros” descends from the child form of the Egyptian sun god Horus, becoming 
Harpocrates in the Hellenistic period. Harpocrates is often portrayed with a finger in his 
mouth.423  The allusion to the Egyptian “Opening of the Mouth” ceremony used to 
“animate” devotional statuary, would have been obvious to the Egyptian theurgists.424 
 Horapollon does not fare as well as his father and uncle in Damascius’ view. 
Heraiscus had predicted that Horapollon would eventually convert to Christianity: 
“Horapollon did not have the character of a philosopher, but kept hidden the notion about 
                                               
420 My trans. “ὠς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχοῦσι τοῖσ βοθλομένοις, λέγω 
δὲ τῆ Ἡραῖσκου ἀναγραθῆ τοῦ Αἰγθπτίου καθόλου λόγου πρὸς τὸν Πρόκλον γραθείση τὸν 
φιλόσοφον καὶ τῆ ἀρξαμένη γράφεσθαι συμφωνία ὐπὸ Ἀσκλνπιὰδου τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πρὸς 
τοὺς ἄλλοθς θεολόγους.” 
 
421 My trans. “αὐτίκα φωτὶ κατελάμπετο πανταχῇ τῶν σινδόνων ἀπόρρητα διαγράμματα, 
καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ καθεωρᾶτο φασμάτων εἴδη θεοπρεπῆ.” 
 
422 My trans.  “λέγεται γὰρ κατελθεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν ἔχων τὸν 
κατασιγάζοντα δάκτυλον, οἷον Αἰγύπτιοι μυθολογοῦσι γενέσθαι τὸν Ὡρον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ 
Ὡρου τὸν Ἥλιον.” 
 
423 George Hart, A Dictionary of Egyptian Gods and Goddesses (London and Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 88. 
 
424 Ann Macy Roth, “Fingers, Stars, and the ‘Opening of the Mouth’: The Nature and 
Function of the ntrwj-Blades,” The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology v. 79 (1993): 57-79.  
 
	 131	
God that he held” (fr. 314, 317).425 In the Syriac Life of Severus, Zacharias Scholasticus 
introduces Horapollon as a grammarian, “a man who was a specialist in his art and a 
splendid teacher” but “also a pagan, bewildered by demons and magic” (15).426  Just 
before Paralius led the mob to sack the Menouthis shrine, Horapollon escaped 
temporarily.427 Zacharias describes the astonishment of the pagans when the Christians 
survived the night without divine retribution (32).428  Soon afterward, “all the people of 
Alexandria, at the time of gathering for service, were shouting many words against the 
“pagans” and against Horapollon, that he should not be called Horapollon but 
‘Psychepollon,’ which means ‘destroyer of souls.’” (32).429  
 The year of the riot Bishop Peter Mongus succeeded in closing down 
Horapollon’s school of rhetoric in all of its real or supposed theurgic frenzy. The 
                                               
425 My translation. “ὁ δὲ Ὡραπόλλων οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἦθος φιλόσοφος, ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐν βυθῷ τῆς 
περὶ θεοῦ δόξης ὧν ᾔδει ἀποκρυπτόμενος.” 
 
426 Ambjorn, trans. 
 
427 Alan Cameron criticizes scholars who argue that an organized “pagan resistance” 
existed in late antique Christian Egypt. See appendix C. The misunderstanding, in his 
view, is based on a reading of sources like Damascius’ Life of Isidore and Zacharias 
Scholasticus’ biography of Bishop Severus of Antioch. Although he acknowledges 
Syranius’ statement (“One could call us fighters since we defend the best and most 
beautiful of philosophies from the charges brought against it,” Metaphysica 91.8), he also 
points out that the Neoplatonists were as antagonistic with their philosophical colleagues 
as Christian thinkers. Acknowledging the survival of traditional pre-Christina thought 
and cult in late antiquity, he still questions interpretations that equate survival with 
resistance. In his view, too much credence is given to the testimony of Paralius in 
Zacharias. He argues that the “paganism” of the poets (and philosophers) that seemed to 
“flower” in a Christianized late antique Egypt is more literary than cultic. Christian 
fanatics, he claims, were unable to tell the difference between cult statues and 
mythological art, and were “probably raiding the sculpture gardens of well-to-do 
Christians.” Wandering poets and other essays on late Greek literature and philosophy 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 160. 	
428 Ambjorn, trans. 
 
429 Ambjorn, trans. 
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grammarian was arrested with his uncle Heraiscus and tortured by Nicodemes, a Roman 
Christian Praetorian prefect under Emperor Zeno. When they were released, Horapollon 
left Alexandria and Heraiscus went into hiding in the house of a Christian doctor named 
Gessius where he fell ill and died. Asclepiades joined him shortly thereafter.430 
Horapollon returned to Alexandria to take over the school after having accepted 
Christianity. Such was the fate of these “Hellenizing priests who gave the cities’ 
philosophers the illusion of continuity with an Egyptian religious ‘essence.’”431  But, was 
it an illusion? Let us now turn to the Egyptianizing elements in Neoplatonist writings as 
well as the Hermetic texts said to be the product of Egyptian “priest-philosophers.” 
 
 
Representing Egypt  
 The Pythagorean tradition “laid great emphasis on the sage’s duty both to honor 
the gods himself, and to ensure that the public cults were conducted in a fit and becoming 
manner.”432   In On Isis and Osiris, Plutarch writes that Pythagoras learned the use of 
symbols from Egypt.433  Plato in Timaeus and Phaedrus demonstrated high esteem for the 
oral wisdom of the Egyptians. The Egyptian Plotinus considered hieroglyphs to be 
evidence of a parallel, if not original, theory of Platonic Forms: “[B]y drawing devotional 
                                               
430 Athanassiadi, “Persecution and Response,” 20.; Watts, City and School, 225. 
 
431 Frankfurter, “Consequences of Hellenism,” 170. 
 
432 Fowden, “Pagan Holy Man,” 52. 
 
433 Mark Edwards, trans., Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their 
Students (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000): 68. 
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images and inscribing in their temples one image to each thing, they created a way of 
understanding” (Porphyry, Vita Plotini 5.8.6).434 
 Damascius also portrayed the Egyptians as seminal contributors to Neoplatonism: 
“Egyptian philosophers in our own day have discovered and brought out the truth hidden. 
in certain Egyptian understandings, so that with them the unique principle of the all (One) 
was celebrated as unknowable darkness.” (Damascius, De Principiis 17.124.4).435  
Writing in the guise of an Egyptian ḥry-tp in On the Mysteries, Iamblichus responds to an 
attack from Porphyry.  He “allies himself with the ancient holy ranks of the Egyptian 
caste, and reminds us of the tradition that the Greek philosophers (including Pythagoras, 
Plato, Democritus, Eudoxus and ‘many others’) first learnt their wisdom from the 
Egyptians.”436  Defending his theurgical innovation, Iamblichus responds:  
First, I would like to interpret to you the type of theology (used by) the Egyptians. 
For these people, imitating the nature of the universe and the demiurgic power of 
the gods, display certain signs of mystical, arcane and invisible notions by means 
of symbols, just as nature copies the unseen principles in visible forms through 
some mode of symbolism, and the creative activity of the gods shows the truth of 
the forms in visible signs (Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 7.1).437 
 
                                               
434 Hadot, trans. “ἀγὰλματα δὲ γράψαντες καὶ ἒν ἑκαστον εκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα 
ἐντυπώσαντες ἔν τοῖς ἴεροῖς τὴν ἔκείνου οὐ διέξοδον ὲμφῆναι.” 
 
435 Ahbel-Rappe, trans. “οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες ἐξένεγκαν αὐτῶν 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην εὑρόντες ἐν αἰγύπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις, ὡς εἴη κατ᾽αὐτοὺς ἠ μέν | 
μία τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴ Σκότος ἂγνωστον ὐμνοθμέν.” 
 
436 Emma C. Clarke, Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis: A Manifesto of the Miraculous 
(Aldershot, Burlington, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 2001): 8. 
 
437 My trans. “πρότερον δέ βούλομαι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων τὸν τρόπον τῆς θεολογίας 
διερμηνεῦσαι. ὅτοι γὰρ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν | τῶν θεῶν μιμούμενοι 
καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μθστικῶν και ἀποκεκρυμμένων καὶ ἀφανῶν νοήσεων εἰκόνας διὰ συμβόλων 
ἐκφαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ χαὶ ἠ φύσις τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν εἴδσι τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λόγους διὰ συμβόλων 
τρόπον τινὰ ἀπετυπώσατο, ἡ δὲ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργία τὴν ἀληθειαν τῶν ἰδεῶν διὰ τῶν 
φανερῶν εἰκόνων ὐπεγράφατο.” 
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Iamblichus’s idea that theurgy was needed to surpass the limits of purely philosophical 
thinking was a break from Porphyry and Plotinus. Eunapius of Sardis (ca. 349 – after 
414) uses the term “theurgy” in his Lives of the Philosophers where he presents it as a 
branch of the paideia of a philosopher. Referring to Porphyry’s accomplishments, 
Eunapius includes “theurgic rites” (Vitai Sophistarum 6.2, 2-3).438 Damascius considered 
Iamblichus an “innovator,” but with some reservations. To many within and beyond 
Neoplatonist circles, Iamblichus’s emphasis on Egyptian, Orphic, and Chaldean cultic 
practice appeared to verge on illicit magia even though it was a reasonable extension of 
Hellenic ecumenism. Using the symbols that the gods have embedded in the world, the 
Iamblichan theurgist “made use many of the invocations, including voces magicae, and 
many of the materials, of the ‘vulgar’ … but he [used] them with a proper understanding 
of how they work.”439 While, “deference to Egyptian wisdom [...] was already a topos in 
the Platonic dialogues where ‘Egypt’ functioned as an ideal culture against which Plato 
measured his own,” Iamblichus’s “Egyptomania” has been overstated.440 Iamblichan 
theurgy, especially translated and adapted by Alexandrian teachers like Horapollon, 
probably did reflect genuine Egyptian cult practices.  
 I will turn my attention now briefly to examples from the Corpus Hermeticum and 
Papyri Graecae Magicae that suggest at least a bidirectional influence.  The following 
excerpt from a spell clearly borrows from the “thanksgiving” or “spiritual sacrifices” 
                                               
438 My trans. “θεουργὸν τελεταῖς.” 
 
439 Dillon, “Iamblichus,” 35. 
 
440 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995): 238-239. 
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found in the Corpus Hermeticum, the Nag Hammadi codices, and both Neoplatonic and 
Christian discourse. It also mirrors Neoplatonism’s concern with incorporate salvation: 
“We give you thanks to you, psyche, with each heart stretched out to you, 
unutterable name honored by the addressing of god and blessed by the holiness of 
god, for to everyone and to everything you have been fatherly / goodwill, 
affection, friendship and sweetest power, give us charisma of mind, speech, 
knowledge; intellect so that we might understand you, speech so that we might 
call upon you, knowledge so that we might know you. We rejoice because you 
showed yourself to us; we rejoice because while we are / presently embodied you 
deified us by the knowledge of yourself” (Papyri Graecae Magicae 3.591-601).441  
 
 Another example from the Corpus Hermeticum portrays a student of the Graeco-
Roman hybrid Thoth-Hermes or Hermes Trismegistus, who ironically warns his reader 
about the deficiencies of the Greek language in expressing Egyptian wisdom:  
“[I]t will be more obscure (he explained) when the Greeks later desire to 
translate our language to their own and thus produce in writing the greatest 
distortion and obscurity. But this discourse, expressed in our paternal 
language, keeps clear the meaning of the words. The making of the sound 
of Egyptian words have in themselves the energy of the objects they speak 
of” (Corpus Hermeticum 16.1-2).442 
 
Greek readers would find reinforcement of the idea of a deeper Egyptian source in 
Neoplatonism. These texts served to authorize and sacralize the Egyptian philosopher as 
well as the broader Neoplatonic intellectual community. 
                                               
441 My trans. “χάριν σοι οἴδαμεν, ψυχῆ, κατὰ καρδίαν πρὸς σὲ ἀνατεταμένεν, ὄνομα 
τετιμημένον | τῆ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορία καὶ εὐλογούμενον τῆ τοῦ | θεοῦ ὀσιότητι, ἦ πρὸς 
πάντας καὶ πρὸς πάντα πατρικὴν || εὔνοιαν καὶ στοργήν καὶ φιλίαω καὶ ἐπιγλυκυτά|την 
ἐνέργειαν εδείξω, χαρισάμενος ἠμῖν νοῦν, | λόγον, γνῶσιν. νοῦν μέν, ἵνα σε νοήσωμεν, 
λόγον | δέ,  ἵνα σε ἐπικαλέσωμεν, γνῶσιν, ἵνα σε ἐπιγνῶ|σωμεν. χαίρομεν, ὅτι ἐν πλάσμασιν 
ἠμᾶς ὄντας ἀπεθέωσας τῆ σεαυτοῦ γνώσει.” 
 
442 My trans. “καὶ ἔτι άσαφεστέρα (φανήσεται) τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον βοθληθέντων τὴν 
ἠμετέραν διάλεκτον εἰσ τὴν ἰδίαν μεθερμηνεῦσαι, ὅπερ ἔσται τῶν γεγραμμένων μεγίστη 
διαστροφή τε καὶ ἀσάφεια. ὁ δὲ λὀγος τῆ πατρώα διαλέκτω ἑρμηνεθόμενος ἔχει σαφῆ τὸν 
τῶν λόγων νοῦν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ποιὸν…καὶ ἠ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων δύναμις ἐν ἑαυτῆ 
ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν λεγομένων.” 
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After the Riot  
 The Alexandrian philosopher would eventually become a casualty of Christian 
aggression. Horapollon became Christian. Damascius despises Horapollon for his 
“conversion” (under torture) but perhaps, as Athanassiadi suggests, this once “combative 
spirit had been worn away by a psychological war of attrition which lasted too long.”443 
His uncle Heraiscus, who had raised him, was dead. His father and teacher also. His wife 
took the household goods and departed with her lover. Perhaps, the “fortunes of his 
professional and domestic life thus seemed to combine against any hope of peace and 
happiness.”444 The vitality of fifth century Alexandrian Neoplatonism was, in part, “the 
expected product of a world which had endorsed intolerance.”445 While a self-serving 
“bricolage” and a nostalgic grasp at recalling an earlier authority was surely at play, the 
material that the ecumenical intellectuals had at their disposal in Egypt—as heirs to 
traditional cultic thought—was also at hand. At the very least, the family of Horapollon 
worked to expand the preexisting Egyptianizing elements in Neoplatonism as well as its 
practical application through theurgic ritual. 
 Just as we see new ideological movements invoking authentic pasts, 
Neoplatonists like Horapollon appropriated the language, rituals, and monuments of 
traditional Egyptian cult to bolster the sense of authenticity and authority of their 
“theosophy” and in opposition to Christianity. Identity connects as much as it 
                                               
443 Athanassiadi, “Persecution and Response,” 21. 
 
444 Athanassiadi, “Persecution and Response,” 21. 
 
445 Athanassiadi, “Persecution and Response,” 12. 
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differentiates, it depends on “others” and responds to them.446 More than a narrative 
constituent in a literary world, the material and documentary record portrays identity as 
negotiable currency in social power relationships.447 Through the choices and actions of 
Horapollon and his family, Alexandria, ‘the city of foreigners’, for a short time may have 
been “vindicated in Egyptian eyes and was even viewed as the very epitome of 
Egyptianism.”448  
                                               
446 Erich S. Gruen, ed., Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean (Los Angeles: 
Getty Research Institute, 20110), 1. 
 
447 Ray Laurence and Joanne Berry, eds. Cultural Identity in the Roman Empire (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1998), 8. 
 
448 Athanassiadi, “Persecution and Response,” 17. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ISIS, THE CULTUS OF SELF, AND THE GENIUS OF APULEIUS 
 
 Shortly after his initiation as a priest of Isis, Lucius speaks these words to the 
goddess: “I shall store your divine countenance and sacred godhead in the secret places of 
my heart, forever guarding it and picturing it to myself” Intra pectoris mei secreta, “the 
secret places of my heart” (Apuleius, Metamorphoses 11.25). The word “secret” derives 
from the Latin secerno, meaning that which has been “set apart.” Lucius “sets apart” his 
heart, his deepest knowing. This line roundly echoes the words that Isis imparted in the 
dream vision promising Lucius “salvation” from his asinine fate: “You will clearly 
remember and keep forever sealed deep in your heart the fact that the rest of your life’s 
course is pledged to me until the very limit of your last breath.” Penita mente, “deep in 
your heart,” which can also be rendered as “in the innermost part of the mind” (11.6). 
When we read The god of Socrates, these secret places of the heart, these innermost parts 
of the mind—claimed by the goddess in Metamorphoses—shift slightly in meaning and 
location.  
 This chapter explores how Apuleius’s philosophical work, The god of Socrates, 
informs his portrayal of the Isis Cult in his second-century Latin novel, Metamorphoses. 
In doing so, I hope to complicate our understanding of the Isis cult as portrayed in 
Metamorphoses and to offer some thoughts about the construction of the “sacred power” 
and what I am calling the “sacred self,” arguing that the self is the source of sacred power 
to achieve personal divinity in Metamorphoses even though it appears that Isis is that 
source.  
 To some extent, this will be a Platonic reading of Apuleius’s novel, a point of 
view that a number of scholars beginning with Filippo Beroaldo in the 14th century and 
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more recently, Thibau, DeFilippo, Moreschini, Dillon, Schlam, and Walsh to name a 
few—have entertained, at least to some extent, particularly in regard to the embedded 
“Cupid and Psyche” tale in Books 4 through 6.449 Acknowledging the Platonic themes at 
play, Nancy Shumate writes: “The well-documented syncretistic tendencies of the age 
make a fusion of Platonic philosophy and Isiac religion not at all strange in a text from 
the imperial period; Plutarch’s treatise On Isis and Osiris makes this very clear.”450 
Recently Friedmann Drews offers a Platonic reading using Apuleius’s “daemonology” 
from The god of Socrates to explain the problem of the relationship between the Isis and 
Osiris initiations in Book 11, the so-called “Isis Book.”451 What hasn’t been done is to 
apply Apuleius’s daemonology—in particular his theory of the personal daemon—to the 
revelation of Isis. This application of “daemon” theory is not arbitrary in my reading. 
Rather Metamorphoses explicitly invites it. I bring four modern perspectives into play in 
order to suggest another way to think about the role of selves in the construction of the 
“sacred” that helps us understand how Late Antique people became divine.  
 
 
 
                                               
449 More recently, see Claude Moreschini, Apuleius and the Metamorphosis of Platonism 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2015); Richard Fletcher, Apuleius' Platonism: The Impersonation of 
Philosophy (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Alexander 
Kirichenko, “Asinus Philosophans: Platonic Philosophy and the Prologue to Apuleius' 
‘Golden Ass,’” Mnemosyne. 61, no. 1 (2008): 89-107. 
 
450 Nancy Shumate, Crisis and Conversion in Apuleius' Metamorphoses (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996), 10. 
 
451 Friedmann Drews, “A Platonic Reading of the Isis Book,” in Apuleius Madaurensis 
Metamorphoses, Book XI: The Isis Book, ed. Wytse Hette Keulen (Leiden: Brill, 2015): 
517 – 528. 
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The God of Socrates  
 In The god of Socrates, Apuleius elaborates on Plato’s idea of the daimonion (in 
Latin, daemon), the personal divine voice or guardian that advised Socrates, a favorite 
topic of writers of the Greek Second Sophistic. Apuleius lays out a taxonomy of being 
consisting of the “highest, intermediate, and lowest” (Apuleius, De deo Socrates 115), the 
highest status reserved for the immortal gods and the lowest for humans. The 
intermediate beings are daemones: intermediary powers, beings in substance and 
habitation somewhere between gods and humans, closer to the air.452 Their job is to 
deliver prayers to the gods. These more or less invisible beings have “no earthy solidity 
which can occupy the field of our vision…the rays of our gaze are let through by their 
loose texture” (144).453 Active imagination is required to “see” them: “Come then, let us 
shape in our minds and imaginatively create a kind of bodily texture…” (140).454  
                                               
452 In his study on the matter, physics, and biology of demons in late antiquity, Gregory 
A. Smith notes: “Being invisible is also not the same as being a metaphor.” “How Thin is 
a Demon?” Journal of Early Christian Studies 16.4 (2008): 482. 	
453 Harrison, trans. “quod nulla in illis terrena soliditas locum luminis occuparit, quae 
nostris oculis possit obsistere, qua soliditate necessario offensa acies inmoretur, sed fila 
corporum possident rara et splendida et tenuia usque adeo ut radios omnis nostri tuoris 
et raritate transmittant et splendore reverberent et subtilitate frustrentur.” 
 
454 Harrison, trans. “Cedo igitur mente formemus et gignamus animo id genus corporum 
texta.” Interestingly, Gregory A. Smith comments: “Demons with superfine bodies fit but 
poorly into a cosmos supposedly characterized by a sharp or even ‘dualistic’ opposition 
between lifeless matter and pure spirit. Indeed, it is time to abandon the label ‘dualist’ 
altogether, especially if incautiously used in the context of material things. Among other 
dangers, assuming a dualistic framework makes it far too easy to assume that invisible 
things were conceived as (merely) mental things, in the Cartesian sense: internal or 
imagined things, devoid of spatial extension, products or objects of pure thought. In 
short, dualism makes it far too easy to reduce ancient demons to a metaphor, or to restrict 
oneself to the psychological, wholly internalized, readings” “How Thin is a Demon?,” 
489. See my chapter 1 for how active imagination in the ancient sense differs from a 
modern “psychological, wholly internalized” sense.   
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 However, there is another class of daemones that concerns us here. Apuleius 
compares them to the Latin genii: “You could call the daemon a ‘Genius’, since that 
particular type of divinity, identical with the mind of each and every person, is (though 
itself immortal) nevertheless born in some sense together with a human being” (151).455 
More importantly, Apuleius describes the daemon as the “human mind (animus humanus) 
itself, even while still located in the body” (150).456 It dwells “in the inmost sanctum of 
the human mind in the function of consciousness itself” (156).457 The daemon seems 
curiosus, inspecting “everything with close attention” (155), for one “can have no secrets 
(secreti) before these guardians” (155).458 Though curious indeed, the daemonic self 
desires the Platonic “Good”: “The virtuous desire of the mind (bona cupido animi) is also 
a good god (bonus deus)” (150).459 Still in keeping with the general view of 
Metamorphoses’ moral timbre, the human can be the curiosus as long as he or she desires 
the authorized virtue of Plato and Plutarch. But, how do we locate authorized virtue? Is it 
a philosophical or theological abstraction or an internally negotiated configuration of the 
self? Before launching into these questions, let us briefly revisit the tale of Lucius on the 
eve of his quest for salvation. 
  
                                               
455 Harrison, trans. “poteris ‘genium’ vocare, quod is deus, qui est animus sui cuique, 
quamquam sit immortalis, tamen quodam modo cum homine gignitur.” 
 
456 Harrison, trans. “Nam quodam significatu et animus humanus etiam nunc in corpore 
situs daemon nuncupatur.” 
 
457 Harrison, trans. “in ipsis penitissimis mentibus vice conscientiae deversetur.” 
 
458 Harrison, trans. “quin omnia curiose ille participet; omnia visitet, omnia intellegat” 
and “ut sciatis nihil homini prae istis custodibus nec intra animum nec foris esse secreti.” 
 
459 Harrison, trans. “Igitur et bona cupido animi bonus deus est. Unde nonnulli 
arbitrantur, ut iam prius dictum est, “eudaemonas” dici beatos, quorum daemon bonus.” 
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The Tale 
On his way to Thessaly, a region in Greece known for its secrets, Lucius 
overhears a conversation between fellow travelers about a saga or “wise woman” named 
Meroe who “can lower the sky and suspend the earth, solidify fountains and dissolve 
mountains, raise up ghosts and bring down gods, darken the stars and light up Tartarus 
itself” (Apuleius, Metamorphoses 1.8).460 He describes himself to the travelers as “the 
sort who wants to know everything, or at least most things” (1.2).461 Aristomenes obliges 
with an unusual account of his own “present inquisitiveness [instans curiositas]” that led 
to punishment at the hands of two sagarum, Panthia and Meroe (1.12). Apuleius becomes 
the curiosus, the “one who looks,” while the saga Meroe, in her rare and secret power, is 
“that which attracts attention.”462 The saga uses this secret power to punish lovers who 
stray or spurn (1.9).  Soon thereafter, Lucius arrives at the farmhouse of Milo and 
Pamphile where he meets the lovely Photis and his aunt, Byrrhena. Byrrhena warns him 
that his hostess Pamphile is a maga, a dabbler in secret knowledge, similar to the saga. 
This news fascinates him. He has an “excessive passion to learn the rare and 
marvelous…those spells of the magic art (artis magicae)” (1).463  
                                               
460 Hanson, trans. “‘Saga’ inquit ‘et divini potens caelum deponere, terram suspendere, 
fontes durare, montes diluere, manes sublimare, deos infimare, sidera exstinguere, 
Tartarum ipsum illuminare.’” 
 
461 Hanson, trans. “sed qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certe plurima.” 
 
462 Carlin Barton describes the person afflicted with “cura” as too filled with care and 
interest; that is, too careful or anxious. 
 
463 Hanson, trans. “anxius alioquin et nimis cupidus cognoscendi quae rara miraque sunt, 
reputansque me media Thessaliae loca tenere, quo artis magicae nativa cantamina totius 
orbis consono ore celebrentur.” 
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Lucius is transfixed by the rare and the secret. Curiosus, curiose, and curiositas 
connote an excessively anxious attention and extreme inquisitiveness: “I was on 
tenterhooks of desire and impatience alike, and I began to examine each and every object 
with curiosity” (2.1).464 His desire to know transforms his perception: “Nothing I look at 
in that city seemed to me to be what it was; but I believed that absolutely everything had 
been transformed into another shape by some deadly mumbo-jumbo” (2.1).465  He spies 
on Pamphile, as she is about to steal away to her lover by transforming into an owl. 
Photis helps Lucius replicate the operation by rubbing an herbal ointment over his body. 
Subject to her artes magicae, he becomes “so transfixed with awe that [he] seemed to be 
something other than Lucius” (3.21).466 But instead of being transformed into the bird of 
wisdom, Lucius turns into an ass (3.25).467   
Fortunately, Photis instructs him that he need only take a bite of roses in order to 
return to his former state (3.25). Thus begins the misadventured quest for the rose where 
Lucius learns more about wise women and joins the company of thieves, heroes, bakers, 
legions, false priests, and aristocrats who beat, ridicule, and make a spectacle of him 
until, in utter despair, he finds his salvation—which I argue is his “sacred self”—in a 
dream vision, through a garland of roses, in the cult of Isis.  
 
                                               
464 Hanson, trans. “suspensus alioquin et voto simul et studio, curiose singula 
considerabam.” 
 
465 Hanson, trans. “Nec fuit in illa civitate quod aspiciens id esse crederem quod esset, 
sed omnia prorsus ferali murmure in aliam effigiem translate.” 
 
466  Hanson, trans. “At ego nullo decantatus carmine, praesentis tantum facti stupore 
defixus, quidvis aliud magis videbar esse quam Lucius.” 
 
467 Carlin Barton summarizes: “Through his fatal fascination Apuleius’s curious Lucius 
loses everything, even his human form, and becomes himself a monster, a human ass.” 
Barton, Sorrows of the Ancient Romans, 91. 
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The Sacred and Society  
 What is sacer about a “sacred self”? Sacer indicates a highly charged condition, 
good or bad, but always a little dangerous or wild, and always very important. Further, 
the sacred is something we respond to powerfully, often anxiously, and, in response, we 
attribute power to it. For the Romans, to call something “sacred” was a hopeful tool for 
acknowledging, controlling, channeling, or repelling a power. When something is set 
apart, it becomes sacred in the Roman sense of sacer; that is, it requires heightened 
attention or care, expressed in cura or cultus. A curate and a cult care for the sacred.  
 Carlin Barton describes the sacrificial system in ancient Rome as a way of 
navigating, domesticating, elevating, mitigating, or nullifying forces, powers, or 
functions in natural and social life (see chapter 2). That which becomes “sacred” is 
isolated or “set apart.” In this Roman sense, sacer could be used to describe almost 
anything: people, places, things, animals, ideas, emotions, natural processes, or invisible 
beings—imagined, perceived, or something in-between: “Absolutely anything or anyone 
could be sacralized.”468 Regardless, the sacred was always powerful, worthy of careful 
attention, and likely dangerous.  
That which is secret, set apart, or sacred invokes wonder, reverence, anxiety, and 
even fear.  Or, equally to the point, that which invokes wonder, reverence, anxiety, and 
fear becomes set apart. What is both dangerous and desirable, to the many, to the few, or 
to the one, is secret and sacred. The anxious care given to fire as the focus of the few in a 
Roman home is similar to the emotional importance of the Vestal cultus to the many. But, 
what of the one, the “sacred self”? This chapter assumes the existence of such a “one,” of 
an individual, embodied, private self. I even suggest that this self can be “cultivated” (i.e. 
                                               
468 Barton, "Emotional Economy,” 346. 
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“care of the self”) and argue, that this is precisely the case in the works of Apuleius.469 
For there remains, I contend, an aspect of self, however we understand its construction, 
that is a cognitive ability, an internal reflexivity, and a solitary knowing. There exists in 
many if not all of us a secret world of being, of imagination, thought, feeling, and desire. 
Its contours are surely shaped by society but its existence as a space of experience is, I 
maintain, an a priori, sui generis stratum of human existence.470 The same reflexivity that 
allows one to critically assess society is also private, secret, and set apart from the social 
world it criticizes. Of the self, it is reflexive awareness or the capacity to be aware that 
one is aware that seems to withstand (if not enable) its own social deconstruction. 
 The extent to which shaping social layers can be shed is a matter of debate. 
Nonetheless, the inner part of us that reflects upon these exterior shapers, in its ability to 
do so, remains essential. The same wonder, reverence, anxiety, and fear, given to that 
which is secret, set apart, or sacred in the social world, also applies to the self. We both 
fear and desire our secret world and the secrets of others. The sacred, in this older sense, 
was something—anything—that elicited a powerful response—like Lucius the ass’s 
response when encountering Isis or like the philosopher’s when encountering her 
daemonic nature—and, through that powerful response, we attribute power back to the 
“Other,” to the person, place, thing, force, function, fantasy, etc. that presented itself so 
                                               
469 While the scholarly literature that explores social and linguistic constructions of self—
including a technology for its care, I will not treat it here. The broader discourse incepted 
by thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Judith Butler informs my own discussion in 
what their discussions broadly offer and lack.  
 
470 My position is both common sense and Idealist. “Our idea of person is then the idea of 
a consciousness which thinks, which has a certain permanence, which distinguishes itself 
from its own successive experiences and from all other consciousness—lastly, and most 
important of all, which acts.” Rashdall Hastings, “Personality, human and divine,” in 
Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford, 
ed. Henry Cecil Sturt (London, New York: Macmillan, 1902), 372. 
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powerfully charged. Hence, the awe-inspiring thunder and lightning storm becomes 
sacralized or “set apart” as Zeus/Theos/Deus by virtue of our powerful response, our 
experience of awe. And, if the awe is internalized, turned inward, the self becomes 
sacred, personal divinity is attained. 
 In both The god of Socrates and Metamorphoses selves become sacred—set 
apart—as the result of a new, more intimate, relationship with a source of sacred power. 
What is interesting here is the question of when, why, and how the self was to become set 
apart, i.e. how the self became sacred. As for “sacred power,” in the case of 
Metamorphoses, the goddess Isis is the source of sacred power; in The god of Socrates, it 
is the personal daemon that is source. For Apuleius, the process of entering into “a new 
more intimate relationship” with a source of sacred power entails a metamorphosis, a 
transformation, what Arthur Darby Nock views as a conversion expressing “the high-
water mark of the piety which grew out of the mystery religions”471 or what Nancy 
Shumate would characterize as a “collapse of familiar cognitive constructs [that] 
precedes…reconstruction of a new world and world view….”472 The new world of the 
convert is an expression of agency although expressed through society and culture: 
“Constituted by society and made competent by culture, individuals make their worlds 
through their acts of perception and interpretation. The external world is filtered and, in 
the process, remade, by the self. It is in this sense that the self is the centre and the 
premise of the individual’s world.”473 Sacralizing the self not only changes how inner 
                                               
471 Nock, Conversion, 138. 
 
472 Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 14. 
 
473 Anthony P. Cohen, Self Consciousness: An Alternative Anthropology of Identity 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 114-115. 
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experience is framed by the subject, but changes how the world it inhabits is experienced. 
“More intimate” suggests an identification with but also an internalization of an external 
source of sacred power (a point to which I will return later.) One difference, so it seems, 
is the location: The daemon is “in here.” Isis is “out there.” Or, is she?  
 
“Chosen Subjection” 
 It appears for Apuleius’s Lucius in his ill-begotten form that the only way out of 
“Fortune’s great tempests and mighty stormwinds” (Metamorphoses 11.15) is voluntary 
subjection to an exalted authority.474 Salvation requires, as the initiating priest of Isis 
Mithras explains, “obedience to our cult and taking on the voluntary yoke of her service; 
for as soon as you become the goddess’s slave you will experience more fully the fruit of 
your freedom” (11.15).475 However, this “voluntary yoke” or chosen subjection may be 
(as alluded to in chapter 2) more subtle than it seems at first.  
 J. Wyn Schofer’s study of ethics and self-cultivation in The Fathers According to 
Rabbi Nathan—a late antique Jewish commentary on ethical maxims and pedagogical 
discourse that includes both legal and non-legal material—introduces the notion of 
“chosen subjection,” the “subordination and internalization of external authorities” into 
our conversation.476 The teachings contained in The Fathers were intended to instruct 
rabbinical students in virtue, the ethics of character, and transform them into sages.  A 
key passage in The Fathers exemplifies this kind of subordination: “Let your house be a 
                                               
474 Hanson, trans. “magnisque Fortunae tempestatibus et maximis actus procellis.” 
 
475 Hanson, trans. modified, “teque iam nunc obsequio religionis nostrae dedica et 
ministerii iugum subi voluntarium. Nam cum coeperis deae servire, tunc magis senties 
fructum tuae libertatis.” 
 
476 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 263. 
 
	 148	
meeting place for the sages, sit in the very dust of their feet, and drink with thirst their 
works” (‘Avot 1:4).477 For students of the sage, chosen subjection expresses “an 
extremely hopeful sense that the self can expand in fundamental ways through 
engagement with powers external to it….”478 As I argued in chapter 2, self-sacralization 
occurs even when the self confronts a force that appears to be greater that it. In Schofer’s 
words: “[O]ne attains the character of a sage through subordination to particular 
authorities with the goal of, in various senses, internalizing aspects of them.”479  
While Schofer modestly characterizes his project as descriptive and comparative, 
he also seeks to theorize a dynamic at play in his source text, one that he admits may not 
be explicit. Cautiously, he explains: “[This] project entails an assertion that some would 
take to be controversial: vocabulary from outside the rabbis’ culture can give insight into 
implicit or overarching concerns that they themselves did not name.”480 The etic 
vocabulary Schofer employs has a Foucauldian pedigree. In his view, scholars who 
hesitate to draw from modern formulations of “self” and “subject” in the scholarship on 
discourse fail to understand the “full subtlety and complexity of the sources.”481 Like 
Schofer, I point to Judith Butler’s general observation in defense of subtlety: “[P]ower 
that at first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into 
                                               
477 Schecter and Kister, trans. 
 
478 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 276.   
 
479 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 256. 
 
480 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 260. 
 
481 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 260. 
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subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject’s self-identity.”482 
Although “scholars of discourse attend to the social function of language and its relation 
to both practices (such as self-transformation) and institutions (such as the rabbinic 
movement),” Schofer chooses to focus on practices of self-transformation.483 By doing 
so, he demonstrates how chosen subjection serves more than the social function that 
concerns many discourse scholars like Butler. In Schofer’s formulation, chosen 
subjection “generates internalization of that which is other, extending or expanding the 
self beyond its original capacities,” an approach that is relevant to my sources as well.484  
 Reborn and renewed, Lucius claims that Isis resides in his heart. Has Lucius 
internalized Isis? Does Isis constitute his divine self-identity? Or, is the dynamic of 
chosen subjection even more subtle? Schofer elaborates: “If the goal of willed subjection 
is an expansion of the self through incorporation of that which is other, then we should 
attend to the specific points at which the other…becomes part of the self.”485 How does a 
person become a “sacred self,” be it sage, a priest of Isis, or daemon? The answer is both 
through “‘practice’ (including ritual and exercises) and ‘discourse’ (including symbols, 
tropes, and more generally ‘language in use’).”486 Perhaps it is not Isis, an external 
authority internalized, but rather the daemon of Apuleius’s Lucius, an inner authority 
                                               
482 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1997), 1 – 18. Quoted in Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 274.  
 
483 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 258, n. 3. 
 
484 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 279.  
 
485 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 282. 
 
486 Schofer, “Chosen Subjection,” 263. 
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externalized as Isis, that constitutes his self-identity as a “sacred self.”487 The self is the 
source of sacred power after all. Apuleius’ understanding of the daemon in The god of 
Socrates suggests the insertion of an intentional Platonic subtext in Metamorphoses. 
 
 
                                               
487 “Internalization” is an important concept in contemporary psychological theory. David 
Harvey claims that “discourses internalize power, beliefs and values, institutions, 
material practices, and social relations. Humans are porous, absorbing elements of their 
ecosystems as well as language and other aspects of their surrounding society” in David 
Harvey, Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996), 48 – 57 and David Harvey, Spaces of Hope (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000), 98 – 101. Paul Ricoeur appeals to internalization at several points 
in his treatment of character formation. He argues that dispositions are formed through 
identification with or internalization of values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes. 
Moreover, while most practices are fundamentally interactive and learned from others, 
people can internalize such interaction and come to “play alone, garden alone, do 
research alone in a laboratory, in the library, or in one’s office” in Paul Ricœur, Oneself 
As Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 156. Kenneth C. Wallis and 
James L. Poulton explore the development of “internalization” as a psychological concept 
in which they explore the uses of the concept by Freudian, cognitive-behavioral, and 
humanist schools in Kenneth C., Wallis and James L. Poulton, Internalization: The 
Origins and Construction of Internal Reality (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
2001). For W.W. Meissner, internalization is “any process of transformation by which 
external relationships, object representations, and forms of regulation become part of the 
inner psychic structure and thus part of the ‘inner world.’” in W.W. Meissner, 
Internalization in Psychoanalysis (New York: International Universities Press, 1981). 
Internalizing the sage depends on identification with the sage. This is something more 
than just learning from the sage. For R.H. Kopp, “learning is more conscious while 
identification remains on the whole unconscious” in R.H. Kopp, “A Definition of 
Identification: a Review of the Literature,” The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. 
42. Ludwig Eidelberg defines identification as a process in which the subject, whether 
conscious or unconscious, “has the impression that he thinks, feels or acts like the 
object—or the object has such an impression” in Ludwig Eidelberg, Encyclopedia of 
Psychoanalysis (New York: Free Press, 1968), 184. Arnold H. Modell goes even further: 
“[The] representation of an external object that has been taken in to the ego to form a 
permanent element within the total personality’” in Arnold H. Modell, Object Love and 
Reality: An Introduction to a Psychoanalytic Theory of Object Relations (London: 
Hogarth [for] the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1969), 145. The external object “taken in 
to the ego” consists of a “mental picture” for Hinsie and Campbell, a memetic impression 
that forms a permanent structure of the psyche in Leland E. Hinsie and Robert Jean 
Campbell, Psychiatric Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 373. 
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“Conversion” 
 Lucius’ apparent “conversion” to the cult of Isis bears further consideration if we 
are to entertain the possibility of Platonic influence. Nancy Shumate proposes a new 
reading of Metamorphoses as “a narrative of conversion.”488 However, she disagrees with 
Nock and others who suggest that we can get a picture of the Isis cult in antiquity from 
Apuleius’s novel. Studies like Shumate’s question the narrative’s usefulness in accessing 
social reality.489 The focus on the personal experience of conversion marks what is new 
for Shumate. Moving from the external/social to the internal/personal, Shumate argues : 
“The process of conversion is a kind of shift in cognitive paradigms, and the period of 
crisis before conversion is an unsettling sojourn in paradigm limbo, so to speak, during 
which habituated structures of meaning and systems of organizing reality disintegrate.”490  
The resultant divinity achieved by Lucius’s return to human form and initiation as 
a priest of Isis, especially when understood in the Platonizing terms of The god of 
Socrates, “is not an agent of moral redemption (as a social phenomenon) but rather an 
epistemological anchor and a transcendent source of meaning and order (as a personal 
                                               
488 Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 1. Citing Lucius as an early example of a “marked 
spiritual reorientation” that distinguished conversion from adhesion to cult, A. D. Nock 
describes how the “ministers of Isis” were not “above considerations of profit,” citing the 
example of the story of an Isis-devotee Paulina who was deceived by Mundus dressed as 
an amorous Anubis after the priests of goddess were bribed (Flavius Josephus, Ant. Iud. 
18.65-80) in Nock, Conversion, 138, 150, 153.  
 
489 See Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 11. Paying attention to “a mass of vivid, 
concrete and realistic detail, on physical objects, houses, social structure, economic 
relations, the political framework of the local communities, and the wider political 
framework of the Empire,” he induces a social, economic, and political world. See also 
Fergus Millar, “The World of The Golden Ass” The Journal of Roman Studies 71 (1981): 
63-75. 
 
490 Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 14. 
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experience).”491  Lucius becomes personally divine through the self-sacralization of 
“conversion.” Lucius’ “process of conversion with which we will be concerned, then, 
involves nothing less than the collapse of an entire system of premises and assumptions 
about how the world works and its replacement by one radically different, or at least so it 
seems to the convert.”492 Defending against the criticism that she is “confusing narrative 
with experience,” Shumate asserts that “experience and narrative reinforce each other in a 
kind of discursive loop”:493   
Raw experience occurs within particular attributional systems that give it 
particular and culturally contingent meanings. Literary narratives certainly have a 
place in such systems, but overarching them are the larger and more thoroughly 
naturalized master narratives of the culture, which in turn shape subsequent 
narrative of all kinds as well as experience itself, and on and on….the moment 
subjectivity begins, it enters a discursive system already saturated with 
interpretations and report of experience, that is, with the preexisting scripts that 
we use to make sense of reality. Even areas commonly regarded as bastions of 
objectivity—notably those of scientific and social scientific inquiry—are not 
immune.494 
 
 At first glance, Lucius’s initiation into the cult of Isis represents a self’s complete 
submission to an external source of sacred power. In order for Lucius to be released from 
the throes of his asinine fate, he must become a slave to Isis (deae servire, 
Metamorphoses 11.15), who is the only power greater than fate: “[B]y the providence of 
the great and mighty goddess, I would overcome Fortune who was so savagely battering 
                                               
491 Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 15. My clarification in parenthesis.  
 
492 Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 15. 
 
493 Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 17. 
 
494 Shumate, Crisis and Conversion, 17. “As Thomas Kuhn argued thirty years ago, 
scientists too work within culturally defined paradigms that inform and limit the way they 
think about problems. Any ‘scientific revolution’ is defined by a shift in these cognitive 
paradigms more than by any positivistic advance toward true and objective knowledge.” 
Shumate, 23. 
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me” (11.12).495 But, the Metamorphoses, read with The god of Socrates in mind, suggest 
my alternative reading. Even in Lucius’s apparent surrender to Isis, there is nothing more 
sacred than what lies within the secret places of the heart. Next, I shall consider ancient 
dream theory in order shed light on the transformation of Late Antique selves, followed 
by two modern perspectives on sacred selfhood that resonate with our two texts and a 
return to the role of curiosity in the quest for personal divinity.  
 
The Dream of the Daemon  
 Reading late antique dream literature, Patricia Cox Miller sees Middle Platonists 
Plutarch and Apuleius as proponents for “a daemonic provenance for dreams…whose 
placement of dreams in a daemonic context served to underscore their mediatorial and 
transformative function.”496 In Miller’s view, Plutarch understood the daemon as “the 
capacity of every person to construct a framework within which to interpret experience,” 
but Apuleius, she continues, “understood daemons as deeply embedded in human 
affairs.”497  So embedded, I contend, that the daemon is the self in the sense that I have 
defined it, as a “reflexive feature of consciousness”—that part of us, remember, that 
experiences awe at the powerful thunder and lightning storm. But, if the daemon is the 
self, why does Apuleius speak of it as a separate entity? Miller solves this problem by 
reconceptualizing Apuleius’s daemones as potestates (powers)—what she refers to as a 
                                               
495 Hanson, trans. “deae maximae providentia alluctantem mihi saevissime Fortunam 
superarem.” 
 
496 Patricia Cox Miller, Dreams in Late Antiquity: Studies in the Imagination of a Culture 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 55. 
 
497 Miller, Dreams in Late Antiquity, 55, 57. 
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“‘personalization[s] of power’…something more like ‘psychic’ abilities.’”498 In her view, 
the daemonic is a function of mind, a function of consciousness itself.  The daemonic 
mind uses a “daemonic language” through dreams that express, in her terms, “the need 
for finer tuning of the sensibilities”—that is, a transformative caring for the self.499  
Lucius’s dream vision of Isis can be read as a voice or sign from his daemon—his 
innermost secret, sacred, self—telling him, perhaps, it was time to turn away from 
curious artes magicae toward the more socially sanctioned arcana secreta.500 Seen as a 
daemonic production, the dream of Isis takes on, in Miller’s view, what she refers to as 
"an epistemological function as source of self awareness and ethical reflection.”501  The 
dream of the daemon functions as what Michel Foucault has called “a ‘technology’ of the 
self, a hermeneutics of self-knowledge” that, I concur, empowers the dreamer to refine, 
augment, and expand the self that has been “set apart” or sacralized.502   
Regardless of his Isiac Platonism, such a self-centered or psychological 
interpretation of the daemon might not have been that far from Apuleius’s mind either. 
Using ancient dream hermeneutics as a critical lens, Vared Lev Kenaan suggests that 
Apuleius would have been familiar with writers who deny the “divine provenance” of 
dreams such as Heraclitus, Cicero, and Petronius. Not unlike Miller, Lev Kenaan posits 
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that Apuleius’ approached daemonic dreams psychologically “as the source of subjective 
imagination, as the locus of the private experience of the world, and as the material from 
which the self is invented.”503  
 
The Cultus of Self 
 In his study of “new religions” and the “New Age movement,” Paul Heelas 
explores sacralization of the self in the modern context. The term “New Age movement” 
loosely describes “a vast array of groups, communities and networks that are engaged in 
a process of a transformation of consciousness.”504 Despite the problems with such 
categories, “New Age movement” is meaningful in so far as it accounts for apparent 
innovations that diverge from modern authorized notions of the sacred in conventional 
religious institutions. However, students of the ancient world will immediately see that 
there is nothing “new” or “modern” about New Age interest in self-sacralization. Heelas 
admits this: “Self-religiosity is ‘as ancient as the Upanishads, for instance; or, to take an 
example from the West, can be found in the millenarian movements of the Middle 
Ages.”505   
 The similarities between New Age thought and Platonism in the late ancient 
world are striking.506 Comparing the New Age approach to self-sacralization helps 
                                               
503 Vered Lev Kenaan, “Delusion and Dream in Apuleius' Metamorphoses,” Classical 
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504 Peter B. Clarke, Encyclopedia of New Religious Movements (London: Routledge, 
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understand its correlate in ancient cult and philosophy. Indeed, the expression “inward 
turn” is used by scholars of the New Age movement in much the same way as it is used 
by scholars of late antiquity to describe the concern with personal divinity (epistrophe). 
The New Age movement seems to agree with both the Isiac and Platonic concept of 
universal creative divinity: In the world of Heelas’ subjects, “all life-all existence-is the 
manifestation of Spirit, of the Unknowable, of that supreme consciousness known by 
many different names in many different cultures.”507 A notion of a Platonic “world 
behind appearances” also occurs: “All life, as we perceive it with the five human senses 
or with scientific instruments, is only the outer veil of an invisible, inner and causal 
reality.” The New Age anthropology of the self is two-fold consisting of “an outer 
temporary personality and a multi-dimensional inner being (soul or higher self).” New 
Age thinkers express a frustration with the “habit of materialism” nicely polemicized by 
Apuleius in the end of The god of Socrates: “The outer personality is limited and tends 
towards materialism.”508 Heelas’s finding that the New Age’s version of salvation 
“cannot be found by tinkering with what we are by virtue of socialization”509 echoes 
                                                                                                                                            
2016); Dylan Burns, “Seeking Ancient Wisdom in the New Age: New Age and 
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Mithras’s admonition to Lucius: “Not your birth, nor even your position, nor even your 
fine education has been of any help to you” (Metamorphoses 11.15).510  
 Likewise, wisdom in the New Age can only be attained by “moving beyond the 
socialized self…thereby encountering a new realm of being.”511 New Age groups, like 
the late Platonists, are interested in the innermost part of the self, the secret heart. Heelas 
writes: “The inner realm, and the inner realm alone, is held to serve as the source of 
authentic vitality.”512 The self is conceived as secret, sacred, and set apart from any 
external authority or idea that would otherwise cultivate it. The (small “s”) self cultivates 
the (big “S”) Self much as the daemon is the Self. Like Lucius secretly observing 
Pamphile’s transformation realizing he “seemed to be something other than Lucius,” 
(Metamorphoses 3.22), some New Age groups posit that we are not who we think we are, 
that, in the course of our day to day life, we are working from a “lower self with base 
instincts,” busybodies of curious desire. 513  How, then, and where, are we to locate the 
sacred in the self? Quoting Heelas:  
 New Agers often treat practices (such as astrology or channeling), which might 
be thought to involve external authority, in detraditionalized fashion (astrology 
and channeling here being seen as ways of ‘putting us in touch with our deeper 
selves’). If New Agers themselves have got it right, we are in the realm of the 
[Zen] koan, not the Ten Commandments. That is to say, religion, as normally 
understood in the west, has been replaced by teachers whose primary job is to set 
up ‘contexts’ to enable participants to experience their spirituality and 
authority.514  
                                               
510 Hanson, trans. “Nec tibi natales ac ne dignitas quidem, vel ipsa qua flores usquam 
doctrina profuit.” 
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Perhaps, the “great unspoken mysteries of the [Isis] cult” provided such a context for 
Lucius; the notion of the daemon, a context for the philosopher. Once the external 
authority was internalized, it transformed. As with New Age groups,  “[t]he basic idea, it 
should be apparent, is that what lies within—experienced by way of ‘intuition’, 
‘alignment’ or an ‘inner voice’—serves to inform the judgments, decisions and choices 
required for everyday life. The ‘individual’ serves as his or her own source of 
guidance.”515 
 
The Sacred Self 
 Thomas J. Csordas’s ethnography of Catholic Charismatic healing in New 
England is a study of ritual efficacy and in this sense offers something to our 
discussion.516 Csordas asks: “How does faith healing work, if indeed it does?” He locates 
efficacy not in “symptoms, psychiatric disorders, symbolic meaning, or social 
relationships, but [in] the self in which all of these are encompassed.”517 Similar to 
Shumate, Csordas defines the transforming effect that occurs in ritual healing as “a 
restructuring of cognition and memory.”518 Ritual performance, he asserts, “stimulated 
transformations of memory and cognition…that in turn could have real emotional and 
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physical effects.”519 An experience of the sacred is, in Csordas’ words, “an existential 
encounter with Otherness that is a touchstone of our humanity….it defines us by what we 
are not—by what is beyond our limits or what touches us precisely at our limits.”520 
Healing is achieved when the “self is objectified and represented as a particular kind of 
person with a specific identity” within the context of a “coherent ritual system”—the 
embodiment of a sacred self.521  Csordas’s process of becoming a “sacred self” resembles 
the transformation seen in both Metamorphoses and The god of Socrates. 
 
Curiositas Revisited 
 P.G. Walsh claims that curiositas is “the key to the novel.”522 Apuleius uses the 
word twelve times in Metamorphoses but it is little attested before, only once, in fact, in a 
letter of Cicero.523 To begin to understand curiositas we must look to the better attested 
curiosus which Apuleius uses twelve times in the novel as well.  In general, curiosus 
means bestowing care or pains upon a thing; in particular, it has the connotation of 
inquiring eagerly or anxiously about a thing. 
 In her study of the emotional lives of Romans in the late Republic and early 
Empire, Carlin Barton writes about a prevalent fascination with the “curious,” that is, 
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“the one who looks and the strange or unusual object which attracts the look.”524 The 
curiosus, she asserts, was motivated by frustration: “He or she could not resist those 
things in heaven and earth prohibited by the Powers That Be. The secret was the rare; the 
secrets of the gods the rarest and most forbidden—and therefore the most desired.”525 
Envy or invidia were inextricably intertwined with curiositas; the unattainability of the 
rare or the secret led to a contorted desire that turned to malice in frustration. Plautus 
writes: “No one is curious who is not also malevolent” (Stichus 208).526 The envy of the 
curiosus, Barton establishes through an exhaustive survey of the sources, was feared in 
ancient Rome as the “evil eye.” In Platonic thought, the curiosus is a polupragmon, a 
meddler, literally, a “busybody.” In On Being a Busybody, Middle Platonist Plutarch 
writes about those who “pass over the stories and subjects of common speech and pick 
out the hidden scandals of every household” (Plutarch, Moralia. De curiositate 516d-
f).527 As a Middle Platonist himself who alludes to Plutarch in the Metamorphoses, 
Apuleius would have been familiar with Plutarch’s discussion. 
Apuleius portrays curiosity, “the drive for wonder,”528 in Carl Schlam’s words, as 
a vice, especially in regard to secret knowledge and otherworldly spectacles—in this 
case, the artes magicae and divina disciplina of the saga and the maga. On his eventual 
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return to human form, Mithras, the priest of Isis who assists Lucius, encapsulates the 
novel’s apparent moral: “[B]ut on the slippery path of headstrong youth you plunged into 
slavish pleasures and reaped the perverse reward of your ill-starred curiosity” (Apuleius, 
Metamorphoses 11.15).529  
But is curiosity always a vice? Lucius’s desire to know eventually brings him his 
desire. He does in fact, as he puts it, “penetrate to the hidden mysteries of the purest 
faith” (Metamorphoses 11.21).530 The “hidden mysteries” are arcana secreta; Lucius 
learns the secret of the sacred (Metamorphoses 11.21). This distinction between curiosity 
and curiositas calls to mind the Greek thauma (or wonder), invoked by Plato as the first 
impulse to philosophy.531 While Plutarch criticizes the curiose polupragmon, the 
“meddling busybody,” he also suggests that we should, as P.G. Walsh puts it,  “direct 
such curiosity toward the things of heaven and earth and sea….”532 Neither Plato nor 
Plutarch discourage inquiry or wonder as long as it is in the cause of becoming a better 
person as they might have it. Perhaps, following Joseph G. DeFilippo, “curiositas is 
blameworthy in a way that mere curiosity is not.”533  In On Isis and Osiris, Plutarch 
suggests that the name of Isis itself is a Greek word relating to oida (know) and that, as a 
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result, her shrine the Iseion, “promises knowledge and comprehension of reality” 
(Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride 352a).534   
In his study of curiositas and the Platonism of Apuleius’s novel, DeFilippo 
suggests that knowledge of Isis can only be acquired when one is “free of the interfering 
and unhealthy impulses which riddle the soul of the polypragmon.” Once Lucius regains 
his form, Mithras reminds him that the promised revelation he has long sought must be 
initiated by Isis in the form of a sign: “[T]he day on which each person can be initiated 
was marked by a nod from the goddess…” (Metamorphoses 11.21).535 Prior to that point, 
Lucius’s approach had been quite different. In Schlam’s words: “Lucius’s eagerness to 
know what is wondrous, directed toward magic, is characterized as an unholy assault on 
the divine.”536 By the end of the tale, we get the feeling that Lucius has learned his 
lesson. But, the lesson is not so much about inquisitiveness as the way in which one 
inquires. Perhaps, the desire for secret virtue directs one toward Isis, while the desire for 
secret vice directs one toward the maga. 
 
Conclusion 
 The aspect of self—that is, the “reflexive feature of consciousness” I have been 
entertaining—that is in play, at least for Apuleius’s Platonic audience in his treatment of 
the cult of Isis is something that can only be seen when read in tandem with The god of 
Socrates which would have been the case for second-century readers and for Augustine 
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in the fifth century. For Apuleius, even in Lucius’s apparent surrender to Isis, there is 
nothing more sacred than the self. To behold Isis, in her sensible form as the moon, or in 
powerful tides running through the natural and social worlds, is an awe-inspiring and 
powerful mystery. But it is the awe itself, our metacognitive awareness of powerful 
experiences, that is terrifying and fascinating, tremendum et fascinans. By co-creating the 
sacred, this reflexive feature of consciousness, perhaps, is the mysterium. It may also be a 
longing for Csordas’ “sacred self” and a re-enchantment of experience that motivates 
self-sacralization. Writing on the uses of the “miraculous,” Graham Twelftree suggests 
the appeal of self-sacralization:  
[F]or those in Western civilizations who are detached from an interpretative 
community and from spiritual attainment, and for whom the windows of 
transcendence have been closed, the perception of a miracle…is relocated in the 
theatre of the questing self. The miracle becomes a sign of the God within us all. 
‘Where classical miracle stories inspired fear and awe, inducing worship of God 
and admiration of the saint, modern miracles tend to inspire admiration of the 
divinity that is the self.’537 
 
If Lucius is to become free he must, from the Isiac point of view, serve the 
goddess. From the Platonic point of view, though, he must cultivate his daemon, which 
resides in the inner most part of his self. Chosen subjection to Isis restores Lucius to his 
human form, curing him of ill-starred curiosity. But, the cultus of self, and the 
imaginative transformation of identity it entails, raises him to the level of a goddess…or 
at least a daemon. Late Antique readers schooled in philosophy might very well have 
observed the Platonic soteriology in Apuleius’s ribald tale.538 
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CONCLUSION:  
 
THE WAY IN IS THE WAY OUT 
 
  This dissertation has been about reading, imagination, and personal divinity in 
late antiquity. It asked: How did Late Antique readers become divine? From Graeco-
Roman wisdom and ritual texts to early Christian theology, late antique literature 
abounded with discourses on personal divinity, the idea that a human could become 
“divine,” a “god.” Using a selection of Neoplatonic and Hermetic texts that Augustine of 
Hippo contends with in Books 8-10 of City of God, I have demonstrated how ancient and 
modern theories of imagination and reading help modern people understand the 
construction of personal divinity for Late Antique readers. Although Augustine accused 
the Neoplatonists, Hermetists, and theurgists of “worshipping demons,” “animating 
statues,” and “making gods,” I have shown that they were more concerned with getting to 
know their indwelling mind they called the daimon/daemon, they were more concerned 
with using cultic rite—the theurgic arts—to “bring the gods to earth” (that is, to make the 
invisible, visible), and they sought to animate their bodies like living sacred statues by 
becoming gods themselves, embodied, ensouled. They believed that knowledge of the 
self’s true nature resulted in personal divinity—expressed by this inscription from the 
Ṣābian Temple of Ḥarrān: “He who knows himself becomes a god.”539 
                                               
539 Henry Corbin, Temple and Contemplation (London; New York: KPI in association 
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In this dissertation, I am interested in the imaginations of late antique writers, 
readers, and hearers for whom personal divinity was seen as an option on their horizons. I 
have taken “seriously those elements in the ancient worldview that seem most alien to 
moderns as a way to explain how ancient worldmaking worked.”540 And, like Averil 
Cameron, I use my own imagination to inquire into the imagination of my subjects.541 
This dissertation is, therefore, an “experiment in the sympathetic imagination of the 
imaginations of other people.”542 
In my project, I add to the social-functionalist understanding of personal divinity 
by inquiring more deeply into areas of personal meaning and individual experience. By 
attempting to understand the experience of such individuals as “ideal readers,” I have 
hoped to offer a corrective for the excesses of a social-functional approach that has 
privileged the social aggregate at the expense of the person. As much as they, as people, 
may have been socially constructed and historically contingent, that is, shaped by their 
environments and their pasts, they were more than their conditioning, just as much as we 
are.543 It may take hard work to get to that “more,” to sort through what is personal and 
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what is social, which is why catharsis (purification) was so important to the Platonici and 
the theurgici. They believed the divine part of themselves didn’t have to do with their 
“situatedness.” So, as noted above, Plotinus advised us to always work on our “inner 
statue” chipping away at the human constructions; Iamblichus saw the purification 
necessary for self-divinization as a “restoration of one’s own essence.” 
 Gregory Shaw laments that scholars today do not believe in ancient wisdom 
“although we are highly skilled at describing how ancient philosophers and theologians 
believed in gods, wisdom, and the divine life.”544 Indeed, it has become commonplace 
                                                                                                                                            
the individual who has the imaginative power to go beyond the brutishness of the 
historico-socio-cultural present. I stray beyond the Durkheimian legacy that posits “a 
social realm which was subject simply to social forces and hence home purely to social 
facts, caused individual consciousness to be seen as irrelevant, irretrievable or non-
existent.” And, I challenge the conflation of individualism and individuality that portrays 
the embodied cognition of individuals, “perceiving, interpreting, intentioning, creat[ing], 
imagin[ing]—in a word, conscious” as somehow a “Western” socio-cultural fiction. 
Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 66. To qualify Joan Scott’s dictum—“It is not 
individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience,”  
Martin Jay suggests that we work with “experience” as “a nodal point of the intersection 
between public language and private subjectivity, between expressible commonalities and 
the ineffability of the individual interior.” “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry 
17, no. 4 Summer (1991): 779; Songs of Experience: Modern American and European 
Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 6 – 7. 
In this dissertation, I have hoped do something more nuanced, which is to look at 
individual agency, in Kathleen Canning words, as “a site of mediation between 
discourses and experience [which] serves not only to dislodge the deterministic view in 
which discourse always seems to construct experience, but also to dispel the notion that 
discourses are shaped by everything but the experiences of the people texts claim to 
represent.” “Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and 
Experience,” Signs 19 (1994): 378. Frances Flannery reminds us: “[T]he sacred texts we 
study often seem to arise precisely as a result of some transformative moment in the life 
of an ancient author or community.” Experientia, Volume 1: Inquiry into Religious 
Experience in Early Judaism and Early Christianity (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2008), 10. 
 
 
544 See full passage here: “It may be helpful to begin by pointing out that scholars today 
do not believe in ancient wisdom. To be more direct, we do not believe in wisdom at all. 
We know that Neoplatonists believed that wisdom allowed them to become divine and 
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now to think that “becoming divine” could only be a kind of self-deception. But, 
description needs verstehen—understanding, if it is to explain anything at all. Our 
sources should be read with compassion for a worldview—and experience—of the 
individual writers and their readers, on their own terms. Personal divinity was not wishful 
thinking for late antique peoples. It was actively and creatively imagined and what was 
imagined was experienced.  
 Reading texts about personal divinity was performative. The activity of reading, 
and imagining what was read, constituted an implicit “spiritual exercise” or imaginative 
technology of self-transformation. Sara Ahbel-Rappe sees the ideal reader as taking part 
in a theurgic ritual:  
Absorbed in the world of the text, one is to leave behind the world of natural 
objects and ordinary thoughts. What takes their place is no less than an entire 
tradition, one purporting to redescribes the universe, locating the soul in the center 
of an unfolding cosmology that is enacting precisely through the soul’s ascent, or 
recitation, we might say of its cosmic liturgy. As a recipient of the text, the reader 
is located both historically as a link in the chain of transmission and ahistorically 
as a part of the world evoked through this transmission.545  
 
Absorbed in the world of the text, the reader embodies the text, carrying an image of a 
newly discovered world, an imago mundi, that she projects, in Henry Corbin’s words, 
onto “a more or less coherent universe, which becomes the stage on which her destiny is 
                                                                                                                                            
reveal the gods in their very bodies, but we do not believe that anymore. Today we do not 
believe in wisdom, and we do not believe in gods—in or out of our bodies—but we are 
highly skilled at describing how ancient philosophers and theologians believed in gods, 
wisdom, and the divine life. However, rather than assume our lack of understanding in 
these matters, we assume theirs. Our reasoning works as follows: since we know that 
there is no wisdom in the deep and deifying sense described by the Platonists, we 
conclude that, when they extolled the virtues of wisdom, they were involved in 
sophisticated forms of self-deception.” “The Neoplatonic Transmission of Ancient 
Wisdom,” in Religious Competition in the Greco-Roman World, ed. Nathaniel 
DesRosiers (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 107 – 108. 
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played out.”546 For Augustine’s Platonici and theurgici, active imagination was soul-
making and imagination was the soul itself. 
 These imaginative engagements with texts about divinity, cultivated a heightened 
self-reflexivity and an experience of “the sublime.” The Neoplatonic, Hermetic, and 
theurgic writers were trained in rhetoric, they were educated to use language to affect 
their readers’ minds and bodies. Using vivid descriptions, transporting images, and 
disorienting thought exercises as part of an initiatory teaching on the nature of the self 
and the divine, the texts are designed in content and style to shock, to rouse a sense of 
self-reflexive awe, to provide an experience of “the sublime”—all to effect, in Greg 
Shaw’s words, “an ecstatic removal from one’s habitual self-consciousness.”547 
 For the soul to become divine it needed to expand beyond the body but it can only 
do so by, paradoxically, turning inward. The boundaries of the Neoplatonic and Hermetic 
soul-self are no less than “those of the intelligible cosmos”—intelligible because they are 
inside.548 To venture past (or deeper within) those boundaries, with a mind embodied, 
was to enter a state of awe: “mad, drunken, love.”549 It was “to become a god” 
(theothenai; Corpus Hermeticum 1.26). The moment when “the apprehension that soul is 
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548 A. H. Armstrong, “The Apprehension of Divinity in the Self and in the Cosmos in 
Plotinus” in The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed. R.B. Harris (Norfolk, VA: 
International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Old Dominion University, 1976), 195. 
 
549 See Plotinus’ use of ecstatic language to describe self-expansion in Ennead 6.7.35.24 
– 27; 36.17-18.  
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not other than the intellect” 550 is, in Plotinus’ words, when one becomes “truly 
intelligible, both knower and known, self-apprehended and not dependent on another in 
order to see” (Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.8.40-42).551 This moment is “thought thinking itself” 
(Aristotle, Metaphysica 1074b, 34-5), the activity of the divine, an ecstatic awareness of 
awareness, the moment of self-realized divinity.552  
 Texts that entertain questions about consciousness and the divine are written and 
read by living human bodies. “Invisible, intelligent, immortal, powerful,” are the terms 
used to define divinity in the Neoplatonic and Hermetic contexts and, as we have learned, 
they are the terms that equally refer to the reflexive feature of consciousness we call 
“mind,” what the Augustine’s Platonici called “soul.” If the soul was deathless and 
divine, it could only claim this knowledge as a mortal body. Gabriella Carone makes a 
crucial point here: 
Even when the self appears as a ‘floating ego’ that can expand its potentialities 
from the soul’s dispersion in the bodily realm of becoming towards, ultimately, 
further unification and identification with the hypostasis Intellect [nous] and 
finally the One, Plotinus still seems interested in securing the preservation of the 
self’s empirical identity even at superior, non-empirical levels. The interest in 
keeping that identity would be to guarantee that we can recover our historical 
personality when we descend from the higher levels and come back to ordinary 
life, something that seems inevitable given our bodily condition…It is important 
that I can call and recall that experience as mine, and as distinct from that of 
another.553 
                                               
550 Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 237. 
 
551 Armstrong, trans. “λάμπον ὁμοῦ καὶ λαμπόμενον, τὸ ἀληθῶς νοητόν, καὶ νοοῦν καὶ 
νοούμενον, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὁρώμενον καὶ οὐ δεόμενον ἄλλου.” 
 
552 Tredennick, trans. “ἡ νόεσις νοήσεως νόησις.” The self is not only preserved, it is 
increased. See Plotinus, Ennead 6.5.12. 
 
553 Gabriela Roxana Carone, “Mysticism and Individuality: A Plotinian Paradox” in The 
Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism, ed. John J. Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University 
Press, 1997), 177 – 178. See Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.17, 26 – 28: “As long as one is in 
contact, it is altogether neither possible, nor is there time, for the one who has had the 
contact, to speak; it is only afterwards that one can reflect upon it” (Carone, trans.). (ἀλλ᾿ 
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 Turning the attention of the reader inward toward features of her consciousness, 
such as “the mind’s eye” and the “entity that makes visibility,”554 Sara Ahbel-Rappe 
observes how the texts “[point] the reader toward a conception of interiority in which the 
experience of imaginative production” sets apart the “the imagination as the object.”555  
This object, as Synesius concluded above, was the “soul.” An inner world of sublime 
self-reflexivity, ecstatic awareness of awareness—perhaps is not so far removed from 
Aristotle’s god—“thought thinking itself,” or better, “imagination imagining itself.” This 
inner world becomes the site of the mysterium, tremendum, et fascinans that Rudolf Otto 
ascribes to the “Wholly Other.” It is not “Wholly Other.” It is shockingly familiar. It is 
our own experience of experience. Otto’s “god” is heightened self-reflexivity writ large. 
Roman historian and philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood explains:  
The experience of sublimity contains an element of illusion…. The power which 
is sublimity appears in that experience as belonging to an object which compels 
us in spite of ourselves to admire it; the object seems to be active, we to be 
passive. But this is not really the case. The power which we attribute to the object 
is really our own; it is our own aesthetic activity. The shock of sublimity is the 
shock of an uprush of imaginative energy within ourselves; and the illusion 
consists in the fact that we do not feel this energy as our own. … We are 
worshipping an idol whose divine attributes are only the magnified shadow of our 
own powers.556 
 
The shock of the sublime and the subsequent awakening to our co-creative role in 
manifesting divinity is what the theurgists referred to as waking the “innate gnôsis of the 
                                                                                                                                            
ἀρκεῖ κἂν νοερῶς ἐφάψασθαι· ἐφαψάμενον δέ, ὅτε ἐφάπτεται, πάντη μηδὲν μήτε δύνασθαι 
μήτε σχολὴν ἄγειν λέγειν). 
 
554 Corpus Hermeticum 13.17. See discussion in chapter 2. 
 
555 Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 128. 
 
556 R.G. Collingwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (London: Oxford University Press, 
1925), 36. 
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gods [that] co-exists with our very nature” (Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 1.3.10-8.1).557  
 Jeffrey Kripal offers another way to understand this deep-seated knowledge that 
pre-exists discursive thought, this “innate gnôsis” identified by Iamblichus. Kripal writes: 
“[T]he sacred and the psyche, are fundamentally related, for whatever the sacred is or is 
not, it is intimately tied to the deepest structures of the human psyche…[W]e are the 
sense of the sacred…the sacred and the human are two sides of the same coin.”558 
Waking up—as embodied, sentient creatures—we find the divine is always already 
embodied, intimately a part of our experience of the world in moments of awe. The 
divinity of the “wholly other” referred to above is terrifying not because of its 
“otherness” but because it is intimately familiar to us, drawing our attention to the 
strangeness of the fact of our existence. It dwells in the secret places of the heart (intra 
pectoris mei secreta) like Apuleius’ daemon, Isis. It is theos the mind’s eye of Hermes. 
 Sometimes, as Friedrich Nietzsche and others have pointed out, when you stare 
long enough into the abyss at the limit of your imagination, it stares back. Why? Why 
does it stare back? Perhaps because the abyss is sleeping and your staring awakens it. 
Perhaps because the abyss is a mirror, you see yourself awakening. But, perhaps, as 
Jeffrey Kripal suggests, the abyss is a two-way mirror: there is something you imagine on 
the other side that both is and is not you, it is more than you, and its “more-ness” calls to 
you. Out of Damascius’ “unknowable darkness,” it calls to you to become more. It 
desires you as you, it. And, it must become human to be known at all. It is not so much 
                                               
557 Dillon, trans. “Συνυπάρχει γὰρ ἡμῶν αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἡ περὶ θεῶν ἔμφυτος γνῶσις.” 
Quoted in Shaw, “Living Light,” 63. 
 
558 Jeffrey J. Kripal, Authors of the Impossible: The Paranormal and the Sacred 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 255. 
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that theurgists wanted immortality (Iamblichus saw that as a by-product of theurgy), they 
wanted to divinize matter, or, more properly, to recognize the innate divinity of 
embodiment; not to ascend, but to expand into greater wholeness, paradoxically, by 
becoming mortal gods.  
 Not long before the Emperor Justinian I closed the School of Athens in 529 CE, 
scholarch Damascius records his teacher’s caution that while “the practice of theurgy is 
divine…those who are destined to be gods must first become human…” (Vita Isidori 
150).559 What did it mean to Isidore that one must first become human in order to become 
divine? Isidore’s admonition was intended to “wake” the reader to the fullness of a 
human bodily experience that is capable of divine apprehension and expression here and 
now and so fulfill the “divine work” of bringing together invisible heaven and visible 
earth as an inner, innate, embodied gnosis, acting in the world: “Ecstasy transforms 
theurgists into gods, yet because theurgists are human, the gods become human.”560 
 In Plato’s Republic, Socrates seems to berate Glaucon for his slow take: “Haven’t 
you realized that our soul is immortal and never destroyed?” To which Glaucon replies: 
                                               
559 Athanassiadi, trans. “Εὶ δὲ θειότερον χρῆμα, ὡς σὺ φὴς ὧ Ἡγία, ἔλεγε πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ 
Ἰσίδωρος, ἡ ἱερατιχὴ πραγματεία, φημὶ μὲν τοῦτο χὰγώ· ὰλλα πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι 
τοὺς ἐσομένους θεοὺς δεῖ.” Isidore is responding to Hegias, one of the competitors for the 
Neoplatonic scholarchy in Athens. Richard Lim has drawn our attention to the way in 
which late antique philosopher were “deeply implicated in the rich texture of mundane 
social interactions and the spirit of competitive strife, or agon, that permeated the 
Graeco-Roman culture.” Papyrus Oxyrhynchus (frag. 52.3659.i.22 – 44) describes the 
quarreling of philosophers as being louder than “raving lunatics”! (Lim, Disputations, 
31). “Becoming human” may have also been intended as a derogatory remark directed at 
Hegias which would have been in keeping with the often adversarial tone in the various 
“philosophical histories” composed by scholarchs and loyal students.  
 
560 Shaw, “Living Light,” 62. 
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“No, by god, I haven’t. Are you really in a position to assert that?” (10.608d).561 
Sympathetic to Glaucon’s point (about Socrates’ current embodied state), historian Garth 
Fowden wonders how the Platonici and the theurgici might have appeared to onlookers 
in late antiquity: “[The theurgist] was important because he embodied, at a particular 
point in time and space, the fundamental unity of the divine and human worlds that 
endowed the whole of creation and history with meaning. And in his personal experience 
of such theioi andres562 the late antique pagan could feel that he had found at last the true 
meaning of those prophetic lines from the Odyssey quoted by Eunapius [Vita 
Sophistarum 6, 7.7]: ‘And the gods, in the likeness of strangers from far countries/put on 
all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities’ (Homer, Odyssey 17.485-6)”.563 
Plotinus, whose immortal eye caught these lines from Homer as well, could not have 
agreed more: 
For in this way the other gods also when many are present often appear to one, 
because that one alone is able to see them. But these are the gods who “in many 
forms travel round our cities” but to that god the cities turn, and all the earth and 
all the sky, who everywhere abides by himself and in himself and has from 
himself being and the things which really are down to soul and life depending on 
him and moving to an unbounded unity by his sizeless unboundedness (Ennead 
6.5.12)564 
                                               
561 Lorenz, trans. “οὐκ ᾔσθησαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε 
ἀπόλλυται;καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε: μὰ Δί᾽, οὐκ ἔγωγε: σὺ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχεις 
λέγειν.” 
562 For theios aner (“divine man”), see Richard Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen 
Mysterienreligionen nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen (Leipzig, 1927). 	
563 Fowden, trans. “καί τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι, παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, 
ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας.” Quoted in Fowden, “Pagan Holy Man,” 59. 
 
564 Armstrong, trans. “ἀλλ᾿ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ θεοί, ὅτι παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι τὰς 
πόλεις, εἰς ἐκεῖνον δὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐπιστρέφονται καὶ πᾶσα γῆ καὶ πᾶς οὐρανός, πανταχοῦ ἐπ᾿ 
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μένοντα καὶ ἔχοντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ὄντα μέχρι ψυχῆς καὶ 
ζωῆς ἐξηρτημένα καὶ εἰς ἓν ἄπειρον ἰόντα ἀμεγέθει τῷ ἀπείρῳ.” 
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 I have hoped that this perspective on the creative role of imagination will add a 
layer of complexity to how scholars and amateurs read texts about personal divinity 
yielding greater compassion for how ancient peoples may have understood themselves 
and their worlds. Furthermore, I have attempted to provoke modern readers to re-imagine 
a world that values many ways of knowing and many sources of knowledge.  Greg 
Anderson suggests that “a modern academic discipline that takes seriously the 
ontological heterogeneities of human experience would hopefully help nurture greater 
sensitivity to the alterities of lifeworlds that have yet to be fully subsumed by Western 
modernity. And in so doing, such a discipline just might encourage us to think more 
critically about the ontological commitments of that same modernity, perhaps even help 
us to imagine less exploitative, more equitable, more sustainable lifeworlds of the 
future.”565 Recognizing ontological diversity in the past and the present is a necessary 
step, often unexplored, for creating social spaces that are truly diverse and inclusive. I 
have tried to consider a selection of what the ancients considered “wisdom” as such and 
so conversed with the “mighty dead.”566 I view the pursuit of personal divinity expressed 
in these texts similarly to how Peter Brown approached late antique asceticism, as “a 
heroic and sustained attempt, on the part of thinkers of widely different background and 
temper of mind, to map out the horizons of human freedom.”567  I have taken the 
philosophers and the historians I have engaged with seriously. For ancient philosophers, 
                                               565	Anderson, “Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past,” 810. 	
566 See my introduction on historical practice, intellectual history, and history of ideas.  
 
567 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 442. 
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philosophy was a “way of life” whose purpose was transformation of the self.568 This 
could equally be said of historians like R.G. Collingwood, (as well as Dilthey and Croce 
before him). Writing history is a transformative practice that leads to self-knowledge in 
the present.  
 Espousing a strange blend of Idealism and Historicism, Collingwood, not so 
unlike the Platonici, was interested in the peculiarities of self-reflexivity, awareness of 
awareness, thought thinking about itself. He writes:   
The peculiarity of thought, then, is that it is not mere consciousness but self-
consciousness. The self, as merely conscious, is a flow of consciousness, a series 
of immediate sensations and feelings; but as merely conscious it is not aware of 
itself as such a flow; it is ignorant of its own continuity through the succession of 
experience. The activity of becoming aware of the continuity is what is called 
thinking.569  
 
Historical research is intimate for Collingwood. When reading an account of an event, we 
do not make the “author’s perspective our own” but we form our own perspective by 
“getting in touch with that of the author.”570 History as a philosophical practice and 
exercise in the ancient sense is a transformative process and “not merely a process of 
becoming, but a process of self-creation.”571 It is “a specialized form of human 
insight.”572 In Collingwood’s historical method, we become the object of our knowing 
and in doing so we come to know ourselves…which has a distinctively Neoplatonic ring 
to it, doesn’t it?   
                                               
568 In the ancient world, philosophers were initiates (mustos). See Hadot, Spiritual 
Exercises,1995; Kingsley, “Esoteric Tradition,” 1998. 
 
569 Collingwood, Idea of History, 306. 
 
570 Collingwood, “Cassirer,” 145. 
 
571 Collingwood, “Cassirer,” 145. 
 
572 Phillips, “Distance and Representation,” 134.  
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 It is doubtful that Collingwood would ever say that “self-knowledge leads to 
personal divinity” the way the Platonici did or at least in those terms. Perhaps he gets as 
close to it as he would when he describes how both artists and scientists perceive the 
objects of their imaginations as “nature.” For both artists and scientists perceiving the 
natural world, “the cognitive activity feels its object to be independent of it and set over 
against it as a limit to its own freedom.”573 The limit to its own freedom is a sense of 
finitude but, Collingwood continues, “a mind that was wholly finite could not be aware 
that it was finite; where finitude is known it is transcended.”574An embodied, imagined 
divinity of the person seems like the “lived transcendence” Collingwood suggests here, 
perhaps not so far from Augustine’s Platonici and theurgici after all.575 
                                               
573 Collingwood, Outlines, 50. Beyond the ability of the artist and the scientist to ask, 
Collingwood’s philosopher wonders, “whether this feeling [of independence and limit] is 
not in some sense an illusion, and whether the object may not in reality be in some sense 
constituted by the very act which apprehends it.” Cf. Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 179 
– 181. 
 
574 Collingwood, Outlines, 51.  
 
575 Collingwood was influenced by the German Idealist Hegel whose engagement with 
Renaissance Hermeticism is well-known. See Connelly, J. “The Hesitant Hegelian: 
Collingwood, Hegel, and Inter-War Oxford.” Bulletin – Hegel Society of Great Britain 
51/52 (2005): 57-73. On Hegel’s Hermeticism see Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and 
the hermetic tradition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Magee introduces his 
book with the following quotation from Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences (my adaptation): “Theos is theos only so far as it knows itself. Its self-
knowledge is, further, self-consciousness in the human and the human’s knowledge of 
theos, which proceeds to the human’s self-knowledge in theos.” Magee comments: “This 
Hermetic doctrine of the ‘circular’ relationship between God (sic) and creation and the 
necessity of man for the completion of God is utterly original. It is not to be found in 
earlier philosophy. But it recurs again and again in the thought of the Hermeticists, and it 
is the chief doctrinal identity between Hermeticism and Hegelian thought.” Magee, 
Hegel, 1, 10. One can see hints of this aspect of Hegel in Collingwood in his unpublished 
lecture, “Realism and Idealism” (1935): “The only answer which seems to me to be 
admissible for a sound metaphysic would be, that all these kinds of unity are to be found 
in the real world, and that its ultimate unity will be none of them to the exclusion of the 
others, but will be a unity of them all, a unity of kinds of unity. Some of them are 
material unities, some mental, some mathematical, some logical; consequently the 
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POETIC POSTLUDE 
Rant 
 
You cannot write a single line w/out a cosmology 
a cosmogony 
laid out, before all eyes 
 
there is no part of yourself you can separate out 
saying, this is memory, this is sensation 
this is the work I care about, this is how I 
make a living 
 
it is whole, it is a whole, it always was whole 
you do not “make” it so 
there is nothing to integrate, you are a presence 
you are an appendage of the work, the work stems from 
hangs from the heaven you create 
 
every man / every woman carries a firmament inside 
& the stars in it are not the stars in the sky 
 
w/out imagination there is no memory 
w/out imagination there is no sensation 
w/out imagination there is no will, desire 
 
history is a living weapon in yr hand 
& you have imagined it, it is thus that you 
“find out for yourself” 
history is the dream of what can be, it is 
the relation between things in a continuum 
 
                                                                                                                                            
ultimate unity of the world will be a unity of being, within which there are these and 
doubtless other orders of being, each with a peculiar type of unity of its own, found there 
and nowhere else. And this answer is certainly in the spirit of objective idealism; it is 
hinted at more than once in passages of Plato, and it is the guiding thread of the chief 
modern attempt at an objective idealism, the philosophy of Hegel.” Quoted in Connelly, 
“Hesitant Hegelian,” 72. Gary Browning acknowledges that Hegel’s influence is 
complicated and ambiguous, especially in regards to Hegel’s unitive Absolutism. We see 
this clearly in The New Leviathan where Hegel is portrayed as obstructing “liberal 
civilization”: “In Prolegomena to Logic (1920), [Collingwood] suggests, ‘…because 
Hegel did not shake himself free from his Spinozistic and Schellingian training he tended 
to fall back, whenever he was not in his happiest mood into just this (monistic) view of 
the concept [“unity of thought”] and his followers have erected the whole into a kind of 
fetish.’” (Browning, Rethinking, 182; Collingwood, Prolegomena, 10). But, Collingwood 
is much more positive about Hegel in the unpublished works as seen above, probably, 
Browning argues, because his British readers were patently unreceptive to German and 
Italian idealism during the interwar period. 
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of imagination 
what you find out for yourself is what you select 
out of an infinite sea of possibility 
no one can inhabit yr world 
 
yet it is not lonely, 
the ground of imagination is fearlessness 
discourse is video tape of a movie of a shadow play 
but the puppets are in yr hand 
your counters in a multidimensional chess 
which is divination 
& strategy 
 
the war that matters is the war against the imagination 
all other wars are subsumed in it. 
 
the ultimate famine is the starvation 
of the imagination 
 
it is death to be sure, but the undead 
seek to inhabit someone else’s world 
 
the ultimate claustrophobia is the syllogism 
the ultimate claustrophobia is “it all adds up” 
nothing adds up & nothing stands in for 
anything else 
 
THE ONLY WAR THAT MATTERS IS THE WAR AGAINST 
THE IMAGINATION 
THE ONLY WAR THAT MATTERS IS THE WAR AGAINST 
THE IMAGINATION 
THE ONLY WAR THAT MATTERS IS THE WAR AGAINST 
THE IMAGINATION 
ALL OTHER WARS ARE SUBSUMED IN IT 
 
There is no way out of a spiritual battle 
There is no way you can avoid taking sides 
There is no way you can not have a poetics 
no matter what you do: plumber, baker, teacher 
 
you do it in the consciousness of making 
or not making yr world 
you have a poetics: you step into the world 
like a suit of readymade clothes 
 
or you etch in light 
your firmament spills into the shape of your room 
the shape of the poem, of yr body, of yr loves 
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A woman’s life / a man’s life is an allegory 
 
Dig it 
 
There is no way out of the spiritual battle 
the war is the war against the imagination 
you can’t sign up as a conscientious objector 
 
the war of the worlds hangs here, right now, in the balance 
it is a war for this world, to keep it 
a vale of soul-making 
 
the taste in all our mouths is the taste of power 
and it is bitter as death 
 
bring yr self home to yrself, enter the garden 
the guy at the gate w/ the flaming sword is yrself 
 
the war is the war for the human imagination 
and no one can fight it but you/ & no one can fight it for you 
 
The imagination is not only holy, it is precise 
it is not only fierce, it is practical 
men die everyday for the lack of it, 
it is vast & elegant 
 
intellectus means “light of the mind” 
it is not discourse it is not even language 
the inner sun 
 
the polis is constellated around the sun 
the fire is central 
 
-- Diane Di Prima (1985)576  
                                               
576 Pieces of a Song: Selected Poems (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1990), 159 – 
161. 
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APPENDIX A 
AUGUSTINE THE READER 
 It is worth taking a brief moment to discuss what we know about Augustine’s 
reading habits generally and in regard to the writers he cites in Books 8 - 10. 
 Augustine’s use of classical references throughout City of God is striking. Gillian 
Clark, captures the force of this use:  
Augustine was out to show that he shared the classical deduction and the 
cultural referents of his opponents. He too could write the Latin of five 
centuries ago that was the hallmark of the educated man. City of God is his 
most consciously and consistently Ciceronian work, both in content and in 
style. Latin-speaking schoolboys worked through Terence and Sallust and 
Virgil as well as Cicero, and there they all are, reinforced by Livy for the 
legends of the early republic and Varro for its religion.577  
 
Harald Hagendahl allows for the possibility, though, that rather than being intimately 
familiar with many of the classical authors he cites, as he appears to be, Augustine’s 
knowledge was gathered from secondary sources such as books, commentaries, or even 
schoolbooks.578 Nonetheless, especially in the case of City of God, Hagendahl argues that 
Augustine “prepared himself for his magnum opus by extensive study of profane authors 
and had them at hand during the course of his work,” a position echoed by Marrrou and 
O’Meara.579 Augustine seemed to be proud of his literary prowess, especially when 
addressing “pagans” as he does in City of God. In one letter, he seems flattered by Darius 
                                               
577 Gillian Clark, “City of Books: Augustine and the World as Text,” in The Early 
Christian Book, eds. William E. Klingshirn, and Linda Safran (Catholic University of 
America Press, 2008), 126. 
 
578 Harald Hagendahl, Augustine and the Latin Classics (Göteborg: Universitet, 1967), 
690. 
 
579 Hagendahl, Latin Classics, 708-709. Cf. Henri Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin 
de la culture antique (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1983),129; John Joseph O'Meara, The Young 
Augustine: An Introduction to the Confessions of St. Augustine. London; New York: 
Longman, 1980), 94. 
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who praises the “immortal fruits” of his wisdom (Augustine, epistula 230). In another 
letter written during the Vandal invasion of North Africa in 429, Augustine composes a 
homily on praise (epistula 231) seeming to delight in citing Persius, Cicero, Plutarch, 
Ennius, and Horace before finally turning to the expected biblical references.580  
 In addition to his use of biblical citations, City of God displays a wide variety of 
literary sources including Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Christian writers. Among the Latin 
writers, Varro, Cicero, Sallust, and Livy figure prominently, offering examples of 
tragedies that befell Rome under the watch of pagan cult as well as the unseemly 
behavior of their gods. His knowledge and citations of the Greek philosophers would 
have been from Latin translations. His access to the philosophies of Plotinus, Porphyry, 
and Iamblichus are believed to have been through the lost translations by Latin Christo-
Platonist Marius Victorinus.581 Of Apuleius, we know that Augustine read De deo 
Socrates, Apologia, at least parts of De Mundo, and that he had some familiarity with 
Metamorphoses.582 James J. O’Donnell speculates that Augustine came into possession of 
a codex containing The god of Socrates and the Latin Asclepius in 412/3, possibly 
through Volusianus or, seeing how popular it was in intellectual circles in Hippo, he may 
have sought it out himself in order to refute it preemptively.583 He does not seem to have 
                                               
580 Augustine, and Wilfrid Parsons. Letters Volume V, Volume V (Baltimore, MD: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1956) 158-165. 
 
581 Gerard J. P. O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1999), 257. 
 
582 O’Daly, City, 253. Augustine alludes to Apuleius’s Apologia (De civitate Dei  8.19) 
and Metamorphoses (18.18), but draws more from De Mundo (4.2) and extensively from 
De Deo Socrates (8 – 9).  
 
583 O'Donnell, James J. “Augustine's Classical Readings,” Recherches Augustiniennes 15 
(1980): 149. 
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been aware of the Greek Hermetic works or other related Hermetic literature such as what 
is now referred to as the Papyri Graecae Magicae, a collection of rituals in Greek (and 
demotic Egyptian) discussed in chapter 4. While he admits to having read only a small 
amount of Plotinus,584 he read Porphyry’s now lost The Ascent of the Soul (De Regressu 
Animae) and his Letter to Anebo (Epistula ad Anebonem) where Augustine may have 
learned of Iamblichus’ philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
584 O’Daly, Guide, 258. See Augustine’s De Beata Vita 1.4 and Contra Academicos 2.2.5. 
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APPENDIX B 
AGAINST THE PAGANS 
In City of God, Augustine objects to the idea—articulated by Apuleius in The god 
of Socrates—that daemones (or to him, “demons”) act as intermediaries between humans 
and the gods, serving a salvific function. Augustine has a clear alternative to Platonic 
daemones in mind as the title of Book 9.15 indicates: “On the Mediator between God and 
man, the man Christ Jesus.”  Underlying his argument for “Christ as Mediator” is a more 
general concern with a traditional Platonic philosophical problem of the relationship 
between the sensible and the intelligible realms—the outer and inner realms respectively.  
Augustine’s argument about the difference between Apuleius’s “daemonic 
mediators” and “Christ as mediator” is complicated as the two models share certain 
elements. Augustine’s Neoplatonic pedigree shows up when he finds imaginative 
common ground with his intellectual forbearers. For example, he acknowledges that both 
non-Christian gods and Christian angels could be “visible and…shining bright [like the 
sun or moon]…or…invisible and mere objects of…thought.” (Augustine, De civitate Dei 
10.27).585  Regarding the nature and existence of the gods of traditional Roman state cult, 
Augustine writes in Book 9: “If the Platonists prefer to call the angels gods rather than 
demons and to include them among those whom their founder and master Plato describes 
as gods created by the supreme god (summo deo), let them say what they please, for we 
must not engage in labored argument with them over words” (9.23).586 The bishop 
                                               
585 Wiesen, trans. “sive visibiles, quos conspicuos lucere cernebat, solem ac lunam et 
cetera ibidem lumina, siue inuisibiles, quos putabat.” 
 
586 Wiesen, trans. “Hos si Platonici malunt deos quam daemones dicere eisque 
adnumerare, quos a summo Deo conditos deos scribit eorum auctor et magister Plato: 
dicant quod uolunt; non enim cum eis de uerborum controuersia laborandum est.” 
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acknowledges virtually “no quarrel between them [the Platonists] and us on that score” 
(9.23) despite the labored arguments that make up the City of God.587  
 The daemones, although immortal like the gods of the Greek philosophers, were a 
class of beings conceived of as being “lower” than the gods—existing in the air. And, 
being closer to the earth, they were able to interact more directly with humans than the 
gods were. They were also, according to Apuleius, subject to passions, and, while 
immortal, they were miserable because of their passions. Like the Platonists, Augustine 
maintains that “true” divinity is not passable or capable of suffering. Humans, who are 
neither immortal nor exempt from suffering, have a soul, the part of their being 
understood as capable of experiencing personal divinity. Therefore, Augustine argues: 
“We need the sort of mediator who is linked to us in our lowest state by bodily mortality 
yet is…immortal…by spirit…” (9.17).588  Although Augustine takes issue with 
Apuleius’s demonology, he  agrees with the general point: “In the scale of nature, angels 
do occupy, metaphysically, a middle position between God and humans, and demons are 
simply a species of angels, being less powerful because less wise” (21.6).589  
 The figure of the “Mediator” bears a startling resemblance to Plotinus’s idea of 
the soul (psyche). Plotinus understood the soul itself an “intermediary logos”590 in much 
the same way that Augustine understood the intermediary function of Christ as Logos—
                                               
587 Wiesen, trans. “ideo inter nos et ipsos paene nulla dissensio est.” 
 
588 Wiesen, trans. “sed tali qui nobis infimis ex corporis mortalitate coaptatus inmortali 
spiritus iustitia.” 
 
589 Sarah Byers, “Augustine and the Philosophers,” in A Companion to Augustine. 
Chichester, eds. Mark Vessey and Shelley Reid (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 
185.175- 187 
 
590 Watson, Phantasia, 326.  
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the “Word made flesh” (John 1:14). This similarity is not a coincidence. Throughout 
Books 8 - 10, Augustine refers to Platonism as the philosophy that came closest to the 
“true” philosophy of Christianity. Although he lights into Apuleius and Porphyry with a 
vengeance, Plotinus seems to have earned his respect: “Plotinus is certainly praised as 
surpassing, in the period just preceding our own recollections, the rest of Plato’s 
followers in his understanding of the master” (9.10).591   
 Augustine then turns his attention from Apuleius’s demonology to a “different 
opinion of the demons [that] was adopted and expressed in his writings by the Egyptian 
Hermes, who is called Trismegistus” (8.23).592 Drawing from Latin Asclepius 38, 
Augustine describes the “telestic art”593 of the Hermetist: “To unite, therefore these 
invisible spirits to visible objects of bodily substance by some strange technique, so that 
the result is something like animated bodies, idols dedicated and subject to these spirits, 
this, Hermes says, is ‘making gods,’ (deos facere) and this great and miraculous power, 
he adds, of making gods has been given to men” (8.23).594 Augustine fails to see how for 
the theurgists, the telestic art was equally concerned with attaining personal divinity for 
the one making the god (a point discussed in chapters 4 and 5). Instead, Augustine 
refutes: 
                                               
591 Wiesen, trans. “Plotinus certe nostrae memoriae uicinis temporibus Platonem ceteris 
excellentius intellexisse laudatur.” 
 
592 Wiesen, trans. “Nam diversa de illis Hermes Aegyptius, quem Trismegiston vocant, 
sensit et scripsit.” 
 
593 My trans. “ἡ τελεστικη τεκνη.” 
 
594 Wiesen, trans. “Hos ergo spiritus invisibiles per artem quandam visibilibus rebus 
corporalis materiae copulare, ut sint quasi animata corpora illis spiritibus dicata et 
subdita simulacra, hoc esse dicit deos facere eamque magnam et mirabilem deos faciendi 
aecepisse homines potestatem.” 
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Such gods then, the gods worshipped by such men and by such men artfully 
fabricated, gods that are in fact demons bound by the chains of their desires 
through some strange technique to idols, when they were described by Hermes as 
gods made by men, were nevertheless not endowed by him, as they were by the 
Platonist Apuleius (with whom we have already dealt adequately and show how 
illogical and absurd are his opinions), with the office of being interpreters and 
intercessors between gods made by God and men who God also made, carrying 
prayers to heaven and fetching back gifts as answers to prayers. For it is 
extremely foolish to suppose that gods made by men have more influence with 
gods made by God than have men themselves, who were also made by the same 
God (8.24).595 
 
 Augustine sees what he believes to be Hermes’ admission of the error of 
“paganism” in the Latin Asclepius based on his reading of two sections, the first, a 
mistranslation of the Greek:596 “It was this grave error and unbelief on the part of men 
who did not pay due attention to worship and divine religion, namely the art whereby 
man could make gods, that the sage deplores…” (8.24).597 The second section is an 
apocalyptic vision Hermes foretells for Egypt:  
                                               
595 Wiesen, trans. “Deos ergo tales, talium deos, arte factos a talibus,1 id est idolis 
daemones per artem nescio quam cupiditatum suarum vinculis inligatos cum appellaret 
factos ab hominibus deos, non tamen eis dedit, quod Platonicus Apuleius—unde iam satis 
diximus et quam sit inconveniens absurdumque monstravimus—ut ipsi essent interpretes 
et intercessores inter deos quos fecit Deus et homines quos idem fecit Deus; hinc 
adferentes vota, inde munera referentes. Nimis enim stultum est credere deos quos 
fecerunt homines plus valere apud deos quos fecit Deus quam valent ipsi homines, quos 
idem ipse fecit Deus.” 
 
596 “Augustine understands this work to say that this making of gods is a consequence of 
human unbelief and religious degeneration, but he bases this interpretation on a causal 
reading of ‘quoniam’ in Asclep. 37, a statement that Augustine finds puzzling in the 
context of the treatise’s demonology, and for which he must find an ingenious 
explanation (Hermes is inspired by an evil spirit 8.24).” O’Daly, Guide, 117, n. 26; See 
also Scott, Hermetica IV, 183, n. 2; Wiesen, 114-115, n. 2. 
 
597 Wiesen, trans. “Iste ergo multus error et incredulitas non animadvertentium ad cultum 
religionemque divinam invenit artem qua efficeret deos. Et tamen quod multus error et 
incredulitas et a cultu ac religione divina aversio animi invenit, ut homo arte faceret 
deos, hoc dolet vir sapiens.” 
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We must certainly take note how this Egyptian, pained to think that the time 
would arrive when abolition would come in Egypt of all that worship which by 
his own admission was set up by men who were gravely in error, unbelievers and 
indifferent to the observance of divinae religionis, said among other things: ‘Then 
this land, this holy seat of shrines and temples, will be covered with sepulchers 
and with dead men…(8.26).598  
 
Augustine understands the vision of Egypt’s shrines and temples “covered with 
sepulchers and with dead men” to be a foretelling of a victorious Christian martyr cult.   
    
                                               
598 Wiesen, trans. “Sane advertendum est quo modo iste Aegyptius, cum doleret tempus 
esse venturum quo illa auferrentur ex Aegypto quae fatetur a multum errantibus et 
incredulis et a cultu divinae religionis aversis esse instituta, ait inter cetera: ‘Tunc terra 
ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum atque templorum, sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque 
plenissima.” Cf. Latin Asclepius 24. 
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APPENDIX C 
THE ALTAR OF VICTORY REVISITED 
 In The Last Pagans of Rome, Alan Cameron ably dismantles the myth of a unified 
non-Christian resistance to Christianity, at least among the Roman senatorial elite, 
famously encapsulated in the story of Symmachus and the Altar of Victory (as well as the 
Battle of Frigidus and elsewhere).599 Cameron reads the reaction of non-Christians to 410 
as a matter of cultural difference, de-emphasizing the possibility of an ideological 
showdown between “true-believers” and demonstrates how, in fact, it was the Roman 
Christians who insured Rome’s afterlife in the form of “Classical” heritage. Yet Peter 
Brown observes that: 
Cameron’s account of the end of paganism finds singularly little place for 
resentment, for regret, still less for anger at the success of so much blasphemy 
against the gods and continued, unspoken fear of their vengeance. Evidence for 
such feelings exists for the Eastern Roman Empire. But Cameron rules this 
evidence out of court, as being limited to small circles of alienated intellectuals.600 
 
Indeed, by bringing Eastern sources (Damascius, Zacharias) to our attention, Edward 
Watts has brought that resentment, regret, and anger to life in his studies on the 
academies of Athens and Alexandria and the struggle of their scholarchs, rhetors, and 
philosophers against steadily diminishing means and social intolerance.601 Watts cautions 
us that while Roman state cult died, it is difficult to pin down the exact circumstances: 
                                               
599 Alan Cameron, The Last Pagans of Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
600 Peter Brown, “Paganism: What we owe the Christians,” The New York Review of 
Books, April 7th, 2011, Website accessed March 15, 2017. 
 
601 Edward Jay Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006; Edward Jay Watts, Riot in Alexandria: Tradition 
and Group Dynamics in Late Antique Pagan and Christian Communities. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010. 
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“Depending upon the regions, sources, and languages scholars choose to privilege, 
Roman[s] … can be seen as violently resisting Christianity’s expansion or as passively 
standing aside while Christians dismantled traditional [cultic] institutions.”602  
The Altar of Victory controversy was more of a symbolic episode whose effect 
was felt in the defunding of Rome’s traditional state cult by Gratian in 382. Cameron’s 
focus on the senatorial elite ignores the vast majority that saw traditional cult persist for 
far longer.603 This dissertation attends to the literary sources that nourished the 
persistence of ancient ideas. The non-Christian discourses and practices intended to 
cultivate personal divinity, even while under the influence at times of similar Christian 
ideas, is a site for the persistence of Classical heritage and ancient thought. Alan 
Cameron concedes:  
So many of the activities, artifacts, and enthusiasms that have been identified as 
hallmarks of an elaborate, concerted campaign to combat Christianity turn out to 
have been central elements in the life of cultivated Christians. This is the one area 
in which “paganism” (defined as the Roman tradition, Rome’s glorious past) 
continued to exercise real power and influence on men’s minds. Despite the best 
attempts of Augustine and other rigorists, the Roman literary tradition played a 
vital and continuing role in shaping the thought-world of Christians, both at the 
time and in the centuries to come.604 
 
One can’t help but wonder if Cameron’s lengthy objection to the persistence of 
traditional pre-Christian thinkers and practitioners up until this concession might have 
                                               
602 Edward Jay Watts, “Review of Alan Cameron. The Last Pagans of Rome. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2011. Pp. X, 878. $85.00,” The American Historical Review. 
116, no. 5 (2011): 1552. 
 
603 Watts, “Review of Alan Cameron,” 1552. 
 
604 Cameron, Last Pagans, 801. 
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something to do with his preference, although common, for referring to them with the 
polemical term of Christian origin, “pagan.”605 
 
  
                                               605	Anthony Kaldellis complains that Alan Cameron offers little about the “last pagans”: 
“One learns nothing…about their gods or reasons for not converting to Christianity. The 
book assimilates them to the generic social background, which is defined in Christian 
terms. Christian groups and discourses are generally given priority and treated as 
normative with strikingly more interest and close engagement. And authors who seem to 
want to deviate from the fold of the Church are marched right back in and disciplined by 
the label ‘unconventional Christians,’ what that means. The sixth century, for example, 
has been homogenized into a ‘monolithically’ Christian society far beyond even the 
dreams of Justinian.” “Late Antiquity Dissolves,” Marginalia Review of Books, 16 
September, 2015: http://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/late-antiquity-and-the-new-
humanities-an-open-forum/	
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APPENDIX D 
THE WORLD OF LATE ANTIQUITY 
 An interdisciplinary and international field, late antique studies gathers late 
Roman historians, Byzantinists, early medievalists, Islamicists, classical archaeologists, 
patristic and religious studies scholars whose diverse approaches include social 
anthropology, archaeology, and cultural/literary theory. Just as disciplinary boundaries 
are crossed, so are temporal and geographic lines. While there continues to be debate 
surrounding its periodization,606 Brown is famous for the provocation: “Late 
antiquity…it’s later than you think!” The geographic scope, while centered in the 
Mediterranean world, now reaches well beyond any of the Empire’s political boundaries 
as historians of late antiquity seem have found the ancient analog to globalization, 
indicating a shift in focus from centralizing power to a diverse periphery. Local and 
regional studies predominate  as does a concern for representations and interpenetrating 
social networks.607  In The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity (2012), Scott Johnson 
portrays Irish monks (in a very spätere Spätantike) commenting on Priscian’s Institutions 
grammaticae in one corner of the late antique world while a bilingual stele in Chinese 
and Syriac is erected in the Tang capital to commemorate 150 years of Christian presence 
in China.608 Gibbon’s “fallen” empire seems rather more to have spread, diffused, and 
relocated (Ward-Perkins’ “vanishing drain pipes” aside). The Byzantines, as we call 
                                               
606 Arnaldo Marcone, “A Long Late Antiquity?: Considerations on a Controversial 
Periodization,” Journal of Late Antiquity 1, no. 1: 4-19 (2008). 
 
607 Adam M. Schor, Theodoret's People: Social Networks and Religious Conflict in Late 
Roman Syria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
 
608 Scott Fitzgerald Johnson, The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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them, called themselves Rhomaioi after all. Henri Pirenne may have been the first to 
challenge Gibbon in his 1939 Mahomet et Charlemagne609 but Brown takes a modified 
“global turn” himself, arguing against dramatic rupture in  favor of continuity by focusing 
on trade routes and regional identities that persisted despite the various sackings from 
North and East. Building upon the previous generation of scholarship on the late Roman 
world—notably in Michael Rostovtzeff, Ronald Syme, A.H.M. Jones, H.I. Marrou, and, 
his teacher, Arnaldo Momigliano, Brown steers the conversation toward cultural and 
ideological history under the influence of Mary Douglas’s social anthropology.610 
Gibbon’s emphasis on institutional history has been replaced by a concern for social, 
cultural, and intellectual trends. Documentary sources are liberally complemented by 
material culture. New archaeological discoveries challenge the triumphalism of our 
Christian sources, highlighting a concern for traditional Graeco-Roman culture amidst a 
growing Christian state. Archaeological studies present regional vitality and affluence 
that discards any notion of a “Dark Age.” While the persistence of tradition is clear, the 
other side to the reassessment of Christian “triumphalism” is the recognition that 
traditional thought and practice also changed—notably, in the new brand of apologia of 
                                               
609 Henri Pirenne, and Bruno Dumézil, Mahomet et Charlemagne (Paris: Tallandier, 
2016). 
 
610 Michael Ivanovitch Rostovtzeff, Rome (London: Oxford University Press, 1981); 
Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960); Arnold 
H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire: 284-602; A Social, Economic and Administrative 
Survey. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Henri Irénée Marrou, A History of Education in 
Antiquity (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956); Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The 
Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Mary Douglas, 
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
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the philosophers—and in some cases waned without intervention from marauding monks, 
disagreeable bishops, or zealous emperors, as in the temple complexes of Upper Egypt.  
 The last twenty years have seen a number of guides, companions, and 
historiographical overviews that indicate a discipline come of age. Bowersock, Brown 
and Grabar’s 1999 Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World uses a “long late 
antiquity” from 250 to 800 CE.611 The Guide crosses temporal and spatial boundaries 
erected by nineteenth-century Classicists and provides a remedy for “too many bishops 
and not enough villages.” Garnsey and Humfress’s edited a collection in The Evolution of 
the Late Antique World (2001) provides a reductus of the “Jones Report” in its concern 
with institutional history.612 In 2004, a similar work edited by Swain and Edwards,  
Approaching Late Antiquity focuses on the period between 200-400 CE, drawing from 
recent archaeology of political-economy with particular attention to “top-down” effects 
of law, military organization, and Imperial reform on society.613 The Past Before Us 
(2004), edited by Carole Straw and Richard Lim, provides an excellent overview of the 
historiography of late antiquity since the time of Gibbon.614  
 Recent trends in the direction of scholarship stand out: the change in focus from 
center to periphery, the influence of the “linguistic turn” with its infusion of literary 
                                               
611 G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown, and Oleg Grabar. Late Antiquity: A Guide to the 
Postclassical World (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2012). 
 
612 Peter Garnsey and Caroline Humfress, The Evolution of the Late Antique World 
(Cambridge: Orchard Academic, 2001). 
 
613 Simon Swain, ed., Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to 
Late Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
614 Carole Ellen Straw and Richard Lim, The Past Before Us: The Challenge of 
Historiographies of Late Antiquity [Conference at Smith College in 1999] (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2004). 
 
	 194	
theory and self-critical awareness of the personal and the present upon historiography, 
and the marshalling of multi-disciplinary approaches. The notion of Rome’s fall into 
decadence is challenged, as is the insistence on abrupt historical breaks. Continuities and 
remains are recognized in context. Religious Studies scholars seek the material and social 
historians look to the force of ideas.  
 The “challenge” for the future seems to be striking a balance between close 
critical readings “against the grain” with the realpolitik of the longue durée freed from its 
nineteenth century presentism. The impact of social history and material culture studies 
paints a more complex and interconnected late antique world revealing unexpected 
continuities and surprising contradictions. Rousseau’s A Companion to Late Antiquity 
(2009) is self-consciously historiographical and, in keeping with The Past Before Us, is 
much more reflexive than the other compendia preceding it.615 Companion, like Guide 
includes more families and monasticism and less army and slavery. The use of 
Foucauldian and literary theory is here taken for granted and well-demonstrated: agency, 
performance, and textual communities populate its pages. Law becomes a prism into a 
society rather than its structural determinant. 
 
Brown’s Influence  
 In The Cult of Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (1981), Peter 
Brown chronicles the rise and function of the cult of saints in early Western European 
Christianity.616 Using social anthropology and a wide array of primary sources to 
                                               
615 Philip Rousseau, A Companion to Late Antiquity (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009). 
 
616 Peter Brown, The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
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resurrect a “history from below,” Brown surveys a variety of human experiences with 
tombs, shrines, relics, and pilgrimages. He pays particular attention to the idea that the 
bodies of saints provided a locus where heaven is joined with earth, setting the stage for 
significant further work by others on the body, materiality, and the senses in late antique 
religion such as Susan Ashbrook Harvey’s Scenting Salvation: Ancient Christianity and 
the Olfactory Imagination (2006), Georgia Frank’s The Memory of the Eyes: Pilgrims to 
Living Saints in Christian Late Antiquity (2008) and Patricia Cox Miller’s The Corporeal 
Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient Christianity (2009).617 Brown asserts 
that the cult was not an upsurge of popular superstition as Hume and Gibbon would have 
it but rather an imaginative shift that reflected changing social relations in Roman 
society. Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity (1982), a collection of essays, lectures, 
and reviews that covers much of Brown’s work in the 1970’s while teaching at Oxford 
and the University of London, was published roughly a decade after Religion and Society 
in the Age of Augustine (1972).618  Brown asks not, “Why did late antique people believe 
in the supernatural?” but rather, “What did they get out of believing so?” As a historian 
of Christianity, Brown stresses the need for “imaginative models” that help the historian 
enter into the thought-worlds and the pressing concerns of late antique men and women. 
However, an imaginative model is also a theoretical framework and one that, in part, he 
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owes to Mary Douglas. Included among the thirteen articles is the influential “The Rise 
and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity” (1971) which launched an inquiry into 
the social organization of sanctity and demystification of power that continues today.619 
The social-functionalist argument in “Holy Man” is revisited throughout a volume that 
ranges widely from Pirenne to Gregory of Tours, Theodoret to Libanius, and the Book of 
Kells to the early medieval ordeals. A careful study of the construction of the holy in late 
antiquity and its loci--especially in the holy person, relic, and icon—as well as, more 
generally, the functional interaction between humans and the supernatural, weaves the 
essays together. For Late Antique society, Brown argues that the “idea of the holy” was 
an embodied field for the projection and mediation of individual concerns and therefore a 
matrix for social cohesion and arbitration. Brown’s The Body and Society (1988) 
examines how the ideology, practice, and institutionalization of sexual renunciation 
developed over time and place in early Christianity.620 Citing nearly every major early 
Christian source (as well as selected contemporary medical and philosophical texts from 
the likes of Galen and Porphyry), Brown reads the body of late antique Christianity, 
amassing social prescriptions for marriage, family, and sexuality from St. Paul to St. 
Augustine in both the Eastern and Western Empires. His familiar social anthropology is 
replaced to some extent by a social psychology (or archaeology?) coming out of Brown’s 
interaction with Foucault (and Hadot and Veyne before him). Brown reads the 
multifarious body as political site, social construct, spiritual exercise, and path of 
                                               
619 Peter Brown, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity,” Journal of 
Roman Studies. 61 (1971): 80-101. 
 
620 Brown, Peter. The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
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resistance. In most of his case studies, gender performance and the social regulation of 
bodies are front and center. In considering questions of what it means to be a person in a 
society, he examines the options people had in private and social life, that is, the 
opportunities for (and limits of) freedom, a concern that I share in my research on 
personal divinity. When imaginative maps get redrawn, power gets relocated. What may 
have seemed like an option for freedom on the ground, soon became a disciplinary 
institution of great consequence, wealth, and power, not the least of which was to cast an 
enduring shadow over the psyche of the West in the form of sexual shame. In Power and 
Persuasion in Late Antiquity (1992), Brown describes the transformation of paideia from 
its classical nexus to a new Christian imperial context.621 A new language of power 
(triumphal representations) and a new style of urban leadership emerges as the bishopric 
superseded the pagan aristocracy’s role in civic euergetism and the philosophers’ 
conciliar parrhesia while gaining the support of the poor (whom they could now 
discipline). Brown also asserts that the pagan elite continued to function under an 
“ideology of silence.” Claudia Rapp’s Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of 
Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition (2005) follows up on Brown’s thesis and 
further complicates the complex construction of episcopal authority.622 
  
Contra Brown  
 Unsurprisingly, the success of the Brown’s influence has elicited a response, 
exemplified concisely in Andrea Giardina’s characterization of the field as “an explosion 
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of late antiquity” and in Bryan Ward-Perkins’ provocative The Fall of Rome and the End 
of Civilization (2005).623 Ward-Perkins reacts to the preponderance of Eastern focused 
correctives of late with some “positivist” Western material culture analysis of his own. 
He bases much of his argument on the availability of high-quality “comfort” goods such 
as pottery, roof tiles, and coins. It is tempting to fault him for being "too Marx and not 
enough Weber" except that it is hard to argue with his common-sense portrayal of the 
devastating effects of war. He questions the Brownian re-characterization of “decline” 
and “crisis” as “transition” and “transformation,” and refutes the more recent attempts to 
recast violent invasion as “accommodation.” By way of offering an explanation for these 
reassessments, Ward-Perkins suggests that post-WWII political developments have 
impacted historiography. Ultimately prioritizing the material base as a cultural matrix, he 
suggests that while 800 may work for the East, the West and the Aegean experienced 
significant material “simplifications” by 400 and 600, respectively. 
 
Late Ancient or Early Christian?  
 In his essay, “Christianity and the Decline of the Roman Empire” (1963), Arnaldo 
Momigliano suggests that any interpretation of the decline of the Roman empire must 
take into account the triumph of imperial Christianity.624 However, he adds, it will not be 
a “simple return” to Gibbon. The question of “survival” needs to be understood in 
relation to two developments—the relative decline of the city in the Western empire and 
the rise of the Christian state. For social and cultural historians of late antiquity, at least, 
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the notion of transformation has, by and large, replaced that of survival through a study 
of Rome’s periphery and a consideration of hybridity and fluid identity as historical 
processes. What the periphery looks like and how these processes play out in the East and 
the West are both similar and different as we shall see later in this essay. Nonetheless, the 
notion of “survival” and its necessary corollary—Christianization or, perhaps, 
imperialization—has been the central problem of late antique studies since its inception 
in the 70s with the arrival of Peter Brown’s The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750 
(1971).625 Nevertheless, the question of how Rome adopted imperial Christian ideology 
and which aspects of traditional culture survived the Christianization of Rome is not so 
far from Gibbon as one might think. 
 It was Peter Brown’s reassessment of the thesis advanced in Edward Gibbon’s 
masterwork The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (ed. J. Bury, 1902) 
that launched the field of late antique studies.626 Eschewing Gibbon’s characterization of 
Christianity as a superstitious usurper, Brown made the case for the transformation of 
classical heritage in Christian times. Brown’s work has established late antiquity as a 
complex and dynamic historical period for academic study. He has paired persistent 
probing of source material with multiple imaginative and theoretical models—in an 
almost “disciplinary iconoclasm” that includes social and literary theory, anthropology, 
psychology and hagiography. New models have given rise to new questions with which 
to interrogate old problems. Central to his contribution is an insistence upon linking “the 
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social and the spiritual revolutions of the late antique period” without reducing their 
relationship to a unilinear cause and effect. 
 
Christianization 
 The master narrative of Christianization, following the triumphalism of the 
Church Fathers, is as follows. After Constantine’s Edict of Toleration in 313, emperors 
became increasingly intolerant of traditional religion, outlawing animal sacrifice and 
even the burning of incense in the home. Encouraged by edicts and bishops, monks began 
destroying cult images and temples. Non-Christian resistance was generally ineffective as 
the Altar of Victory was removed from the Senate. Holy men attracted followers because 
of their athletic asceticism and miraculous healing. Emperor Julian’s revival failed in the 
fourth century. In the fifth century, a declining tradition cult and rising Christianity saw 
more destruction of temples and more building of churches. Finally, Emperor Justinian 
closes the Academy at Athens (529), and enforced baptism of non-Christians ensues. 
Regardless of whether or not one accepts this fairly reasonable oversimplification, it still 
doesn’t explain why people were attracted to Christianity.  
 The problem of christianization remains central to the field although the problem 
itself is understood in different ways. On the question of conversion and the appeal of 
Christianity, A.D. Nock’s Conversion: The Old and New in Religion from Alexander the 
Great to Augustine of Hippo (1933) remains the standard.627 In her essay, “Paganism and 
Christianization” (2012), Jaclyn Maxwell gathers a number of theories about the 
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attraction of Christianity.628 MacMullen, she writes, points to the effectiveness of 
imperial ideology, the appeal of holy people, healing, and exorcism; Jones, to a sense of 
expediency among the upwardly mobile after the crisis of third century; Salzman, to an 
aristocracy that reformed Christianity to it aims; Fowden, to the increased mobility in the 
empire and the need for Zugehörigkeit; Frankfurter, to the charisma of leaders and the 
fact that abandoning former beliefs was not, in practice, required. Ramsay MacMullen’s 
1984 Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-400) (1984) challenges uncritical 
reception of patristic representations of the “triumph” of Christianity.629 MacMullen 
argues that in order to understand the dynamic of Christianization in the Roman empire 
between 100-400, we must first understand the preexisting state of non-Christian 
ideological commitments. While the diverse cultic traditions of the Graeco-Roman world 
were non-exclusive, the exclusiveness of imperial Christian ideology forced adherents 
(not converts in the Nockian sense) to make a choice. An interest in the miraculous, a 
desire for spiritual and social benefits of adhesion, and a fear of physical pain (heavenly 
or imperially sanctioned), combined with the subsequent demonization of non-Christian 
cultic practices, enabled Christianity to gradually supersede traditional beliefs and 
practices.  
Citing the persistence of traditional cultic practices and beliefs into early modern 
and modern societies as evidence for the relative “triumph” of Christianity, Pierre Chuvin 
argues in A Chronicle of the Last Pagans (1990) that christianization between 300-600 
was, in fact, possible due to the non-Christian elites’ loss of power, public policies of 
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exclusion that encouraged their assimilation, and finally, under Justinian, threats of 
physical elimination.630 For Chuvin, the process was gradual and complex, displaying 
contradictory evidence between official representations and legal proscriptions, on the 
one hand, and local material and epigraphic sources, on the other. He traces the retreat of 
non-imperial ideologies from a popular and public forum to the more private and 
philosophical spheres.  
 Gillian Clark wonders if Roman institutions might have had more of an impact on 
Christianity than previously considered. In Christianity and Roman Society (2004), 
Clark’s argument that Roman society transformed Christianity relies on the premise that 
traditional society embraced the emerging textual and ethical communities out of political 
expediency rather than from commitment to ideology.631 Her discussion of the difference 
between philosophical and Christian “selves” is especially interesting but she emphasizes 
political and economic impacts over such ideological developments. The innovative role 
of martyrs, saints, and bishops is well documented yet those social innovations are 
trumped, in her view, by the alliance between imperial and episcopal power.  
 Hal Drake analyzes the “Constantinian Revolution” in terms of realpolitik. In 
Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (2000), he refutes the inherent 
intolerance many scholars have attributed to Christianity, choosing to focus on the 
politics of power rather than theology.632 His portrait of a pragmatic Constantine who 
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used the rising bishops as administrative adjuncts, while seeking to build a stable 
ideological consensus between pagans and Christians through an “inclusive 
monotheism,” is original and draws from current day scholarship on American power 
politics.  
 Michele Salzman mines A.H.M. Jones’ The Prosopography of the Later Roman 
Empire (1971) for data regarding ideological and career identity shifts within the 
Senatorial class in The Making of a Christian Aristocracy: Social and Religious Change 
in the Western Roman Empire (2002).633 She argues that the senatorial aristocracy, more 
than the imperial court, influenced the transformation of the Roman Empire from pagan 
to Christian identification. Once self-identification as a Christian, she maintains, ceased 
to disrupt personal, familial, and social networks, conversion became a matter of self-
interest. It was in this climate that Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine “transformed” their 
Classical paideia for Christianity. 
 Recent archaeological studies have had a significant impact on our understanding 
of Christianization. In “The Fate of Rural Temples in Late Antiquity,” a contribution to 
Bowden, Levan, and Machado’s Recent Research on the Late Antique Countryside 
(2004), Beatrice Caseau charts conflicting ideology evidenced by the destruction of 
traditional temples (as well as the persistent attraction to these sites) in the countryside of 
the late Roman Empire up to the sixth century.634 Outside of the cities, the suburban, 
rural, and “uncultivated” zones contained both elaborate temple structures and more 
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informally defined sacred landscapes or sanctuaries. Surveys of cultic sites indicate ebbs 
and flows in use that correlate to settlement patterns and economics, as much as 
ideological shifts. In one example, she points to the villa of St- Aubin-sur-Mer in 
Normandy which was built on top of a Celtic fanum from the second century later to be 
toppled in the fourth century by a Roman shrine. She concludes that the enforced 
“privatization” of tradition cultic practice (i.e. moving from public to private spaces) 
resulted in the loss of temple traditions. In “The Fate of Pagan Cult Places in Palestine,” 
from Lapin’s edited Religious and Ethnic Communities in Late Roman Palestine (1998), 
Tsafrir notes that while expressions of traditional cult (statues of gods and heroes, 
mosaics with imagery from Graeco-Roman mythology) survived into the sixth century, 
there is no evidence of temples or temple sacrifice after the end of the fourth century in 
Palestine, at any rate.635 Tsafrir reads Epiphanius against Ammianus Marcellinus to 
confirm that violent destruction of pagan temples was slower than apologists generally 
indicate. Relying heavily on the work of epigrapher, Louis Robert, and with an interest in 
Greek polis-cult, Robin Lane Fox argues for the vitality of ethnic “polytheisms” in the 
late empire in Pagans and Christians (1986).636  
  
The Greek East 
 In Hellenism in Late Antiquity (1990), Glen Bowersock, in much the same vein as 
Baynes’ Hellenistic Civilization and East Rome (1946), challenges the view of Hellenism 
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as Hellenizing; that is, a forceful overlay of Greek cultural forms and values.637 Drawing 
on a range of philological, literary, archaeological, and visual evidence—especially the 
mosaics from Paphos, Cyprus—he argues that Hellenism was not imperialistic. Greek 
culture enriched and influenced through contact, to be sure, but also provided a vehicle 
for local cultural expression and preservation. Much of Bowersock’s discussion of 
Hellenism involves the survival of tradition culture in late antiquity despite patristic 
claims of triumph. He uses Syrian and Egyptian examples to reassess Momigliano’s Alien 
Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (1975).638 For example, when John of Ephesus 
comments on the thousands of non-Christians in the mountains near the Maeander 
Valley, Bowersock reminds us of valley cult practices described in sixth-century B.C.E 
inscriptions that continued to be depicted on local coins into the sixth century C.E. 
According to Damascius, these practices were also known to fifth and sixth-century 
Alexandrian Neoplatonists. 
 In Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews, and Christians in Antioch 
(2007), Isabella Sandwell uses the sermons of John Chrysostom and the letters of 
Libanius to complicate identity in late antiquity and offers a new approach to thinking 
about Christianization.639 Relying on the social anthropology of Frederik Barth and T.H. 
Eriksen, she makes the case for multiple fluid social identities and allegiances. While 
John Chrysostom is unambiguous about what differentiates Christians from Greeks or 
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Jews, the writings of Libanius suggest a range of degree in ideological identification and 
practice. 
 In “The Student Self in Late Antiquity” (2005), Edward Watts examines how 
traditional classical education for elites—paideia—blurred the boundaries between 
classical, Christian, and Jewish identities as a normalizing strategy in Egypt.640 In his City 
and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria (2006), a cultural history of paideia in 
it social, political, and economic context, Watts comments on the relationship between 
Bishop Synesius and Philosopher Libanius to show the collegiality that exists between 
classical and Christian intellectuals who shared paideia.641 In Riot in Alexandria: 
Tradition and Group Dynamics in Late Antique Pagan and Christian Communities 
(2010), Watts traces the resilience of Graeco-Roman heritage and the way in which non-
Christian and Christian intellectual groups reconfigured this heritage in post-
Constantinian Alexandria.642 Drawing from Neoplatonist Philosopher Damascius’ Vita 
Isidori and Bishop Zacharias Scholasticus’s Vita Severi, he argues that both groups had 
long histories of preserving and communicating their collective pasts. Prior to the fourth 
century, internecine Christian disputes occupied more Christian attention more than 
philosophically-centered teachings (see also Richard Lim’s “Christian Triumph and 
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Controversy,” 1999).643 With the rise of monastic communities as a model for Christian 
instruction, upper class Christians were now “cut off” from the intellectual training 
provided by the traditional classical philosophical schools. In this new climate, Christian 
pedagogues used Athanasius’ Vita Antonii as an interpretatio Christiana on classical 
paideia. However, Christians in Alexandria continued to be interested in traditional 
classical paideia. Rather than thinking in terms of Christianization, he understands the 
social and cultural change in Alexandria as contingent upon “personal connections and 
individual interactions.” 
 
The Latin West  
 The Greek East has sometimes been the evidential “linchpin” for both the survival 
classical culture and its transformation. However, a similar hybridity is evident among 
Western intellectuals in nascent late antique successor states albeit without the force of 
imperial Byzantium. In The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 
200-1000 (2003), Peter Brown makes amends to the lacuna of the West in The World of 
Late Antiquity.644 It was Marrou’s Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (1949) 
that had planted the notion of the vitality of the Western Empire in the fourth and early 
fifth centuries.645 Nonetheless, it was, perhaps, an under-appreciation for the “barbarian 
frontier” in The World of Late Antiquity (which has since been corrected by Peter 
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Heather, Walter Goffart, Wolf Liebeschuetz, and Ian Wood) that led him to revisit the 
localization of Christianity in emerging “micro-Christendoms” in Europe (and beyond) in 
The Rise of Western Christendom. He recalls Theodoric’s comment that a rich Goth 
imitates a Roman while only a poor Roman imitates a Goth. In “Conversion and 
Christianization in Late Antiquity: The Case of Augustine” (2004), Brown uses the 
recently published “Dolbeau sermons” of Augustine to complicate our notion of 
christianization in the West.646 We see the bishop on the ground contending with the 
superstitio of nominal “Christians” who still consulted astrologers and diviners. 
Christianization did not amount to conversion in any Nockian sense. As Averil Cameron 
points out in “Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory After Foucault” (1986) it 
was not as if people simply adopted a new “religion,” changed their whole view of the 
world and way of living from some “reorientation of the soul.”647 Rather, it was slow 
changes in the society that allowed the possibility for Christianity to “adhere” itself to 
society. Alan Cameron in The Last Pagans of Rome (2011) persuasively argues against 
the picture of elite Roman pagans acting in resistance to christianization as symbolized in 
Symacchus’s famous Altar of Victory and the Battle of the Frigidus.648 That said, his 
argument works best when confined to the West. In The End of Ancient Christianity 
(1990), Robert Markus considers the “Christianities” of the West in North Africa, Gaul, 
and Italy under that assumption that the boundary between Christianity and other spheres 
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of activity is not fixed nor are Christianity’s constituent beliefs and practices universal. 
He advances the notion of “de-secularization” to describe how Christianity appropriated 
previously non-religious spheres of activity into its scope.649 More concerned with 
attitudes about classical cultural elements that continued to be part of the life and mind of 
late antique peoples, Markus points to the Gallo-Roman poetry of Ausonius which 
displays an easy blend of motifs from classical culture and Christian ideology. While he 
and his pupil Paulinus shared the imaginative landscape of paideia, Paulinus eventually 
renounced his wealth and status to follow “authentic” Christianity through ascetic 
practice, a choice Ausonius, like so many other late Roman Christians, found simply 
unnecessary. They each drew the “map” of what constituted Christianity differently.  
 In “Christianization, Secularization, and the Transformation of Public Life” 
(2009), Richard Lim looks at Markus’ process in reverse. In a society where notions of 
the sacred infused all spheres of activity, it was not until early Christianity becomes a 
threat to classical culture that certain select practices, like participating in sacrifices and 
imperial cult, became “religious” while other practices rooted in traditional culture 
avoided that categorization.650 Lim argues that one of the ways Christianity reshaped 
Graeco-Roman culture and society was through the construction of the sphere of the 
saeculum. Public spectacles such as the munera and ludi, though demonized by some, 
were relegated to the saeculum which became an “autonomous discursive space” for 
classical culture where it was protected from Christianization, yet transformed in its 
accommodation. The ludi and munera were desacralized and then secularized. In 
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Barton’s view, this “secularization” might be seen as an alternative, unauthorized (in the 
minds of the normative Church Fathers, at any rate) sacralization. Lim cites Stark and 
Bainbridge's study of the cycle of desacralization and resacralization in modernity, a 
work inspired by Weber's notion of disenchantment as a feature of modernity.651  In 
Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianization of the Roman World (1995), 
Brown attempts to highlight the cultural and ideological bricolage between traditional 
and Christian thought and practice that, especially in the Western limes, constituted a 
”Middle Ground.”652 Brown cautions against privileging the Christian Church as the 
“principal agent in the diffusion of a more adaptable form of classical culture.” 
Understanding Christianization as a Geertzian “cultural system” that included vibrant and 
conservative non-religious institutions and traditions while considering how hybridity 
and fluid identities functioned, particularly in the periphery, moves us forward in 
identifying the nuances of contested sacralizations and secularizations. Taking such a 
view offers an apotropaic against reverting to a dichotomous “survival versus triumph” 
model of social change in late antiquity. Nevertheless, it is heartening, I think, for those 
of us who, when stumbling upon a celebration of kalendae ianuarii, might find some 
comfort in “continuity over time” once in a while.  
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